Cost-effective allocation of public funding to promote the commercialization of renewable energy technology by Culver, Lauren C. (Lauren Claire)
Cost-Effective Allocation of Public Funding
to Promote the Commercialization of Renewable Energy Technology
by
Lauren C. Culver
B.S. Materials Science and Engineering
University of Florida, 2007
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
JUN 3 0 209
LIBRARIES
SUBMITTED TO THE ENGINEERING SYSTEMS DIVISION AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF CIVIL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREES OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY
AND
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN CIVIL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
JUNE 2009
©2009 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
All rights reserved.
Signature of Author:
ARCHIVES
W Technology and Policy Program, Engineering Systems Division
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
May 14, 2009
Certified by: -
Morton and
Certified by:
Accepted by:
David H. Marks
Claire Goulder Family Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
/ / , and Engineering Systems
Thesis Supervisor
John D. Sterman
Jay W. Forrester Professor of Management and Engineering Systems
Thesis Supervisor
SDaniele Veneziano
Chairman, Departmental Committee for Graduate Students
Accepted by:
Dava J. Newman
Professor of Aerondutics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
Director, Technology and Policy Program

Cost-Effective Allocation of Public Funding
to Promote the Commercialization of Renewable Energy Technology
by
Lauren Claire Culver
Submitted to the Engineering Systems Division and the Department of Civil and
Environmental Engineering on May 14, 2009 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degrees of Master of Science in Technology and Policy and Master of Science in Civil
and Environmental Engineering
Abstract
The need for new Renewable Energy Technologies (RETs) is growing with the
challenge of providing affordable electricity under increasing environmental and public
health constraints while promoting energy security and improved energy access.
Governments have chosen to intervene in the commercialization process to overcome market
failures that distort private investment in new technologies to ensure the provision of these
technologies. Both technology-push and demand-pull policies are necessary to accelerate
commercialization of renewable energy technologies, but the optimal balance of these
strategies is not understood.
This thesis investigates the most cost-effective allocation of public funding, provided
through a portfolio of commercialization policies, to ensure technologies bridge the valley of
death. Case studies of photovoltaic technology promotion in the United States, Germany, and
Japan provide examples of commercialization policy portfolios with varied results. Distilling
the key funding flows and the resulting technology, product, and market development from
the historical data provides a basis for a system dynamics model that simulates a firm
commercializing a single technology from research and development through deployment.
Different policy portfolios are tested to determine the most cost-effective distribution of
commercialization support. The Japanese example suggests providing balanced support
throughout research and development, demonstration, and deployment is more cost-effective
than the either the US research-focused approach or the German market stimulation strategy.
Similarly, the simulation model shows that providing funding through all phases of
commercialization is more cost-effective than an unbalanced strategy that relies
predominately on technology-push or market-pull strategies.
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1 Introduction
Society faces growing challenges associated with the provision of electricity. These
challenges stem from new constraints such as avoiding climate change, assuring energy
security and dual goals such as increasing electricity access and maintaining air quality for
public health. By introducing new renewable energy technologies (RETs) and
commercializing them for widespread use, electricity can continue to fuel economic growth
without damaging security, health, or the environment. Unfortunately, commercialization of
RETs is slow and uncertain. Due to a number of market failures the private sector does not
invest the economically optimal amount in the development of RETs (Arrow, 1962; Arrow,
2007, Jaffe et. al, 2005). When the government withdraws public funding and the private
sector is not yet ready to invest, many technologies remain undeveloped in the valley of death
(PCAST, 1997). Although commercialization is typically viewed as the responsibility of the
private sector, the importance of providing these technologies suggests a need for public
intervention. Accordingly, governments have responded with policy to promote the
commercialization of RETs by advancing cost reductions, technological improvements, and
technological innovations.
Current policies are often insufficient to ensure commercialization (Murphy &
Edwards, 2003). RETs that do not obtain enough support lay dormant in what is referred to
as the "valley of death" (Branscomb & Auerswald, 2002). The most cost-effective allocation
of public funding to bridge this valley of death, through government policy, remains unclear.
This thesis will make recommendations on how governments should allocate their limited
funding to the breadth of commercialization policies through a comparative case study
analysis of commercialization policy and a system dynamics simulation model to compare
different public policy strategies. Specifically, I will argue that the most cost-effective
portfolio provides balanced funding via policies throughout the process of commercialization:
technology development, product development, and market development. A strategy that
provides consistent, long-term funding will most effectively manage technology development
and induce private sector investment to carry out the critical, later phases of
commercialization.
Historically, support for RETs has come in the form of research and development
(R&D) funding and market stimulation. Research and development has the potential to
deliver revolutionary technological innovations that have higher performance or are
fundamentally lower in cost. Either of these outcomes will lower the overall cost that
determines how competitive a new technology can be with incumbent energy technologies.
A country that focuses on R&D will achieve a broad technology array that will allow future
deployment of the technology in markets with differing technical needs and costs. In
addition to a significant amount of installed capacity, deployment support through market
stimulation induces learning and economies of scale, which can also increase performance or
lead to lower costs (Isoard & Soria, 2001). A market provides the opportunity to test a
technology and reveal areas for improvement that can lead to incremental innovations that are
likely to further contribute to cost reductions, which reinforce adoption.
Both R&D and market stimulation have a definite but narrow impact on the overall
commercialization process. There is a clear tradeoff between emphasis on R&D and
emphasis on deployment. The strategy determines the future technology profile, the future
installed capacity, and the overall technology cost. Although R&D provides a diverse set of
technologies for the future, the lack of deployment hinders product development and industry
creation. Market stimulation policy will drive installations of the currently prevailing
technology, but may not stimulate technological breakthroughs.
Technology-push working with market-pull is critical for commercialization (Mowery
& Rosenberg, 1979; Norberg-Bohm 2000, 1999; Lund, 2007). Experience shows that weak
market stimulation strategies or no demand stimulation risks wasting the public R&D monies
spent on RETs (Loiter & Norberg-Bohm, 1999). Market incentives alone are too slow to
induce the innovation needed to bring about new technologies (Bonvillian, 2009c). However,
even when both policies are employed together, commercialization is uncertain in part
because there is insufficient understanding of innovation in the commercialization process
(Holdren, 2008). Complementary policies are not effective unless they are woven together to
ensure that the effect of one smoothly transitions to the influence of the other (Lund, 2006).
Poor understanding of the feedbacks between various stages and the blurry boundaries
between phases complicates policymaking (Holdren, 2008). For example, both R&D and
market stimulation policies only peripherally address product development, so the use of an
additional policy can better induce the necessary change. Some countries have introduced an
intermediate demonstration phase to improve the transition from publicly funded technology
development to privately sponsored deployment (Rothwell, 1994).
The portfolio of commercialization policy reflected in the budgets allocated to each
phase has significant impacts on the process of commercialization. Currently the debate is
limited to "How much R&D money is required?" or "What size subsidy is best?" Both are
very important questions, but little is being done to address what is the best balance between
the two. Understanding the proper balance between policies that affect commercialization in
each development stage is critical.
Through a combination of historical data and simulation this thesis seeks to illuminate
the proper balance between potential policies by providing evidence suggesting the most
cost-effective policy portfolio solutions. I will use (1) case studies to survey the breadth of
policies that have been used and determine a rough estimate of cost-effectiveness of the
strategies coupled with (2) a system dynamics model that will provide a more generic
understanding of the cost-effectiveness of public support through the stages of technology
transformation. The case studies specifically evaluate key policies used to support
photovoltaics in the United States, Germany, and Japan and the effects of these policies on
stakeholders and outcomes related to the technology to be commercialized. A system
dynamics simulation model that eliminates the country specific attributes of policy and
models the overall funding scheme is used to evaluate the effect and cost of various policy
portfolios.
To achieve the end goals of mitigating climate change, providing widespread
electricity access, and improving air quality, technologies need to be deployed rapidly to
achieve scale and to reduce costs. However, deployment now cannot come at the expense of
developing technologies that will be necessary for the future. The case studies show an over-
emphasis on R&D may lead to stunted deployment, which diminishes the cost reductions that
can be achieved from economies of scale or learning. An overemphasis on market
stimulation, may limit diversity and the long-term potential of breakthrough technologies.
By examining the impacts of various policy regimes, we show that a singular emphasis falls
short of the goal while a balanced approach achieves both short-term and long-term goals at
the lowest cost.
Chapter 2 provides background in commercialization and motivations for government
intervention. Chapter 3 describes the cash flow "valley of death" facing new technologies
during commercialization. Chapter 4 presents a comparative case study analysis of
photovoltaic commercialization support. Chapter 5 presents the system dynamics model and
results. The final chapter concludes that a strategy that balances funding through technology
development, product development, and market development is the most cost-effective
portfolio of commercialization policies because it provides financial support during the
transformation and induces private investment.
2 Commercialization and Government Intervention
Commercialization is a complex process through which consumers gain access to new
technologies through developing and deploying a new technology (Grubler et al., 1999). In
practice the necessary innovations arise through research, development, demonstration, and
deployment. Energy research often begins with breakthroughs in the basic sciences of
chemistry, physics, and materials science. The research phase gives birth to new
technologies that apply new scientific understanding or generate improvements in existing
technologies because of better understanding of scientific systems. Development furthers the
invention by applying it to a narrow technology and expanding the manufacturing and other
processing techniques for the technology. The development stage furthers the embodiment of
the invention in a more manufacturable form and begins to bring the cost down.
Demonstration is a stage often overlooked, but increasingly recognized for its importance in
exposing the operational weaknesses of the technology (IEA, 2008a pp. 172). During
demonstration, pilot plants are constructed and small installations are built to confirm that the
technologies work together properly to deliver the expected benefit. When sponsored by the
government, demonstration provides a financial stimulus through project cost sharing and
promotes the exchange of information that can improve the product and reduce the perceived
risks involved with the manufacture and installation of a technology. Deployment begins with
the initial introduction of a new technology and continues until the market is self-sufficient.
Initially the technology may be restricted to a niche market, but as production expands,
economies of scale are achieved, learning by the engineers occurs, and consumers provide
feedback to improve the product. These cost reductions, technology improvements, and
product improvements help drive the product into larger markets.
Part of the challenge of influencing commercialization is the difficulty in defining a
useful metric (Gallagher et al., 2006). Each country depending on their R&D efforts or RET
deployment efforts may view the success differently, but generally commercialization can be
evaluated through its inputs and results (Gallagher et al., 2006). Both public and private
R&D investments are relevant inputs to commercialization. Private R&D investment data is
challenging to access because much of the information is proprietary (Gallagher, 2006;
Margolis, 2002; Nemet, 2006). Public R&D information is easier to access, but is difficult to
identify because R&D that contributes to innovation is a combination of applied energy
R&D, energy science R&D, and basic science R&D. Outcome metrics relevant to
commercialization describe the development of new technology (ex. number of patents), the
market penetration (ex. cumulative installed capacity), and the industry strength (ex.
production, number of firms). All of these metrics reveal an aspect of the commercialization
process, but none absolutely indicate commercialization success.
Commercialization occurs spontaneously so it is commonly held that government
should leave commercialization to the private sector. The private sector is well positioned to
make decisions about what investments will be profitable because of their acute
understanding of the market (Kammen & Margolis 1999). Additionally, it is often argued
that the government plays a detrimental role in commercialization by "picking winners"
(Roessner, 1984; Nelson, 1982 pp. 469-470). Despite these beliefs, governments have opted
to intervene in the commercialization of RETs (IEA, 2008a pp. 178).
Government intervention in commercialization is often justified as an attempt to
correct market failures (Jaffe et al., 2005). There are two commonly understood market
failures implicated in the under-provision of RETs. First, R&D into RETs is under provided
by the private sector because of the positive spillover externality associated with innovation.
Firms investing in R&D are likely to produce innovations that cannot be entirely appropriated
to the firm. Competing firms are then likely to benefit from the innovation without
contributing to the development cost (Mowery & Ziedonis, 2001). This knowledge spillover
discourages firms from investing in R&D.
The second market failure that causes the under provision of RET is the negative
externalities associated with traditional energy sources. Traditional energy sources have
environmental, public health, and energy security costs that are not levied on the producers
because there is no established market for those impacts (Tietenburg, 2006). The price of this
traditional energy is lower that what it would be at an economically efficient level. Until the
negative externalities, especially the health and environmental costs, are applied to traditional
energy conversion technologies, RET will have a difficult time entering the energy supply
market (Awerbuch, 2000). This is particularly true because energy is typically considered a
commodity good. To most consumers there is no differentiation between an electron
produced by coal plant and one produced by a wind turbine, although there has been limited
success offering green power to cater to those who will pay a premium for electricity
generated from renewable sources (Bird & Sweezy, 2005). In general,, this market combined
with high entry costs and capital investment costs and a rigid, established infrastructure is not
obviously appealing for investment (SET-Plan, 2007).
There are several options for government intervention to counteract the described
market failures. Most commonly, R&D funding and market incentives are used'. Research
and development programs act as a wellspring of new technologies and drive down costs of
existing technologies. These new technologies by their sheer merit tend to push themselves
into the market. Although public funding for R&D in energy technologies overall has fallen
almost 50% since its peak in the 1980s, nominal funding for RET has remained relatively
constant, but overall a small fraction of total energy R&D (IEA, 2008a pp. 172). Funding for
Details of structuring energy R&D policy are provided in the Appendix.
energy R&D worldwide is suboptimal (IPCC 2007). According to Davis & Owens (2003),
R&D funding of RETs in the US is one quarter of what is optimal to protect against
uncertainty in the energy sector. The Stern (2006) report recommends a doubling in energy
R&D. Others recommend increases as great as 3 to 10 times current levels (Nemet &
Kammen, 2007). Market stimulation policies take a variety of forms2. Direct incentives
include renewable portfolio standards, procurement policies, and building obligations.
Indirect incentives include feed-in tariffs, tax credits and subsidies. These direct and indirect
incentives stimulate demand in the product that will pull technologies through development
to satisfy customer needs.
In the past decade it has been recognized that both a technology-push policy and a
market-pull policy are necessary, but not sufficient for advancing commercialization of new
technologies (Dosi, 1982; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1979). The key to successful
commercialization is having many technologies in the pipeline and then subjecting them to
several consistent policies to reduce their cost. The effect of a portfolio of
commercialization policies can impact the technology transformation synergistically as
shown in Figure 2.1.
2 A more detailed explanation of the market stimulation policies is provided in the Appendix.
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3 The "Valley of Death"
Despite the implementation of technology-push and demand-pull policies many RETs
are not being commercialized quickly enough to become significant players in addressing
current energy challenges. Murphy & Edwards (2003) attribute this to an unsuccessful
transition from public support during R&D to private support in the market. The failure or
delay in commercialization is often attributed to the "valley of death." Energy technologies
are particularly susceptible to the valley of death because of the long lead times and the need
for considerable technology and manufacturing technology development required to
successfully commercialize the invention (Norberg-Bohm, 2002).
It is most accurate to frame the valley of death as the cash flow valley of death as
shown in Figure 3.1. The curve represents the total cash flow of the firm over time. Initially
cash levels are high as the government is funding high-risk technology development. As the
technology moves closer to commercialization government funding begins to decline. Cash
flows are significantly low for a time until private investment is secured. Early stage private
investment, like venture capital and angel investments, is not widely available (Gompers &
Lerner, 2001). Over time, as the firm begins to become profitable, the cash flow begins to rise
and venture capitalists exit as the firm can be supported through more traditional private
capital (Moore, 1999; Roberts, et. al, 2000).
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Figure 3.1 Cash flow valley of death (Murphy & Edwards, 2003)
It is also important to understand the cash flow valley of death in terms 
of risk and
development. The private sector is influenced by risk; government 
support of the
development of the technology, product, and market can reduce this 
risk. As shown in
Figure 3.2, having sufficient cash provides opportunity for technology transformation, 
which
reduces risk and leads to outside investment.
Technology
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Figure 3.2 Valley of death can be explained through a variety of lenses 
because of a
reinforcing connection
Solutions for the valley of death require the entire portfolio of RDY policies 
to align
with the private sector to induce investment (IEA, 2008a pp. 169). This is challenging
because the public and private sectors have different perspectives. The 
public sector is
interested in the development of technological innovations and, thus, focuses 
on technology
performance and cost reductions primarily in the early, high-risk stages (Murphy & Edwards,
2003). Private investors, on the other hand, are not attached to a particular technology, but
are instead interested in products and large markets to satisfy their underlying need for profit
(Murphy et. al, 2002). The market can be pushed by the technology or driven by customer
need as long as the potential payoff of the market is sufficient to warrant the risk involved in
the initial investment, according to venture capitalist H. Anderson (personal communication,
February 24, 2009).
The academic literature suggests three general approaches to overcoming the valley of
death, shown in Figure 3.3, including (1) managing risk, (2) encouraging a transition from
technology development to product development, and (3) fostering cooperation of the public
and private sectors (Murphy & Edwards, 2003; Goldman et al., 2005; lEA, 2008a).
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Figure 3.3 Managing risk, accelerating the shift the product development, and public-
private partnerships can help to overcome the valley of death
The first approach requires the public sector to reduce risks stifling RET firms.
Government sponsored research and technology development reduces technology risk, and
setting a framework for a stable, robust market reduces market risk (deJager & Rathmann,
2008). A second approach is to ensure that some product development has occurred prior to
private sector involvement by reinforcing existing development and demonstration policies
(Murphy & Edwards, 2003). An accelerated shift from a technology focus to a market focus
can be fostered by changing public funding assessments to include an element of product
development so that government funds and the private sector rewards the same companies
(Murphy & Edwards, 2003). Finally, the two sectors can work together through co-
investment partnerships to contribute uniquely to technology development and to reduce risk
by reducing information asymmetries (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). By facilitating early action
between technologists and investors, governments increase the chance that new technologies
will be properly positioned to acquire the necessary capital and the private sector can tap a
revenue stream that was previously not accessed.
4 Case Studies
Introduction
The main findings of comparative country-case studies are used to explore real
practices of various countries' response to commercialization. To provide sufficient depth,
the case studies focus on the development of solar photovoltaics (PV). The first modern
photovoltaic research began in 1954 at Bell Labs and continues all over the world. Following
the surge in RET development after the first oil shocks of the 1970s, many countries began
pursuing photovoltaic technology more intensely. Figure 4.1 shows the increases in PV
champion-cell efficiency over time and highlights the differences in technology.
Figure 4.1 The increase of PV cell efficiencies by technology from 1975-2005
(Kazmerski, 2005)
Photovoltaics, as a family, are currently in different stages of the commercialization
process. Figure 4.2 below shows a clear distinction between the generations of technologies
determined by the production cost of the technology and the power efficiency of the device.
First generation photovoltaics are made of single crystal or multi-crystalline wafers. The
efficiency of such cells is limited by the Shockley-Quisser limit. As shown in Figure 4.2,
second generation cells are also limited by this physical phenomenon. However, the
materials used allow high-throughput, low-material production methods, which significantly
lowered the cost per square meter. The third generation of technologies will likely
incorporate nanomaterials or new light capturing techniques. There are two potential
strategies that could succeed as third generation PV. The first is sacrificing high conversion
efficiencies for extremely low cost production methods, high throughput, and minimal
material cost. These technologies may include organic photovoltaics, dye solar cells, or
quantum dot solar cells. Another third generation strategy is to develop cells that can
overcome the Shockley-Quisser limit. Production costs may be considerable, but much less
area would be needed to produce the same amount of electricity. Potential technologies
include quantum wells, tandem structures, and multiple exciton generation. Firms attempting
to commercialize potentially third generation PV technologies have received some initial
private funding (Wesoff, 2008).
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Figure 4.2 PV generations distinguished by cost per Watt (UNSW, 2008)
The future market of PV technologies is likely to have a mixed composition with a
few dominant technologies, much like "batteries and bicycles", according to US DOE
photovoltaic expert S. Stephens (personal communication, March 23, 2009). But for now,
the world production of photovoltaics is more than 85% first generation. Each technology
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generation projects cost reductions in the future. A major source of cost reductions will come
from technology solutions such as an increase in efficiency or cheaper manufacturing, but
other gains may be made in product features related to installation and balance of system
costs.
The United States, Germany, and Japan have implemented a variety of photovoltaic
commercialization policies and have emerged as leaders in the industry3. The expenditures
and outcomes of each country's policies provide information about the cost-effectiveness of
each approach4 .
Policies and Expenditures
The US, Germany, and Japan began their support of PV technology in the early
1970s. Since that time all three countries have continued some form of support, but have
developed distinctly different policy frameworks. Important policies in each country are
shown below in Figure 4.3.
3 Several other countries could be pursued in the future. At first glance, lessons from other countries reinforce
the lessons from the US, Germany, and Japan3.
4 A detailed summary of support in the US, Germany, and Japan is provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 4.3 Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment activities in the United States, Germany, and Japan (PVPS
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The US began its PV R&D program in 1973, and picked up speed with the Solar
Photovoltaic Research and Development Act of 1978. In the 1990s the US initiated two cost-
shared, public-private R&D partnerships between what is now the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL) and small and large firms developing photovoltaic technology:
the Photovoltaic Manufacturing Technology project (PVMaT) and the Thin Film Partnership
Program (TFPP). Both programs were well-structured public-private partnerships that
divided risk through cost sharing, increased information flows, and increased the knowledge
in academia, national labs, and the private sector. Public support in these partnerships
leveraged private investment in R&D when outside or internal funding was otherwise hard to
obtain. Overall the programs sped up the pace of development and encouraged more private
investment into R&D (Margolis, 2002). In 2005, the Energy Policy Act introduced a 30
%investment tax credit for PV system that has since been modified to make it more
accessible. In the face of dismal domestic demand, the success of the US R&D projects is in
part due to the international market created through Germany and Japan's subsidy programs.
The German PV program began with a heavy emphasis on R&D following the oil
crisis of 1973. Cultural support for increasing the use of renewable energy led to the
Thousand Solar Rooftops Program. The demonstration program offered subsidies for the
purchase and installation of a PV system in return for participation in a five-year monitoring
project. The success of this demonstration led to a larger Hundred Thousand Solar Rooftops
Program and a Renewable Energy Law (EEG). The EEG raised the existing feed-in tariff
(FIT) to an attractive level and created a stable environment to assure investors of the
continuity of the market. The FIT, which is complemented by low-interest loans, has resulted
in a large base of distributed, grid-connected PV installations.
Japanese funding for PV R&D began with the Sunshine Project in 1974 and has
continued since that time. From 1994 through 1997 in exchange for participating in a
monitoring program, residents or public facilities were eligible for a subsidy covering half of
the cost of installing a PV system. Using a public-private partnership scheme, the Ministry of
Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) ran a Field Test Project on New PV Power Generation
Systems for Industrial and Other Applications from 1998 through 2003. The project served
to prove the efficacy of PV systems and to standardize the technologies for future,
widespread deployment. The Field Test programs have been greatly expanded in number and
in budget in recent years. Japan has several subsidy programs for different sets of consumers,
the most successful of which was the Subsidy Program for Residential PV Power Generation
Systems that ran from 1997-2005 and will be reinstated in 2009.
Examining only the rhetoric behind each country's policy portfolio, each country
performs activities from R&D through market stimulation. However, from examination of
the budgets, shown in Figure 4.4, it is evident that each country has a different policy
emphasis. Research and development, which includes work on cells, modules, inverters,
building integration, and system development, has been the focus of US spending. Germany
has spent the vast majority of its money on market stimulation in the form of a feed-in tariff
to remunerate electricity production from photovoltaic systems. Japan is notable because it is
the only country with a sizeable demonstration expenditure. The Japanese emphasis on
demonstration is consistent with the historical cooperation between the government and large
corporations to undertake industrial development (Bonvillian, 2009b). The cost of the PV
promotion program in Japan has been fairly stable. For example, in 2005 the funding level
was the same as it was in 1994, however, the annual installation increased from 1860kW to
130 MW (PV Upscale, 2006).
Figure 4.4 Federal budgets in the United States, Germany, and Japan (PVPS Annual
Trends, 2003-2007)
From the policy and budget description it is reasonable to generalize the US policy as
supply-push, the German policy as demand-pull, and the Japanese policy as a combination of
the two with the addition of demonstration. The outcomes resulting from these historical
budgets reveal how each policy strategy shaped the overall process of commercialization in
each country. Trends in deployment, industry, technology development, and costs provide
insight into the overall commercialization goal.
Installations
Deployment of a technology is an important step in the commercialization process
because it yields incremental improvements in the product and technology and reduces unit
costs at scale. The case studies suggest that as long as there is a pull from a market that is
stable, transparent, long-term, and technology specific with minimal administrative and other
non-economic barriers working contrary to market stimulation that the pull is sufficient to
fuel commercialization (Watanabe et al, 2000; Watson, 2008; Loiter & Norberg-Bohm,
1999).
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As shown in Figure 4.5, Germany dominates annual and cumulative installation. The
annual installation rate increased dramatically in response to the FIT restructuring in 2004.
The German incentive delivers guaranteed annual payment for generation as compared to the
US tax credit and the Japanese capacity subsidy. Through the combination of a growing
German market and a stagnating Japanese market, Germany overtook Japan in 2005 as the
leader. Annual installation began declining in Japan in 2005 at the conclusion of the
residential subsidy program. While in effect, the Japanese subsidy was successful because
grid parity could be achieved through the high cost of grid electricity and the subsidy
payment. Installations in the US have been slowly increasing, though concentrated in regions
with high electricity prices and suitable state or local subsidies to complement the more
meager federal subsidy.
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Figure 4.5 Annual and cumulative installed capacity between 1996 and 2007 (PVPS
Annual Trends, 2007)
Judged only by installation success, the German strategy, although expensive, is
clearly the most effective. However, installation only captures well-constructed deployment
policies, and cannot definitively recommend a commercialization portfolio. Installation
success ignores the effectiveness of the strategy to generate new technologies or develop
industry. Much of the installed capacity in Germany is first generation technology and many
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of the installed modules are imported from other parts of the world. Because of the long
lifetime of photovoltaic technologies installation of one generation can dampen installation of
the newer improved technology. Manufacturing cannot be easily converted to produce
another technology so foreign competitors could overshadow the domestic industry by
providing these advanced technologies. Despite Germany's overall dominance in annual
installations, Figure 4.6 reveals that Japan's commercialization policy has actually been more
cost-effective. For each dollar spent Japan has been able to install as much as twice the
amount of capacity. Considering the superior solar resource in Japan, electricity generation
in Japan per installed MW is also higher than in Germany. Figure 4.6, which includes both
state and federal US market incentives, demonstrates little about the cost-effectiveness of the
US portfolio because much of the installation has occurred in a few states with extensive
incentives applied in addition to the federal tax credit. However, excluding state support
leads to a false conclusion that the US policy is efficient (Ricaud, 2000).
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Figure 4.6 Annual installations per annual policy portfolio expenditure provides some
indication of cost-effectiveness (PVPS Annual Trends, 2003-2007)
The German FIT approach is considerably more expensive than the Japanese subsidy
approach (PV Upscale, 2006 pp. 33) especially considering that the payments from FITs will
continue to accrue for the next 20 years. However, is difficult to directly infer that the
German program is wasteful because the price of electricity in Germany is not as high as in
Japan so it requires more incentives to compete with grid electricity.
Production
A commercialization policy can also be judged by its ability to stimulate industry.
Table 4.1 shows that of the top 16 firms worldwide three are American, three are German,
and four are Japanese firms. Overall, production in Germany has increased dramatically5 .
Production in Japan has also increased, although it slowed in 2006 and 2007. Changes in US
production have been steady but modest. Figure 4.7 shows that out of almost 4500 MW of
production worldwide in 2007 the US produced almost 300 MW and Germany and Japan
each produced more than 900 MW.
Table 4.1 Top 16 cell producers in 2007 (Hirshman et al., 2008)
Company
Q-cells
Sharp
Suntech
Kyocera
First Solar
Motech
SolarWorld
Sanyo
Yingli
JA Solar
Mitsubishi Electric
BP Solar
SunPower
Ningbo
Isofoton
Schott
2007 Cell
Production (MW)
389.2
363
336
307
200
176.4
170
165
145.5
132.4
121
101.6
100
100
87
84
5 The Appendix contains information on the evolution of production in the top firms of each country.
6 SolarWorld also has a strong presence in the US.
7 BP solar also has a strong presence in Germany, Spain, India, and Australia.
8 Schott also has a strong presence in the US.
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Figure 4.7 Annual production by region in 2007 (Hirshman et al., 2008)
Diversity
Although large installation rates and a growing industry are signs of successful
commercialization policy, they focus on present time success and can ignore future
technology developments. Commercialization policy must continue to bring forth new
technologies from the progress of R&D. A highly successful policy will therefore result in
the production of different technologies. Figure 4.8 shows the composition of production in
the US, Germany, and Japan compared to the global composition. Roughly 90% of the
production in Germany and Japan is first generation compared to a global average of 84%. It
is apparent that production in the US is much smaller in absolute terms, but 64% of
production is from new second generation technology suggesting the US is poised for future
improvements in cost effectiveness and scale.
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Looking even further into the future, the US is already leading in third generation
technology. In the last few years, venture capitalists have begun funding new technologies
that show promise of evolving into a commercializable third generation PV 9. In the US more
than a dozen such companies have received funding. In Japan a few corporations have begun
to pursue development of third generation technologies, namely dye solar cells. In Germany,
a single small molecule photovoltaic developer has received private investment (Wesoff,
2008). Figure 4.9 shows the number and proportions of firms pursuing each type of PV
technology.
9 Firms funded in each country are listed in the Appendix.
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Figure 4.9 Number of firms commercializing different generations of technologies
(Hirshman et al., 2008; Wesoff, 2008)
The industry that resulted from each country's commercialization path clearly relates
to the portfolio of policies employed in each country. The US boasts a diverse set of
technologies birthed from R&D programs, but US deployment lags, especially considering
the US's size and comparatively superior solar resource. The German industry emerged in
response to the promising domestic market and a manufacturing investment tax credit used to
keep the industry within the country. The strong demand created by the FIT required rapid
production and installation, which favors the more familiar first generation technology.
Because of the long-term nature of the FIT, the installation frenzy continues. The opportunity
to extract large margins by producing a lower cost cell has encouraged a number of second-
generation firms that are slowly increasing their production capabilities.
The Japanese focus on transitioning from R&D to deployment through demonstration
programs and their focus on industrial R&D, including the large electronics manufacturers
has led to a few large firms. These firms are continuing to focus on the crystalline silicon
cells, but like in Germany, there is some activity in second generation technologies and
increasing interest in third generation PV in industry labs.
Cost Reduction
Despite considerable progress in the areas of PV deployment, the PV industry, and
new technologies, commercialization will only be truly successful after the technology has
become widely adopted. Widespread acceptance will be the result of an attractive product
offered at a suitable cost that is at or near grid parity. Research and development can reduce
costs through technological breakthroughs or more incremental improvements or by
increasing cell efficiency. The efficiency of a technology is a very powerful cost lever. With
the same factory throughput an increase in efficiency would increase the number of MW
produced each year. We see this to be the case in Figure 4.10, where initially the cost is very
high, but through decades of R&D the costs are reduced. A log-log plot of cumulative
production and cost in Figure 4.11 shows two regimes. In addition to cost reductions from
R&D, cost reductions also arise as production increases through a phenomenon called
learning (Arrow, 1962). Learning which began as strictly the cost reductions that arose from
repeating the same activity repeatedly has now been extended to include several different
mechanisms of cost reduction that occur during production and deployment (Sagar & van der
Zwaan, 2006). Learning can lower the cost of manufacturing, installation, operation, and
maintenance (Sagar & van der Zwaan, 2006). A two-factor learning rate can be used to
describe the inclusion of the effect of learning-by-searching associated with R&D with the
more traditional, learning-by-doing (Berglund & Soderholm, 2006). Research and
development decreases module costs, while deployment can reduce both the module and
non-module costs.
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Figure 4.10 Evolution of cost reductions and annual production for crystalline silicon
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Figure 4.11 Photovoltaic technology learning curve (Prometheus Institute, 2007; Rogol
et al., 2008)10
Installed prices, of concern to the consumer, can also be decreased through
deployment. A denser market and practiced installers, electricians, and buildings inspectors
reduces many of the installation costs. Accordingly, we would expect the non-module prices
in Germany and Japan to be lower than in the US. As we see in Figure 4.12, the US does
have historically higher non-module prices. High non-module costs in an emerging market
10 Departure from the curve at high capacity may be due to a silicon shortage in 2005-2007.
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were confirmed by PV Upscale (2006) in an analysis of Spain. In a geographically dispersed
market the electrician may spend most of his time driving and will get fewer projects done in
a day requiring him to charge more for each project. The number of site visits decrease as
there are fewer iterations between the installers and building inspectors, according to solar
industry expert C. Jones (personal communication, January 15, 2009).
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Figure 4.12 Reductions in per Watt module and non-module prices from 1993-2007
(PVPS Trends, 2007)
Using historical price information there is no way to see the exact cost difference
because of profit margins. In Farber's (2006) analysis of installed costs in Germany and the
US he finds that overall system cost in Germany is two thirds that in the US. In the US costs
of monitoring and installation are roughly equal to the combined cost of modules, inverters,
and other Balance of System (BOS) costs. Although the weighted average module cost in
Germany is higher because of only 10% thin film technologies (compared to 64% in the US),
the reductions in non-module costs are dramatic.
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Figure 4.13 Illustration of cost breakdown of installed cost in Germany and the United
States (Farber, 2006)
Conclusions
No one country excels along the entire innovation chain; countries tend to have a
single, dominant policy focus. Each policy concentration can be related to a narrow impact
on photovoltaic commercialization. The result of significant federal R&D funding in the US
is a variety of technologies vying for dominance. The diversity of options coupled with a
strong tradition of venture capitalism has resulted in the birth of many startups. Germany's
heavy market stimulation has resulted in unrivaled cumulative installation that is dominated
by first generation technology installations. Japan, before 2005, had the largest diversity of
policies along the commercialization path, and provides an example of a balanced
implementation of both supply-push and demand-pull policies. Japan's New Sunshine
Program contained elements of R&D, industry collaboration, and market creation (Watanabe,
1995). Overall, Japan has been the most efficient in deployment (PV Upscale, 2006) and has
had a more cost-effective portfolio than either the US or Germany. By actively funding the
demonstration of new technologies they have improved the technology and ensured the
technology is suitable to use in the larger market. Firms know there are gains to be obtained
from market learning, but the initial cost of demonstration is often preventatively high.
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Industry may perceive the initial costs of market learning are too expensive and too risky. In
these situations a government supported deployment program can encourage private
investment and initiate the learning cycle for the entire industry (Virdis, Wene & Nilsson,
2003 pp. 42). Although some may argue that it is not the public sector's responsibility to
assist a technology so far down the commercialization path, ending public funding before
private funding is sufficient increases the risk that R&D money already invested will lay
fallow. Reluctance to invest in the demonstration required to tune a product and begin
market development is similar to the underinvestment in R&D and may suggest reasons for
government intervention. When financing is hard to come by, the government should more
actively induce private investment by sharing in the risks of technology verification, product
development, and market entry.
Japanese demonstration programs are stable, comprehensive programs rather than
singular events as has been the case with demonstration projects conducted in European
countries and the US. This structure leads to more productive industry and investor
participation. Industry involvement, which has historically been accomplished through
public-private partnerships, provides industry with a better knowledge of the state of the
technology and an understanding of the direction of the market. Through this cooperation
technologies will evolve more quickly because of more commitments to riskier, long-term
projects.
Policies that relate to the neglected product development phase like demonstration
should be more widely pursued. By extending public funding later in the commercialization
process to support these policies private investment occurs earlier. As can be seen in Figure
4.14 this increase in funding from both sides fills in the valley of death.
Figure 4.14 More public funding of technology development and product development
induces greater private funding (Adapted from Murphy & Edwards, 2003)
PV commercialization and progress to achieving a cost goal in the near future would
be much improved if all policies were consistent and working in unison at each point of the
commercialization path. Although technology-push and market-pull are sufficient to
commercialize a technology, demonstration can reduce the friction in transition. As
suggested in the literature solutions to the valley of death successful policies reduce risk
through consistent support, incorporate early stakeholder involvement in technology
transformation and cost reduction, and encourage product development.
5 Clean Venture Simulation Model
Understanding how a single policy may affect the complex commercialization process
can be challenging because the specific impact and interaction of various policies is
unobvious. I will employ a system dynamics simulation model to develop a better
understanding of how flows of funding support the entire commercialization process, and
how development of the technology, product, and market enhance each other. System
dynamics is a computer simulation method that models conceptual interactions and clarifies
feedbacks of complex systems (Sterman, 2000). By developing a model and testing different
policy conditions, we can make recommendations on the most cost-effective policy portfolio.
In this model, commercialization occurs when a firm, and therefore its technology, passes
through the valley of death into positive cash flow. Each different public support strategy can
be used to guide a technology through the valley of death, but certain strategies are more
costly because of their reliance on a single policy. The most cost-effective allocation of
public funding will be the strategy that requires the least public investment and still generates
a successful firm.
Model Background
The model is adapted from a simulation of venture capital investment policies and
firm behavior policies for a clean technology firm (Miller, 2007). The original model
portrayed a clean technology firm seeking venture capital funding to continue product
development and build a market for its product. The original model was adapted in a number
of ways to better represent the influence of public and private funding and risk and
development.
Model Structure
In the adaptation developed here the model portrays a single startup working to
develop and commercialize a clean energy technology. The model reveals high-level
government strategies that can induce private investment and increase the probability that a
technology will successfully be commercialized. Complete documentation of the model can
be found in the Appendix. The simulation begins when the firm is very young, with staff
consisting of two engineers with a single RET idea and government funding for R&D. With
additional funding the technology can be transformed into a product and then sold to a
market. The firm is influenced by flows of funding and development. In addition to the firm,
important stakeholders portrayed in the model include the government, private investors, the
market, and the competition.
The technology begins in the very early stage of R&D and proceeds through to the
infusion of private capital and the expansion of a customer base. As modeled, the firm's
health and existence is measured by its working capital (Figure 5.1). Working capital is
increased when the product is sold and generates revenue. Expenses for operations drain
working capital as the firm pays the cost of goods sold and salaries for engineers and sales
personnel. Spending money for operations occurs earlier than generating positive cash flows,
putting the firm in danger of bankruptcy and thus the technology in danger of lying fallow
without private sector investment.
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Figure 5.1 Working capital is at the heart of a firm commercializing an RET
Before the private sector will invest in the firm, a product and a market must be
developed, which requires prior technology development. Technology development initially
is the role of government. Through the process of government funded research new
applications of scientific understanding and revolutionary innovations result in new
technologies as shown in Figure 5.2. With additional funding, this technology can be further
developed to meet existing needs or create new technological opportunities. Continued
funding of technology development will lead to incremental improvements, which may
manifest themselves as improved performance or technology-driven cost reductions. Once a
minimum technology development threshold is reached the firm can make a decision to
allocate its effort between product and technology development. As technology development
increases the government will provide less and less funding with the expectation that the
private sector will begin to invest because the technology is nearer to being commercialized.
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Figure 5.2 Government funds high-risk research and development
Still the private sector will not invest without confidence that they will receive a
return on their investment, which requires evidence of a significant market and a product to
serve that market (Zider, 1998; Fried & Hisrich, 1994). Risk is related to the product of the
payoff and the probability of success; increasing either of these decreases the risk. The
market grows as new uses are found for the technology and a more attractive product leads to
market growth as shown in Figure 5.3. Figure 5.3 aggregates all potential customers,
however, in the model the sales cycle is disaggregated into the following customer stages.
Potential prospects are firms capable of adopting the RET that could presumably be
evaluating the entire field of RET options to replace their current fossil-fuel technologies.
Prospects are all the firms capable of adopting that are aware of their options and have not
ruled out purchasing the RET venture's technology. Hot prospects are those that are actively
evaluating the firm's technology. Purchasers have purchased the technology and Adopters
are actively using the technology. The progression from potential prospect is determined by
the number of prospects at each stage, the average amount of time a prospect remains in a
stage, the sales effort applied by the firm, and the success of the sales effort. The stock of
potential prospects grows through increases in technology and features or directly through
policy.
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Figure 53 Technology development creates a new market to be served
After sufficient technology development, one of three things may happen. First,
technology development may drive the cost of the technology down to a point where it has a
significant advantage over the market incumbents (in this case, traditional power producers
and electric utilities). Alternatively, technology development may lead to a technology that
far exceeds the functionality that can be provided by competitors. Finally, technology
development may yield a profitable niche market that is currently underserved or not served
at all. If any of these three conditions are met, investors will take an interest in the firm
because of its potential profitability. A combination of these events reduces the risk related to
an investment in the firm; when the market, product, and technology risk is low enough, the
private sector invests. Because a technology alone is not sufficient to capture a market,
private funding will be channeled towards product development as shown in Figure 5.4
(Murphy & Edwards, 2003).
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Figure 5.4 A potential market induces the private sector to invest in technology and
product development
Technology and product development accumulates and the firm becomes increasingly
successful finding adopters for their product. As shown in Figure 5.5, as the number of
adopters increases, learning reduces the cost of the product, which improves the
attractiveness of the product and in turn continues to enlarge the market and further decrease
costs. Together these induce more private investment. As sales increase and revenue is
generated, the firms can continue to invest in technology and product development.
Eventually, a firm's role in the market will be firmly established and the technology can be
considered commercialized.
Private I
Figure 5.5 Cost reductions continue to drive the commercialization process
Policy
Policies are available to influence the technology transformation, as shown in Figure
5.6. In addition to traditional public funding for high-risk R&D and common market
incentives this model also incorporates a more progressive development policy: public-
private partnership cost-share agreements. These agreements extend public funding past the
high-risk stage and contribute to manufacturing R&D, process R&D, and pilot projects. In
these partnerships the public sector and private sector both agree to fund a portion of the
project cost. As the technology is closer to commercialization the government will fund a
smaller and smaller fraction of the total cost.
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Traditionally, to prevent the government from becoming too involved in
commercialization, public funding for R&D may only be used for technology development
(Gompers and Lerner, 2001). In this model, government funding for R&D can only be spent
on technology development. Cost-share monies, private investment, and any revenues can be
used to pay for customer service, marketing, sales, and product development.
Market development support is incorporated in this model as an indirect market
stimulation policy, which lowers the price of the product so that it becomes more attractive in
comparison with the price of the technology offered by the competitor. A common example
of an indirect market stimulation policy is a subsidy or a rebate.
A carbon price may also be imposed to stimulate the market. In this model a carbon
price is represented as an increase in the price of the competitor's technology. Here we
assume that the cost per ton of carbon, which typically relates to an increase in the cost of
electricity generation from fossil fuels, can also be represented as an increase in the cost of
the generation technology. This is a reasonable assumption because after a carbon price is
put in place additional increments of carbon-emitting generation will be accompanied with a
cost of abatement or a permit/tax cost. With a known capacity factor, efficiency, and
resulting emissions a carbon price can be back-calculated into an increase in technology cost.
Due to many factors external to the firm, successful commercialization is not assured
(Miller, 2007), but to improve the provision of affordable, clean energy in the coming decade
governments should consider several complementary policies that are highly cost-effective.
Experiments and Results
In the base case we will examine the cost and results of a portfolio in which the
government only funds R&D. The initial values are shown below in Table 5.1, and the
necessary maximum public funding for R&D is adjusted (to the nearest $50,000) until the
firm can succeed during the first 60 years of the technology.
Table 5.1 Initial Values for Base Case
Parameter Value Units
Number of Potential Technology Adopters 1 million People
Engineers 2 People
Sales Force 0 People
Average Salary 17000 Dollars/Person*Month
Initial Technology Development 1 Technology
Theoretical Maximum Technology Development 300 Technologies
Technology Development Threshold to begin .25 Dimensionless
Product Development
(fraction of theoretical maximum)
Initial Product Development 0 Features
Multiple of Incumbent Functionality Threshold 2 Dimensionless
(how much better RET must be over incumbent)
Initial Cost per Unit 2 million Dollars/Unit
Initial Competitor Cost per Unit 100,000 Dollars/Unit
Decrease in Costs per Doubling of Purchases 0.10 Dimensionless
Decrease in Costs per Doubling of Technology 0.18 Dimensionless
Development
Minimum Market Size for Private Financing 300 million Dollars
Minimum Private Investment 100,000 Dollars
Frequency of Private Investment 36 Months
Frequency of Public Funding 36 Months
In the base case public R&D funding is given to the firm every three years for
technology development until the technology development reaches half of its theoretical
potential, as shown in Figure 5.7. In the first year, the firm is given the maximum public
funding for R&D, which is $16.55 million. Over thirty years, as technology development
occurs, the public sector provides less and less money annually to support development.
Discounted at an annual rate of 2%", the total public cost of the R&D-only policy is $31.12
million. If the R&D had been funded by a single grant, rather than over thirty years, it would
require an $81.35 million investment. Without government funding no technology
development would occur at all.
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Figure 5.7 Profile of annual public R&D funding in the base case when R&D is the only
commercialization policy employed
As the technology develops and the potential market grows the private sector invests
in the firm. The technology becomes more than three times superior to the competing
technology, and the population that is capable of adopting the product increases. The
combination of a better technology and a more lucrative market induces a nominal total of
" Discount rates of 1%, 2%, and 3% are examined. These discount rates reflect federal discount rates over a
long period of time.
$38 million of private investment in the firm, as shown in Figure 5.8. If private investment
had not occurred because technology development or product development did not improve
enough to reduce the risk of investment then the public funding would eventually be
consumed and the technology would fail as shown in Figure 5.9.
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Figure 5.8 Profile of annual private investment when R&D is the only
commercialization policy employed
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Figure 5.9 Without private investment the RET will stagnate in the "valley of death"
With the combined public and private investments shown in Figure 5.10 the firm does
not become independent for almost 50 years after the technology was first invented. The
valley of death lasts roughly six years. A summary of the results for the base case and the
following policy cases is provided in Table 5.2.
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Figure 5.10 Working capital comprised of both public and private investment
Table 5.2 Summary of case inputs and results
Base Case Policy Policy
Case 1 Case 2
Maximum Public Research and 16.55 12.75 9.5
Development Expenditure (Million $)
Maximum Cost-Share Available 0 0 250
(Million $)
Subsidy (%) 0 20 20
Total Discounted Public Cost 42.45 34.06 27.87
(1% discount rate) (Million $)
Total Discounted Public Cost 31.12 24.67 19.19
(2% discount rate) (Million $)
Total Discounted Public Cost 26.30 20.95 16.38
(3% discount rate) (Million $)
Years to Market 46.5 38 30.5
(first commercial sale)
Profit in Year 60 (Billion $) 0.4387 3.193 6.935
Cumulative Purchases 8,123 35,499 63,019
Years to Private Investment 21 18 18
Total Private Investment (Million $) 38.16 44.61 25.42
In addition to R&D, other policies can promote commercialization. In two different
policy cases we will examine how the cost of crossing the valley of death changes with
additional policies in the portfolio. In the first policy case, an indirect market stimulation
policy, reduces the price of the firm's RET by 20%, which changes the timing of investments
and reduces the overall public cost of commercialization. The higher value of a potential
market induces earlier private investment in the firm and larger investments in each round as
shown in Figure 5.11. This private infusion of capital reduces the maximum public funding
for R&D to $12.75 million.
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Figure 5.11 Profile of annual private investment when an R&D policy and an indirect
market stimulation policy are in effect
In the second policy case, a public-private cost sharing agreement is coupled with the
R&D and market incentives. Cost-sharing increases the productivity of private investment
through government dollar matching and further reduces the initial R&D investment required
to create a successful firm to $9.5 million. Because of the fund matching nature of the cost-
sharing program, the private sector injects about half the amount of money as it did without
cost-sharing.
These two cases and the R&D base case all lead to a successful firm, but at different
costs. The R&D only case is the most expensive, followed by the combined R&D and
market stimulation case. Achieving a successful firm purely through R&D requires a
considerable amount of funding to be committed to reach technology development levels that
on their own are high enough to induce private investment. The addition of the market
stimulation policy relaxes the need to rely on technology development because it creates a
comparatively larger population of potential adopters because of the lower price. Cost
sharing further reduces the overall portfolio cost because it contributes to technology and
product development. Unlike R&D funding that is extinguished before the technology is
ready for market, cost sharing can provide funding in what may otherwise be the critical
valley of death period. With less capital committed to this technology, more technologies can
be supported. Less private investment may be socially optimal because of the opportunity
cost of that money.
In addition to affecting the cost of crossing the valley of death, implementing policies
to complement R&D decreases the amount of time a firm has negative or very low cash
flows. Figure 5.12 shows that the market stimulation policy decreases the time in the "valley
of death" by almost ten years. The combination of cost-sharing and market stimulation
allows the firm to emerge from the valley of death in 35 years. Each additional policy
increased the total technology development marginally because of higher levels of cash
available from sales to be reinvested in technology development.
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Figure 5.12 Increasingly positive working capital indicating successful
commercialization occurs at different times under each policy portfolio
The growth in working capital is driven by increasing sales. The difference in
purchases is shown in Figure 5.13 below. The differences in capacity are extremely
important for working toward the climate change mitigation goal. First, the sooner clean
energy technologies are deployed the sooner they can displace greenhouse gas emitting
alternatives. Installations far in the future are not as valuable for carbon mitigation as those
deployed now. Second, the earlier commercialization is achieved the sooner production can
be scaled up. At a future date cumulative deployments will be higher for a technology that
began production earlier. Finally, due to the feedbacks between operating revenues and
technology development and its affect on the market size, the rate of adoption is different in
the three cases. For all three of these reasons, the portfolio employing cost-sharing in
addition to market stimulation and R&D funding is the superior strategy.
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Figure 5.13 The start of purchasing, the cumulative amount purchased, and the rate of
purchasing differ for each of the policy portfolios
Employing all three policies is also beneficial for achieving cost reductions that are
important for widespread adoption. Clean, affordable electricity is directly tied to the unit
cost of RETs. As shown in Figure 5.14, the policy portfolios reach different ultimate unit
costs because of the differences in learning that drive down costs when production experience
accumulates. These policy portfolios have the same cost reduction due to technology
development, the earlier regime. The kink in each cost curve occurs when cost reductions
due to cumulative production occur in addition to the cost reductions from technology
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development. When working capital is positive and there is sufficient private investment,
marketing begins. The marketing creates potential customers who are persuaded to purchase
the technology.
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Figure 5.14 Unit costs decrease differently in each policy portfolio due to differences in
production
Predictions of adoption and firm success depend largely on the price of the product.
The cost of the product decreases over time through two mechanisms: technology
development and experience (Berglund & Soderholm, 2006). The cost of the technology has
a significant impact on the purchases, working capital, and total private investment so it is
difficult to predict the success of commercialization without strong evidence of cost reduction
to be expected per doubling. Learning rates are different for every technology and are not
necessarily constant overtime (Sagar & van der Zwaan, 2006). In a two-factor learning rate
assumptions made about each learning rate have a different effect. Figure 5.15 and Figure
5.16 show that the cost reductions due to a doubling in technology development have a much
greater influence on the cost of the technology. The result, shown in Figure 5.17 and Figure
5.18, is that projections about working capital are much more susceptible to uncertainty about
cost reduction through R&D than through deployment.
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Figure 5.15 Sensitivity of unit cost to cost reduction due to doubling of technology
development. Varied uniformly between 0.05 and 035 around 0.18.
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Figure 5.16 Sensitivity of unit cost to cost reduction due to doubling of cumulative
purchases. Varied uniformly between 0.05 and 035 around 0.18.
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Figure 5.17 Sensitivity of cumulative purchases to cost reduction due to doubling of
technology development. Varied uniformly between 0.05 and 0.35 around 0.18.
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Figure 5.18 Sensitivity of cumulative purchases to cost reduction due to doubling of
cumulative purchases. Varied uniformly between 0.05 and 035 around 0.18.
Another strategy to induce development and deployment of RETs is to place a price
on greenhouse gas emissions. By increasing the cost of traditional technologies, either by
emission control devices or emission permits, the population of potential RET adopters
increases. In this model a 30% increase in the competitor's cost is caused by a $30/ton
carbon tax 12 . The increase in competitor price drives up adoption and profits of the RET as
shown in Table 5.3. The difference in purchases also causes a difference in cost per unit due
to learning, which further promotes adoption of the RETs. Changes in the carbon price
reveal that the successful commercialization of RETs is highly sensitive to carbon prices as
shown by the increased purchase rates in Figure 5.19.
Table 5.3 Summary Results of Carbon Policies
Base 10% 30% 50%
Case
Total Discounted Public R&D 31.12 26.11 21.52 18.88
Cost(2% discount rate) (Million $)
Years to Market 46.5 40.5 34 29
(first commercial sale)
Profit in Year 60 (Billion $) 0.4387 2.093 7.371 15.24
Cumulative Purchases 8,123 23,749 47,996 70,788
Years to Private Investment 21 18 18 15
Total Private Investment (Million 38.16 45.49 37.33 64.78
$)
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Figure 5.19 Deployment of the technology occurs significantly earlier when carbon
pricing increases competitor's costs
12 I assume the electricity generation mix is 50% coal, 25% natural gas, and 25% carbon free (nuclear, hydro,
renewable). Using a generation weighted levelized cost of electricity before and after a $30/ton carbon tax, Ifind that the cost of the alternative to the RET increases by 30% (Lazard, 2009). This estimate is rough becauseit does not account for feedbacks in the generation mix or adaptation under a carbon price.
Although effective, the cost of a carbon policy to society is a complex issue. Further
understanding of the impact of a carbon price is needed to determine if it is more cost-
effective than a pure R&D regime or a strategy with a diverse set of commercialization
policies. The cost and value of a price on carbon is being debated because of uncertainty
surrounding how much a carbon policy may increase the cost of fossil-fuel based electricity
generation technologies. Internalizing the emission externality in a carbon price will
undoubtedly raise the cost of electricity and force out some traditional generation. It is
unknown whether new RETs can fill in the deficit. Figure 5.20, showing the sensitivity of
purchases to increases in competitor price caused by a carbon policy, suggests that the size of
the carbon price strongly influences the success of RET technology commercialization. With
adequate R&D funding a carbon policy also shortens the valley of death causing the RET to
be deployed earlier and allowing a larger cumulative installed capacity over time.
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Figure 5.20 Sensitivity of cumulative purchases to carbon prices
Conclusions
I have examined the impact of various funding strategies on firm survival, which has
served as a proxy for successful technology commercialization. Employing a balanced
combination of R&D spending, public-private cost sharing, and indirect market stimulation
was more cost-effective than a strategy leaving out one of these policies. A balanced
portfolio, one that provides funding to a technology over its lifetime, develops the
technology, product, and market alike and so benefits from the feedback between each stage
of development and deployment. Balancing the tradeoff between investing in R&D and
learning through deployment improves technological capabilities and reduces cost through
multiple avenues. The proper balance of funding depends on the private investment that can
be leveraged. The attention to the entire technology transformation reduces risks in multiple
ways and induces private investment in commercialization.
The balanced policy strategy also accelerated deployment and increased the overall
capacity deployed. These benefits are currently not priced and so cannot be included in a
measure of cost-effectiveness, but they are critical for avoiding climate change. Future work
could monetize the deployed capacity benefits for a more in depth comparison of the costs
and benefits of the different portfolio schemes.
The model is limited in content and scope, and could be improved with additional
complexity. Future work should remove simplifying assumptions to provide a more detailed
understanding of the industry dynamics. For example, R&D actors, private investors, and
market stimulation policies could be disaggregated. Other policies such as non-economic
barrier removal, loan guarantee programs, and customer financing programs could be
included. For many clean energy technologies the model could be made more complete by
including the cost and activities associated with manufacturing. A more detailed private
investment decision-making method could be improved by evaluating the size and frequency
of investment and limiting private investment so as not to dilute the firm's ownership. Future
work could also collect more detailed empirical evidence to further understand the costs and
benefits of each policy portfolio for specific technologies.
The scope of the model could also be expanded; the analysis examines a single
country and a single technology individually. The model is not complex enough to
understand the global implications of different policies in different regions of the world
interacting though trade and multinational corporations. Due to a given country's resources,
demand, and national strengths it may be rational to have an unbalanced public funding
portfolio, but this model is not equipped to look at the aggregate effectiveness of different
countries pursuing different strategies.
6 Conclusion and Recommendations
New RETs must be commercialized to provide affordable and increasingly accessible
electricity in a carbon-constrained world. Due to positive spillover externalities in the
development of RETs and the negative environmental externalities associated with existing
fossil fuels, the private sector underinvests in the commercialization of new RETs, justifying
government intervention to correct these market failures. Commercialization requires new
technologies to be adopted, which in turn requires lower product costs and increased
functionality. Because of the complexity of commercialization and its feedbacks a number of
policies can stimulate the process. A well designed R&D portfolio supplies new technology
innovations and lowers the cost of existing technologies through technology breakthroughs
like improved performance, new materials, and new manufacturing techniques. Market
stimulation policies of all kinds induce deployment of the technology. Deployment also leads
to technology improvements and cost reductions, but they are of a different kind and
magnitude. Rather than revolutionary innovations, deployment causes evolutionary
innovations that arise through customer and supply chain feedback.
Despite a policy portfolio that in name includes technology-push and demand-pull
policies, the case studies show that governments tend to emphasize one policy or the other.
Some success is achieved because either of the two traditional commercialization policies
promote new technology, technology improvements, and cost reductions in a limited
capacity. However, frequently this unbalanced portfolio of funding causes commercialization
to fail as technologies are trapped in the valley of death. R&D does provide a variety of
potential technologies for the future, but without a market new technologies may not
transform into marketable products. Conversely, a strong market induces considerable
deployment, but has a limited effect on creating new and better technologies that may be
cheaper and more efficient in the longer term. Since it is impossible to know the optimal
technology portfolio over the long-term, countries must choose a balanced funding strategy
that achieves near term goals and provides for the future simultaneously.
An additional policy phase of demonstration can improve the commercialization
process even more by lubricating the transition from public to private support. The
government can induce private investment by bearing a fraction of the cost and assuming a
fraction of the technology and market risk. By extending public funding and inducing earlier
private funding the valley of death can be filled in. Investment in market learning is often too
expensive for a single firm and is subject to the same spillover externalities as R&D, but
demonstration projects serve to prove technological performance, validate the desirability of
the product, and ensure the stability of the market.
The case studies show that the funding decisions implicitly make a tradeoff between
the types of technologies that are available and the strength of the commercializing industry
and deployment. Strong R&D created a variety of technologies and reduced the technology
cost of the product. Strong deployment policies resulted in considerable annual installation
and annual production and reduced the product cost. The development of strong industry
was also supported by stable deployment policies. Japan achieved low module and non-
module (technology and product) costs by funding both R&D, a subsidy program, and
ensuring the transition through extensive field-testing. As a result of their balanced policy
portfolio, they have been the most cost-effective achieving both new technologies and
installed capacity.
The system dynamics simulation model shows that the timing of funding over the
lifetime of technology commercialization has considerable impact on the time to success and
the social cost. Each policy portfolio can be used to commercialize a technology, but they
differ in terms of overall public cost and the length of time to cross through the valley of
death. If commercialization relies only on R&D funding then commercialization comes at a
considerable expense and takes a comparatively long time to be successful. Similarly, if the
focus is on market development support, then the size of the market induces private
investment and less public funding is needed. A stable market induces an initial amount of
private investment, which can be used in cost-shared partnerships to reduce the burden of
technology development cost and free up private capital for product development. Cost-
shared funding for the technology transformation reduces the cost to commercialize and the
amount of time in the valley of death is reduced.
The debate over technology-push and demand-pull policies is limited. This thesis
shows that a reliance on one of these policies is costly despite its potential effectiveness. An
unbalanced policy portfolio results in an unbalanced result both in terms of technological
progress and implementation. It is critical to have a portfolio of policies influencing the short
and long-term commercialization path of a technology. To address all of the problems,
climate change especially, development of breakthrough technologies should be coupled with
deployment of existing technologies. Deployment takes action now and provides lessons for
future technology generations.
7 Case Studies
United States
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budget and support for photovoltaics has fluctuated since that time as shown in Figure 7.2.
Starting in 1978 the Solar Photovoltaic Research and Development Act laid out a ten-year
plan to promote RD&D for PV. The law placed considerable emphasis on commercialization
especially through publicly visible demonstration projects. Most of the funding for the
National Photovoltaic Program went to R&D despite its original emphasis on demonstration
and commercialization because the administration in the 1980s slashed the budget leaving
funding only for basic R&D. Luckily, the funding for basic R&D remained relatively stable
and was able to build industry knowledge that contributed to developments when
demonstration support began. The long-term experience made it easier to transition to
commercialization in the 1990s. Since competitiveness with the grid was farther away, US
firms, compared to Japanese firms for example where the cost of electricity is high, tended to
divert resources to activities that would lead to radical innovation (Rogol, 2007).
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Figure 7.2 Research and development funding for photovoltaics in the US through the
US Department of Energy (thEA, 2009)
The US pursued two very successful applied R&D programs in the 1990s. The first
of these programs, the Photovoltaic Manufacturing Technology project (PVMaT) began in
1991. Through phases of (1) problem identification, (2) process-specific manufacturing and
teamed research on generic problems, and (3) product driven PV module manufacturing
technology and PV system components research, the program sought to identify and solve PV
manufacturing issues. Specifically the goals were to improve manufacturing processes and
equipment, accelerate cost reductions from manufacturing, improve performance and
reliability, and lay the groundwork for scaling up the industry. Each phase of participation
was competitive and offered a bigger investment by the public sector. Goal setting was done
with industry and government collaboration. The independent teams had heavy industry
representation that were aware of the market when allocating funds to projects. Cost sharing
was used to share risk between the public and private sector. The cost system was multi-
tiered so large firms assumed 50% of the cost burden compared to 30% by small firms.
Information sharing between the private sector, academia, and the public sector at annual
review meetings was one benefit of the program. Information sharing was also encouraged
through "generic-teamed" research collaborations. Participation in these collaborations
reduced cost-sharing requirements and promoted longer-term, higher-risk research
collaborations (Margolis, 2002).
The PVMaT program brought success to individual firms, and overall the program
resulted in cost reductions and increased manufacturing capacity in the industry. These
successes were both incremental development and due to the manufacturing breakthroughs
that occurred through risky or peripheral R&D projects that would not have been undertaken
but for the risk sharing of the cost-shared partnership (Margolis, 2002).
The second landmark R&D program in the US was the Thin-Film PV Partnership. It
was a descendent of earlier a-Si projects and ran from 1994 to 2007. The goal was to move
specific thin-film PV technologies from R&D to demonstration, specifically from prototype
to pilot production. The program was structured as a multi-tiered cost share where the
government percentage reflects the distribution of risk between the private and public sector.
The research goals were set in regular meetings between industry, university, and an NREL
monitor. Some of the cost shared funds were required to go to team projects to both
encourage participants to be more collaborative and less secretive and to reduce duplication
among participants.
The program resulted in an increase in the efficiency of thin film cells and the success
of technology transitions from laboratory experiments to pilot production. For example,
United Solar Systems Corp and BP Solar successfully developed their a-Si technologies and
Siemens Solar Industries developed its CIS technologies.
In 2007 the Thin-Film Partnership Program was phased out along with the PV
Manufacturing R&D Project and the University and Exploratory Research Program. These
projects were reorganized under Technology Pathway Partnerships (TPP) and the PV
Incubator Project under the Solar America Initiative.
Another innovative research program was the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's (JPL) Flat-
Plate Solar Array Project. It was a boost to the industry for several reasons. First, it served
as an initial market by purchasing 5 kW modules from each PV manufacturer. Second, it
performed testing and standard setting for the industry. Finally, it provided firms with
feedback as to how to improve the reliability of their modules. Overall, it revealed the
products that were effective in a real world environment.
Currently PV RD&D falls under the Solar America Initiative (SAI), which is part of
the Advanced Energy Initiative that began in 2006. The majority of the funding is for cost
shared research and commercialization projects in collaboration with the private sector to
enhance the cross over from R&D to commercialization. Through Technology Pathway
Partnerships (TPP) projects to achieve a PV system that meets the cost goals of SAI are
funded. This industry-lead, public-private partnership specifically seeks to develop
technologies that may be cost competitive as early as 2015. The research is broken up into
several sub categories: component development, systems development, and technology
evaluation. Special PV incubator activities fund development of system components (US
DOE, 2008).
The initiative has also established a lab for both private and public researchers to
standardize their processes. The lab is called the Process Development and Integration
Laboratory and it is hosted at NREL. The initiative conducts the work that was done under
the Thin-film partnership and the PV Manufacturing R&D project in the past. More
fundamental research on semiconductor properties, device mechanisms, and fabrication
processing to improve efficiency, stability and reduce cost is performed under the Advanced
Materials and Devices branch of SAI.
Demonstration
Solar America Cities were established in 2007 under the Solar America Initiative. In
2007 thirteen Solar America Cities were chosen, and twelve more were chosen in 2008.
Through the partnership local governments are given funding and technical and regulatory
assistance to install photovoltaics (US DOE, 2008).
Deployment
The US has a relatively weak federal deployment policy. In 1978, the US passed the
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act, PURPA. PURPA required renewable generation to
be purchased by electric utilities at the "avoided cost" of electricity based on energy and
capacity costs that the utility would otherwise incur by generating the power itself or
purchasing it from another traditional generator. PURPA did much to stimulate low-cost
renewable generation like wind power, but was little incentive for more expensive
photovoltaic installations.
Also in 1978, the Energy Tax Act established a 10% tax credit for residential solar
Installations. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 extended the 10% business tax credits for solar
installations indefinitely. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 increased the solar investment tax
credit to 30% with a cap of $2,000 until the end of 2008. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 extended the 30% investment tax credit eight years, removed the
$2,000 cap, and made public utilities eligible to receive the tax credit. In addition to the
investment tax credit, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 also established a 1.5 cent/kwh
renewable energy production incentive (REPI) for state and local governments.
Currently, the federal government has set no renewable energy targets. Many of the
states have set targets, many of which are substantiated with renewable portfolio standards.
Some states have building obligations, system benefits charges, green power funds, net
metering, rebates, and roof programs that may be coupled with the federal tax credit (Energy
Policies of the USA, IEA 2007).
The federal government has begun a new Loan Guarantee Program. It has the
potential to provide renewable energy firms with low-cost capital. Congress has allocated $60
million dollars for which PV projects would be eligible.
Despite weak demand enhancements, 830.5 MW of grid-connected distributed PV
was installed in the US in 2007 as shown in Figure 7.3. However, the US should no longer
rely on international demand, but should develop policies to create demand nationally
(Margolis, 2002). "The U.S. fascination with factors such as patents as stimulators of
technological innovation ignores the need for other kinds of market-enhancing policies"
(Rycroft & Kash 1999).
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Figure 7.3 Annual and cumulative installed capacity in the United States (PVPS
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Industry Development
The example of the US in the 1970s and 1980s shows the importance of multiple
policies working together and the importance of demonstration and market stimulations. In
the 1970s with a broad set of policies linking demand-pull, supply-push, and public sector
involvement the US PV industry grew causing decreases in cost and increases in production.
In the 1980s when the demonstration and commercialization budget was severely cut and
demand-pull policies were removed the costs of PV did not decline as rapidly. The 1990s
saw a return to private sector collaboration including the PVMaT project and the Thin-Film
PV Partnership Project- this boost coupled with a growing international market to substitute
for adequate demand-pull policies improved the growth of the PV industry (Margolis, 2002
pp. 97,98) Production in the US is steadily increasing. In 2007, 273 MW of cells were
produced in the US as shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Annual Cell Production (MW) in the United States (Prometheus Institute,
2007; Hirshman et al., 2008)
Company 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
BP Solar 20.5 25.5 31 13.4 14.2 22.6 25.6 27.7
Evergreen 1.9 2.8 6 14 13 16.4
First Solar 3 6 20 60 119
Global Solar 2 1 1 2.5 3
Schott 4 5 5 4 10 13 13 10
SolarWorld 28 39 46.5 52 62 42 35 35
United Solar 3 3.8 4 7 14 22 28 48
Other 19.5 27.3 32.2 18.8 25.5 18.5 24.5 13.58
Total 75 100.6 120.6 103 138.7 153.1 201.6 272.7
Table 7.2 shows the diversity of the US photovoltaic industry. Annual production is
comprised of both the proven silicon technologies and the more recent thin film technologies.
As a result of considerable R&D, the number of firms commercializing each generation of
technology is large. Exciting new PV technologies continue to be developed in the US and
more and more are receiving financing to begin production. Unfortunately, without a strong
domestic market demand, firms are left to compete for market share in the German and
Spanish PV market. State renewable initiatives, such as the RPS laws, may begin to provide
a substantial domestic market for PV depending on the technology differentiation.
Table 7.2 Diversity of photovoltaic technology in the United States is reflected in the
production and number of firms for each generation (Hirshman et al., 2008; Wesoff,
2008)
First Generation Second Third Generation
Generation
Cell production in 2007 98 173 0
(MW)
Number of firms in 2007 7 12 13
Firms in 2007 Advent Solar, Amonix, Ascent Innovalight,
Blue Square Solar, Emcore, Konarka, Lumoflex,
Energy, BP Solar, EPV Solar, First NanoGram, NanoSi
Evergreen, Solar Solar, Global Solar, Plextronics,
Power Industries, Solar, Miasole, Solarmer, Solaris,
SolarWorld, Nanosolar, Power Solarity, Solasta,
Spectrolab Film, Schott, Solexant, Stion,
Solopower, United Vanguard
Solar
Sources:
PVPS National Reports, 2003-2007
Energy Policies of the United States, IEA 2007
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Figure 7.4 Timeline of German photovoltaic commercialization policy (IEA, 2007a)
Research and Development
Germany began investigating photovoltaics and other sources of renewable energy in
1970, as shown in Figure 7.4. Since that time Germany has established itself as a leader in
the promotion of renewable energy generation. The Federal Ministry of Education and
Research (BMBF) is responsible for institutional funding of basic research at research centers
while the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
(BMU) is specifically responsible for renewable energy R&D. From 1974 to 1992 the PV
program had a heavy emphasis on R&D. There is still a strong focus on PV R&D, within the
5 th Energy Research Program, as it receives the most R&D funding among the RET. Public
funding for R&D over the last 35 years is shown in Figure 7.5 below.
To achieve the maximum effect and to accelerate market uptake, those projects that
are undertaken through collaboration between industry and researchers are given special
preference to receive both national and state research funds. There is also project funding
anyany
I
available specifically to fund research projects that focus on technologies that are close to
market readiness. Research programs are constantly evaluated by industry and researchers.
In addition to university work, the Center for Sun Energy and Hydrogen Research
Baden-Wuerttemberg and the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems (ISE) conduct
cutting edge research. Research ranges from basic materials and optics research to more
applied energy systems and energy technology research.
An incentive for private renewable energy R&D investment is available through a tax
reduction for renewable energy R&D.
German Photovoltaic R&D Expenditures
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Figure 7.5 Research and development funding for photovoltaics in Germany (lEA,
2009)
Demonstration
Germany has had little activity in the realm of demonstration projects. The Thousand
Solar Rooftops program is an exception. From 1991-1994 the program gave a 50%-60%
subsidy for the purchase and installation cost of a PV system. Participation in the program
required a five-year monitoring and evaluation component.
Deployment
Germany's presence in PV is primarily because of their successes in incremental
innovation of photovoltaics driven by lessons from deployment. Germany is most well-
known for their market stimulation strategy which began in 1990 with the establishment of
Stromeinspeisegesetz (StrEG) or the Electricity Feed in Law. StrEG required utilities to pay
a fixed rate of 65% to 80% of the retail price for electricity generated by renewable energy
sources. The law was in effect from 1991 to 2000. It provided the same tariff for all RETs so
it did not stimulate PV installations because of PV's comparatively higher costs.
From 1999 through 2003, the government ran a Hundred Thousand Rooftop program
to stimulate 300 MW of investment in decentralized PV systems with an average size of 3
kWp. The program provided soft loans from the state bank, KfW, to the public. The loans
effectively acted as a 40% direct subsidy. In 1999 the program was put on hold so the
program only achieved 9MW of its 18MW goal for the year. The program was rather
unsuccessful until the start of the EEG in 2000, which offered a 0.50 C/kWh FIT for a
duration of 20 years. Unfortunately the combination of the EEG and the loan created
extremely favorable conditions that caused a rush for PV installations forcing the program to
be paused again in 2000.
The Renewable Energy Law (EEG) enacted in 2000 marks the beginning of the
highly discussed market stimulation through a feed-in tariff. The law included a number of
important details including: fixed payment for new installations; rate differentiation by
technology, location, and size; a 20 year FIT lifetime; a technology specific degression rate;
shallow grid connection costs for renewable energy developers; priority grid access; a utility
purchase obligation; and an exemption from grid imbalance settlement payments. All of
these features reduce the renewable energy developer's risk and encourage investment in
renewable energy. It is important to note that this policy is funded by all electricity
consumers via the transmission grid operators.
The EEG was amended in 2004 and again in 2007. The amendments arising from the
2007 evaluation will be enacted in 2009. A major change to the tariff will be an increase in
the tariff degression rates. Currently, the degression rate for roof top installations is 5% and
for ground level parks it is 6.5%. Under the new law the tariff for rooftop installations will
be reduced annually by 8% from 2009 to 2010 and then by 9% annually from 2011 onwards.
Ground level solar park rates will increase to 10% annually in 2009 and 2010.
Since the conclusion of the Hundred Thousand Rooftop program in June 2003, roof
top installation support has come from soft loans from KfW. The KfW provides loans
through the Umwelt Program, the ERP Program, and the Solar Power Generation Program.
The Umwelt Program provides 10 to 20 year, low-interest loans to private companies
covering up to 75% of the investment costs. The ERP Program provides 75% of the
financing for small and medium enterprises for 10 to 15 years. The ERP and Umwelt
program funding can be combined by eligible parties. The Solar Power Generation Program
or Solarstromerzeugen has provided soft loans for PV since January of 2005. It finances up
to 100% of the project to a maximum of 50,000C for PV investment.
Other funding for PV is also available. Federal states provided PV support to
complement national deployment funds. The C02 Building Rehabilitation Program, which
began in 2000, also provides subsidies that can be used for PV installations.
Germany has targets for both the proportion of TPES generated by renewables and the
amount of RES-E penetration. Their current goal is to achieve 4.2% of TPES with renewable
sources by 2010. This percentage will increase to 10% by 2020. Specific to electricity
supply, Germany plans to generate 12.5% of its electricity needs by 2010 and 20% of its
electricity needs by 2020 with renewable energy. As Germany adapts to meet the goals of
the EU 20-20-20 directive, this target will be increased to 25%-30% of electricity from
renewable sources in 2020.
As a result of the feed-in tariff, Germany is currently the largest market in the world
and has the largest installed capacity of 3635 MW in 2007, predominately in grid-connected,
decentralized locations. The annual and cumulative installed capacity is shown in Figure 7.6.
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Figure 7.6 Annual and cumulative installed capacity in Germany (PVPS National
Reports, 2000-2007)
Industry Development
The photovoltaic industry in Germany is strong. The EEG has undoubtedly created a
stable investment climate facilitating 916 MW of cell production in 2007. Annual production
is summarized in Table 7.3. Table 7.4 shows that most of this production is the conventional
crystalline silicon cell, but an increasing number of firms are emerging to begin production of
second generation, thin film technologies.
Table 7.3 Annual Production of major German companies
Hirshman et al., 2008)
(Prometheus Institute, 2007;
Company 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Antec Solar 7 8 8 0
Deutsche Solar 3.3 7.5 9 42 38 55 51 135
Ersol Solar 9 9 16 20 40 55
Ever-Q 5 10 27.5 49.8
Q-Cells 8 28 75 166 253.1 389.2
Schott 10 16 24.5 38 53 82 83 74
Solarwatt 8 10
Sunways 4.5 4.5 11 16 30 38
Wurth Solar 2.4 15
Other 2.2 3 3.5 4 5 32 149.6
Total 13.3 25.7 58 125 209 362 535 915.6
Table 7.4 Diversity of photovoltaic technology in Germany is reflected in the production
and number of firms for each generation (Hirshman et al., 2008; Wesoff, 2008)
First Generation Second Generation Third Generation
Cell production in 2007 821 95 0
Number of firms in 2007 10 19 1
Firms in 2007 Arise Technologies, Antec Solar, Avancis, Heliatek
Centrosolar, Brilliant 234, Calyxo, EPV
Conergy, CSG Solar, Solar, Ersol Solar, First-
Deutsche Cell, Ever- Solar, Johnana Solar,
Q, Q-Cells, Schott, Inventux, Malibu, PVflex
Solarwatt, Sunways, Solar, Odersun, Scheuten
Solar, Signet Solar,
Sunfilm Solibro, Solarion,
Sulfurcell, Wurth Solar
Sources:
PVPS National Reports, 2000-2007
Nobuyuki, 2006
Energy Policies of Germany, IEA 2007
Japan
Research and Development
The Japanese government takes three approaches to PV funding: technology
development, demonstration and field tests, and promotion. A timeline of these key policies
is shown in Figure 7.9. Depending on the stage of development the government will fund a
prescribed fraction of the project. Basic R&D projects are eligible to receive 100%
government funding. As the R&D becomes more applied and closer to supporting
commercialization the public funding decreases to 66%, then to 50%, and finally to 33%.
(IEA, 2008b). This funding structure reflects the belief that the government should perform
high-risk, long-term R&D and develop infrastructure for public use. The responsibility for
applied R&D shifts to the private sector as the technology becomes less risky and the
research more practical. The majority of the budget funds the demonstration and field test
stage unlike other developed countries.
In 1974, in response to the oil crisis, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI which
is now METI- the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry) began the Sunshine Project
(1974-1993) to develop specific new and RETs, including PV. With respect to PV, it
primarily focused on R&D, aiming to reduce the costs of PV by a factor of 100. Over the
course of the program the budget for PV grew from 3 MUSD in 1974 to 53 MUSD in 1993
with a highpoint of 73 MUSD reached in 1985. The historical budget is shown in Figure 7.7.
According to Watanabe (1995) this spending induced private sector spending of an additional
$70 to $120 million per year. The New Energy and Industrial Technology Development
Organization (NEDO) was established in 1980 to implement the Sunshine Project by
developing and promoting RETs. NEDO receives 100% funding to carry out the R&D
efforts and distributes the projects between national institutes, universities, and the private
sector.
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Figure 7.7 Research and development funding for photovoltaics in Japan through
METI (IEA, 2009)
In 1993, the New Sunshine Program (FY1993-FY2000) continued to promote
advancements in PV technology. This program shifted the focus on PV technology from
R&D to demonstration. It set a target of installing 400 MW by 2000 and 5000 MW by 2010.
Annual funding for PV under this program reached 113 MUSD by 2000 at the conclusion of
the project. Over the course of the Sunshine Programs both cell efficiencies and system
technologies improved.
From FY2001-FY2005 the first 5-Year Plan for Photovoltaic Power Generation
Technology Research and Development was instituted. Its conclusion marked the start of the
4-Year Plan for Photovoltaic Power Generation Technology Research and Development
(FY2006-FY2009), which was developed from the 2030 roadmap. Other recent support of
energy R&D has come from the Third Science and Technology Basic Plan released in 2006
and the 2007 Basic Energy Plan. There remains a strong focus on PV as it receives the
highest amount of funding amongst the RETs. (In 2006, PV was 64% of renewables R&D
funding).
Research and development projects are reviewed every few years. In addition to a
technical and time schedule review, there is a review of the necessity of government
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participation and a review of the R&D operations structure which includes an evaluation of
the leadership ability of the project leaders and of the cooperation between industry,
academia, and the public sector. The market prospective of the project and the success in
increasing the awareness of the public and stakeholders are also evaluated.
On its own initiative, the private sector organized PVTEC, the Photovoltaic Power
Generation Technology Research Association to do collaborative work. The public sector
attempts to engage the private sector in R&D by clearly setting the long-term direction of
technology advances. Roadmaps like the PV Roadmap Toward 2030 and a general energy
technology roadmap for 2030 released in April 2007 are an example of this long-term
planning. In 2004, Japan developed an R&D roadmap extending to 2030. The roadmap is to
be reviewed regularly, with the first scheduled review in 2009. The PV specific roadmap is
technology differentiated, outlines short-term and long-term goals, and aims to develop more
market-driven R&D. The roadmap is designed to maintain a position of world leadership
based on technology advances and cost reductions in cells, modules, BOS, and generated
electricity. At the time the roadmap was produced, Japan was the PV production leader and
the installed capacity leader. They have since fallen to China and Germany respectively.
Japan could benefit from a long-term, transparent policy and funding roadmap to accompany
the R&D/technical roadmap. The influence and success of the technical PV roadmap should
be evaluated for its potential in the US.
R&D has been successful because "as the government plans and directs the long-term
R&D scheme continuously and consistently, the talents from the private sector, universities
and national institutes can be gathered to engage in their respective research and there has
been a sufficient government budget (largest in the world) to cover the R&D projects, and
projects are evaluated appropriately, and flexibly modified" (Virdis, Wene & Nilsson, 2003).
Recognizing the diversity of technology needs, R&D has and will continue to focus on
reducing costs, stabilizing grids, and improving PV system performance. Below is a list of
R&D done under each of the over arching energy R&D policies discussed above.
Under the Sunshine Programs (FY1974-FY2000)
Development of Technology for Practical Application of Photovoltaic Power
Generation Systems
* 1974-1997
* 100% government funded
* Aims to improve manufacturing to lower costs and advance system technology
Development of a Low-energy Consumption Manufacturing Process for Solar Grade
Silicon
* 1997-2000
* 66% government funded
* Reducing the cost of solar grade silicon raw material and ingots
Development of Practical Technology for High Efficiency Multi-crystalline Silicon
Solar Cells
* 1999-2002
* 100% government funded
Development of Advanced Manufacturing Technology for Photovoltaic Power
Generation Systems
* 2000-2004
* 50% government funded
* Transferring and improving manufacturing and mass production technology
from NEDO to private sector
Under the first 5-Year Plan for Photovoltaic Power Generation Technology Research
and Development (FY2001-FY2005)
Development of Advanced Solar Cells and Modules
* FY2001-FY2005
* Aimed to establish short-term basic technologies that would reduce PV power
generation costs and more quickly commercialize developed technologies
Development of PV System Technology for Mass Deployment
* FY2001 -FY2005
* Aimed to develop common infrastructure technologies to support large-scale
PV deployment
Investigation for Innovative Photovoltaic Power Generation Technology
* FY2001-FY2005
* Aimed to improve the performance and lower the costs of PV power
generation through new materials over the long-term
Development of Technology to Accelerate the Dissemination of Photovoltaic Power
Generation Systems
* FY2001-FY2005
* Aimed at developing technologies for industries supporting PV cell and
module production
* Followed by the PV Systems Advanced Practical Technology
Under the 4-Year Plan for Photovoltaic Power Generation Technology Research and
Development began FY2006-FY2009 based on the 2030 roadmap
R&D for Next generation PV Systems
* FY2006-FY2009
* Aimed at creating basic technologies to meet 2030 roadmap goal- higher
efficiencies, lower costs, improved durability
Development of PV Systems Technology for Mass Deployment, Phase II
* FY2006-FY2009
* Aimed at developing evaluation technologies for performance and reliability
of cells/modules, manufacturing, disposal, and LCA
PV Systems Advanced Practical Technology
* FY2005-FY 2007
* Advances industrial technology to accelerate practical application of R&D
developments
Demonstration
The PV industry in Japan has experienced continued government funding and
presence through the demonstration phases. Unlike other developed countries, the majority
of Japan's public funding is spent on demonstration projects and field tests. The installations
from the demonstrations are significant, for example, the cumulative installed capacity from
field tests FY1992-FY2007 is expected to be about 90 MW. However, the demonstration
also serves to involve other stakeholders in the process and reduce risk.
Below is a description of different demonstration programs conducted by NEDO
(PVPS National Reports, 2003-2007).
PV System Monitoring Program
* FY 1994-FY 1997
* 50% government funded
* Program expanded under the New Energy Law as the Subsidy Program for
Residential Photovoltaic Power Generation Systems
Field Test Project on New PV Power Generation Systems for Industrial and other
Applications
* FY 1998-FY2003
* 50% government funded
* Partnerships with private companies and local governments to demonstrate the
effectiveness of PV systems and to adapt and standardize deployed PV systems
Field Test on New Photovoltaic Power Generation Technology
* FY2003-present
* 50% of the installation cost is subsidized
* Trials medium to large scale advanced technology installations at public and
industrial sites to improve performance and decrease costs
* Private businesses, local authorities and organizations are eligible
* Subsidy recipients must collect performance data of the PV system for 4 years and
demonstrate the performance of the PV system as part of the field test
* Originally only supported projects of 10 kW or more, but in FY2008 it will be
extended to 4 kW or more for a new module type and 3 kW or smaller systems that
have multiple connections, like what would be needed in collective housing
Demonstrative Project on Grid-Interconnection of Clustered Photovoltaic Power Generation
Systems
* FY2002-FY2007
* Trials household, grid-connected PV systems with batteries to research large-scale
and extensive introduction of PV to the grid
Demonstrative Project of Regional Power Grids with Various New Energies
* FY2003-FY2007
* Trials PV systems paired with other distributed generation technologies to study the
issues surrounding electricity quality of distributed power sources
Verification of Grid Stabilization with Large-scale PV Power Generation Systems
* FY2006-present
* Demonstrative research to establish a system for stabilizing the output from MW-
scale PV systems while maintain the grid's electricity quality
Development of an Electric Energy Storage System for Grid-Connection with New Energy
Resources
* FY2005-FY2010
* Developmental research on electricity storage technologies
International Cooperative Demonstration Projects for Stabilized and Advanced Grid-
connection PV Systems
* Demonstrative research of micro-grids with large capacities of PV systems
* Collaboration with China, Thailand, Vietnam, Nepal, Mongolia, Myanmar,
Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia
International Cooperative Demonstration Projects Utilizing Photovoltaic Power Generation
Systems
* FY2006-present
* Improving the reliability of PV systems
* Collaboration with China, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia
Deployment
In 2007, the Revised Basic Energy Plan was released which specified the expansion of
RETs as a priority. Photovoltaics are viewed as a viable energy source in the present and a
key long-term solution to energy supply. Japan is aware of the need for a full portfolio of
policies and accordingly broken down government support measures into six different
categories.
1. Support for basic technological development
2. Creating initial demand
3. Technology introduction by the public sector
4. Support for market expansion
5. Creating a supporting-industry structure
6. Building awareness
An extensive portfolio of market stimulation policies are employed simultaneously
including RPS, net billing, tax incentives, Green Power Funds, low-interest loans, and
subsidies by the national and regional governments.
There are many targets for renewable energy deployment in Japan. In 1997, the Law
Concerning Special Measures to Promote the Use of New Energy, also called the New
Energy Law, set a target of 3.1% renewable energy contribution to total primary energy
supply by 2010 (excluding hydroelectric and geothermal). The Special Measures Law on
Promoting Use of New Energy by Electric Enterprises, also called the RPS Law, sets a target
of 1.35% of electricity by 2010. The Law Concerning Promotion of the Development and
Introduction of Alternative Energy sets a PV specific target of 5000 MW or 12200 Gwh by
2010, which has been extended to 16000 Gwh by 2014 or 1.63% of electricity sales.
Utilities are active in offering their own incentives to meet the RPS. Net metering has
been available to buy back household surplus electricity over a contract period of 15 to 17
years since 1992. Since 2000, utilities have also participated in a Green Power Fund to
develop renewable energy projects. By the end of 2006, 15 MW of photovoltaic modules
were installed through voluntary contributions under the program.
Generation of renewable electricity also generates "unbundled" renewable energy credits.
Details of the law allow banking and borrowing of these credits. To balance the cost
disadvantage that PV has compared to other renewable sources, METI allows the double
counting of electricity generated from PV. In other words, when a PV system generates 1
kWh of electricity it is treated as if it had generated 2 kWh.
Financial incentives include a property tax reduction offered by the national government
to corporations or individuals who install a PV system and low-interest loans for PV projects
offered by commercial banks.
Regional governments are also involved in PV promotion. Three hundred forty-four local
governments have support programs including investment subsidies, production subsidies,
and preferential loan programs. In addition to subsidies offered by regional governments,
subsidies and other promotional programs are hosted by a number of Japanese ministries.
These are listed below.
By METI
Subsidy Program for Residential Photovoltaic Power Generation Systems
* FY 1997-FY2005
* Aimed to create a self-sustaining PV market through subsidies to residential PV
installations
* Paid 33-48% of installation and purchasing costs
* Results - in 2005 when program ended it was responsible for 932 MW of the 1421
installed (65.5%)
Local Introduction of New Energy Promotion Project
* FY 1997- present
* 50% government funding originally and now can be between 50% and 33% (in 2006)
* Promote the use of photovoltaic systems in regional governments and nonprofit
organizations
* For a minimum of four years after the system becomes fully operational the utilization
status of the system is recorded
* About 25 MW will be installed between FY2008 and FY2010
Project for Supporting New Energy Operators
* FY 1998-presen
* Originally a maximum of 50% subsidy and guaranteed debt
* Since 2007, a 1/3 subsidy and 90% guaranteed debt
* Aims to accelerate the private businesses that launch the introduction of new energy-
most installations have occurred at factories
* Between FY 1998 and FY2006 986 MW of PV have been approved
By MoE
Solar Promotion Program
* FY 2006 - present
* A variety of projects that promote the introduction of PV
Community Model Project of a Virtuous Circle for Environment and Economy
* FY2004- present
* City planning efforts which include introduction of PV systems
By MILT
Guidelines for Planning Environmentally-friendly Government Buildings
By MEXT
Eco-school Promotion Pilot Model Project
* FY 1997- present
* Subsidy for planning investigations
* Subsidy covering half the cost of new construction of the school and one third of the
cost for rebuilding or retrofitting
* Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) joined in FY 2002
* MoE joined in FY 2005
Other promotional activities include Cool Earth 50, which began in 2008 and provides an
energy technology innovation plan leading up to 2050. The plan identified PV technology as
a priority technology for meeting greenhouse gas emission reductions and set a goal of 40%
conversion efficiency by 2050. PV is also promoted under the Kyoto Protocol Target
Achievement Plan established in 2005. METI has also established a new energy planning
office made up of several working groups. The goal of the office is to study new ways to
promote PV systems to give new energy to the Japanese PV market. There are also an
increasing number of financial institutions that are financing environmental activities and
providing preferential, low-interest rate loans to install a PV system or on homes that have
PV systems.
The combination of market stimulation policies, especially the residential subsidy,
established a grid-connected, decentralized installation niche market. In 2007, 1919 MW
were installed of which 85.8% were residential, grid-connected, distributed PV systems. The
annual and cumulative installations are shown in Figure 7.8. Residential subsidies have been
very successful for developing a PV market for a number of reasons. First, as private
companies increased production they gained economies of scale, which led to PV system
price decreases. The subsidy offered each year was decreased to maintain equality with
already high grid electricity prices in Japan, creating an instantly viable market. The focus on
standardized systems made it easier for suppliers and consumers to make transactions. What
resulted from the sustained and balanced promotion program is a comprehensive industry
chain and standardized, familiar technology for residential installations. These programs
have also increased public awareness leading to further interest and further opportunities. For
example, programs to buyback surplus power and policies like the Building Standards Law,
which acknowledged PV cells as architectural materials, led to more installations by housing
manufacturers. Installations are now common on private houses, prefabricated houses,
collective housing, apartment houses, public, industrial, and commercial facilities and
buildings.
350 2500
- Off-Grid Domestic
300- Off-Grid Nondomestic
- Grid-Connected Distributed 2000
250 EM Grid-Connected Centralized
" -- Cumulative
C- 1500 a
a 200 o
S 150 9
1000 
100 --
50500 E
50 1 o
1- -5 & -- -
Figure 7.8 Annual and cumulative installed capacity in Japan (PVPS National Reports,
2000-2007)
Currently Japan falls behind Germany in terms of cumulative installed capacity and
behind China in terms of annual production. However, Japan was once the leader in terms
of both installed capacity and production. Unfortunately, the residential subsidy may have
been removed too quickly. In 2006, after the end of the Residential PV System Dissemination
Program, the annual PV market growth stagnated. Regional government subsidies and major
developers who now employ PV systems in pre-fabricated homes are responsible for a large
portion of the installations since the national subsidy scheme ended. Major capacity
installations now are from the Field Test Project on New Photovoltaic Power Generation, the
Project for Supporting New Energy Operators, the Verification of Grid Stabilization with
Large-Scale PV Power Generation System, and the Utility RPS and Green Power Funds. In
2007 for the first time the annual installed capacity in Japan decreased. The decrease in
annual demand may be an artifact of the dried up domestic demand from the conclusion of
the subsidy or other external factors. Installation decreases may be due to production
decreases attributed to a shortage of silicon or a result of more exports to strong German and
Spanish markets. It is unclear whether European demand held the Japanese industry up in
2007 or if the foreign markets out competed the domestic markets. Regardless of the cause,
the Japanese government is reinstating the subsidy in 2009.
Industry Development
The geographical and cultural elements coupled with strong policy contributed to a
strong PV industry. With high energy prices and few natural resources, Japan did not need an
exorbitant subsidy to match the cost of grid-electricity. Japan has a history of industrial
innovation and government-corporation cooperation (Bonvillian, 2009b). Through the
Japanese PV roadmap they targeted the already successful electronics industry and focused
on ways to improve manufacturing. Manufacturing decisions by Japanese firms was highly
influenced by the demand-side policies (Rogol, 2007). The market stimulation policies
made investment in more manufacturing capacity economic and so drove supply-side scale
up which led to reductions in the price of the technology, which then stimulated increased
demand. Despite the per watt subsidy decreasing, installations continued because the
production cost was dropping (Rogol, 2007). The stability of the market support measures
was critical because manufacturers made their investment decisions based on the belief that
the subsidy would remain in place. Without this stability, investments would not have been
made and prices would not have dropped (Rogol, 2007).
At the conclusion of the subsidy, Japan used its experience as an island nation to
generate wealth through export. The Japanese PV industry continued despite lack of strong
market support, and in 2007, 932 MW of photovoltaic cells were produced. More detailed
information about annual production by Japanese firms is shown in Table 7.5.
Table 7.5 Annual production of major Japanese companies (Prometheus Institute, 2007;
Hirshman et al., 2008))
Company 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Kaneka 5 8 7.5 13.5 20 21 30 45
Kyocera 42 54 60 72 105 142 180 207
Mitsubishi 12 14 24 42 75 100 111 121
Electric
Mitsubishi 2 10 12 12 14
Heavy
Sanyo 17 19 35 35 65 125 155 165
Sharp 50.4 75 123.1 197.9 324 428 434 363
Other 2.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 2.5 5 5.5 17
Total 128.6 171.2 251.1 363.9 601.5 833 927.5 932
Japan has a number of firms in the PV industry as shown in Table 7.6 but is clearly
dominated by a few large corporations. Most cell manufacturers produce c-Si, but there are
an increasing number of a-Si manufacturers. Some of the large crystalline silicon
manufacturers are expanding their business to include thin film technology. The commercial
production of CIS began in 2007. There is no production of CdTe modules; they are banned
by law because of fears of toxicity. In addition to cell and module manufacturers, there are
several silicon feedstock producers, several Si-ingot and wafer producers, and inverter
manufacturers. There has also been dramatic growth in the number of PV integrators.
Table 7.6 Diversity of photovoltaic technology in Japan is reflected in the production
and number of firms for each generation (Hirshman et al., 2008;Wesoff, 2008)
First Second Third Generation
Generation Generation
Cell production in 2007 835 97 0
Number of firms in 2007 6 5 2
Firms in 2007 Clean Venture Honda Motor, Aisian Seiki, Sony
21, KIS, Fuji Electric,
Kyocera, Kaneka,
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi
Electric, Sanyo, Heavy, Showa
Sharp Shell
Sources:
Energy Policies of Japan 2008, IEA
PVPS National Reports, 2003-2007
Virdis, Wene & Nilsson, 2003
NEDO, 2004
Kurokawa & Ikki, 2001
Watanabe, Wakabayashi et al. 2000
PV Upscale, 2006
Begin PV R&D
1973
Sunshine Project
1974- 1993
Field
t I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Residential Subsidy Program
FieLd Test Proect on New PV Power eneration Systems
for Industrial and other Applications
5 Year Plan for Photovoltai Power Generation
Technology Reseach and Development
2001 -20W
Demonstrative Project on GridnInterconnetion of
Clustered Photovoltac Power Generation Systems
2002-2007
Field Test in New Photovoltar Power Generation
Ted11
Demostrative Project oftRegional Power Gride with
VarionuNew nes
2003.2007
Community Model Project of a Virtuous Cycle for
Environment and Economy
New Oiosbus 
oProve5 Der opsnmt of an Electic Enrg Slor System for
19- 01997 GnslConn on with NewEnrgy Reournes2005- 200Ivne System Ntooring Progapi191. Ml) 9oot97 PSolr Promotion PRsmraLocal Introduction of N ewIr rgy Promso nio fct 2006
1997
International Cooperativ lmonlrafiln Projcte
Subjdy Program for Ressdntwl PV p pGent Uti fn Photovolaic PowerGener ation Sytesn
201997-21
IVer icatmn of Grid Stabiiation with Large..cah PS
1997 20-
New energy Enterprises National Rrnrwable Porlfolio Radald
P Year Plan for Photovollaic Power meneration
Technology R&D
Government Boin Net metering begin
1998 2Aft.
SP und IResidential Sbidy Program
ea e ow uA0
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 200 2101 2002 2113 2004 200 2006 21007 2008 2009 201 2011 2012
Figure 7.9 Timeline of photovoltaic commercialization policy in Japan (IEA, 2008b)
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8 Appendices
Policy Details
Government intervention has proved to be necessary to commercialize RET because of
common market failures. Government sponsored research and development to overcome the
private sector's underinvestment in R&D creates technology improvements and reductions in
cost. Demonstration projects can contribute to product development by building a customer
base and providing some experience with the technology, market, and regulations. Market
stimulation creates niches in which a product can improve from customer feedback and cost
reductions through learning and economies of scale from which a self-sustaining part of the
economy can be created.
Research and Development
Research and development as a whole is intended to develop technology and lower
costs. It is well established that an R&D portfolio is necessary to provide an adequate
technology-push. The portfolio should have a balanced set of projects addressing short,
medium, and long-term technologies. For example, with respect to PV, R&D should be
performed on many potential materials and device structures. Complementary technologies
like the balance of systems in PV systems and enabling technologies like grids and storage
should be included in the portfolio. Different PV systems are in different phases of
development and will likely serve different markets, but they should all have stable R&D
funding so that new options continue to move through the pipeline.
A more progressive supply-push policy is an R&D partnership. Partnerships
involving government, industry, universities, and international players are becoming widely
used (Gallagher, 2006). The government-industry partnership has been successful in both
wind and solar technologies because the government takes on some of the risk and cost
involved in funding a public good, and industry is around to steer the direction of the work.
The spread risk and spread cost allows firms to undertake R&D that is riskier or peripheral, to
capture knowledge spillovers, and often to maintain intellectual property rights. Government
interest in a technology often sends a signal to industry management and financiers that the
technology is worth further investment.
Demonstration
In technology transformation it is clearly the function of R&D to create and develop a
technology. Equally obvious is the role of demand-pull in market development. The critical
failure in this transformation is often product development. The technology and the market
may exist, but without successfully molding a product around that technology and aligning it
with the market there is still a failure to commercialize. Failure to develop a product by
demonstrating the role of RETs in the future energy system will "send the wrong signal to
governments and private investors and will have the potential to inhibit future investment in
RETs (RETD, 2006)." Therefore, in addition to R&D and market incentives, governments
are increasingly turning to demonstration projects. The demonstration phase is an excellent
learning experience for industry because it allows feedback from customers, engineers, and
installers that can be integrated into product design. Small changes and details to tailor the
technology to the market reinforce the product development. The technology may also be
improved or become cheaper through learning.
For investors, the demonstration phase can be an excellent way to reduce risk. The
chance to observe the technology performing will increase the information they have as to the
technology's shortcomings and successes. Their perceived technology risk will be reduced.
Their perceived market risk will also be reduced because demonstration will provide an
opportunity to verify the niche market. To some extent demonstration may also reduce the
regulatory risk. Although demonstration cannot change poor policies or guarantee that
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policies will not change in the future, it can confirm which policies are working smoothly and
where problems could arise in future projects.
Market Stimulation Incentives
In the case of PV, where high costs prevent a spontaneous market, there are many
market stimulation policies to choose from. Direct incentives increase the number of units
of a RET that are purchased. A procurement policy requires the government to purchase a
predetermined number of units. Procurement creates an instant market that can influence the
entire commercialization chain (Virdis, Wene & Nilsson 2003). It is designed to reduce the
cost by forcing the technology down the learning curve (Gruebler, Nakicenovic, & Victor,
1999). Other regulations that force adoption of a technology are obligations imposed by the
government on other parties. A building standard requires new buildings of a certain size or
type to install a certain amount of RET. Obligations are also created through renewable
portfolio standards, which require utilities to supply a predefined portion of electricity from
renewable energy. Renewable portfolio standards typically apply generically to the breadth
of RETs. In some cases, however, special carve outs, which are technology specific, set
different goals for different RETs.
Indirect incentives increase the attractiveness of purchasing a RET by reducing the
cost to the consumer. Typically, tax credits or cash subsidies are granted. The tax credit
subsidy has the drawback of requiring a consumer with a large enough tax appetite to benefit
from the subsidy. Either of these policies can be capacity-based or production-based. A
capacity-based incentive is determined based on the upfront capital costs of the RET and is
either a fixed amount or a percentage, often with a cap. A performance-based incentive on
the other hand provides a fixed return on every kWh produced by the technology. A more
specific type of performance-based subsidy is called a feed-in tariff. A feed-in tariff
100
guarantees the generator of specific types of technology a fixed return for each kWh fed into
the grid. The feed-in premium,
a derivative of the feed-in tariff, provides a fixed return on the electricity fed into the grid in
addition to the market price of electricity. Feed-in laws are established by the government
and carry an obligation for transmission and distribution operators to connect renewable
energy generators to the grid. Net metering and net billing or buy back programs are similar.
In net metering there is only one meter. During generation the meter spins backwards. At
the end of the billing period the difference between consumption and production is paid to the
utility at the regular residential rate. In net billing the price of the electricity consumed and
produced are different. Net billing is a voluntary purchase agreement where utilities agree to
purchase surplus electricity at the selling price of electricity nationwide. In a buy back
scenario a utility agrees to purchase all of the generation at a fixed rate and they will also
assume ownership of the Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) generated. RECs are a virtual
commodity that is created for each kWh of generation. RECs may be bought and sold to
meet renewable portfolio standards and provide an additional stream of funding.
Placing a price on carbon is another indirect incentive for RETs. Carbon pricing
policies benefit RETs by increasing the cost of the competitor's technology. The carbon
price can be applied through a carbon tax or a carbon cap and trade program. A carbon tax
is a fixed fee set by law that must be paid for each increment of emission of carbon dioxide.
A cap and trade program sets a cap on the total quantity of emissions allowed in a given
period of time for a given region. A permit to emit an increment of carbon dioxide must be
surrendered at the end of each year for the total amount of emissions released that year.
These permits are then bought and sold throughout the year as firms choose whether to
purchase permits or to reduce their emissions. Both the carbon tax and the cap and trade
program seek to equilibrate the marginal abatement cost.
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In addition to regulatory measures, RET can be stimulated by voluntary measures.
The most common of such voluntary measures is green power marketing. Utilities offer
green power marketing to customers who can enroll to pay a premium on all of their
electricity and in return the utility will invest in more renewable energy generation (Bird &
Sweezy, 2005).
The are other tax measures such as accelerated depreciation, value added tax
reductions, reductions on import duty, property tax exemptions, and tax holidays employed to
support RETs.
Investment into RET can also be stimulated by reducing non-economic barriers.
Those barriers include interconnection rules, siting, licensing, and permitting laws, and a
variety of other potential penalties (Margolis & Zuboy, 2006). The private sector is more
willing to invest if the market and regulations are clear. Information sharing can also be
helpful to stimulate adoption of RET. In many cases adopters are unsure of the technological
performance. If the technical performance is more certain then project financiers can more
easily calculate the financial structure to guarantee a return. There are many other financial
tools that can be used to make investment in RET more widely available (Haas et. al, 2003;
IEA, 2004)
Amidst the debates over which policies are best, the bottom line is that the details of
the policy are paramount and in many cases several policies must work simultaneously to be
successful. Experience with different policies and different policy combinations have
revealed best practice structures for market creation policies and general qualities of policies
that are crucial (de Jager & Rathmann, 2008 ch. 3).
Risk reduction is best achieved through policies that are long-term, stable (Loiter &
Norberg-Bohm, 1999), transparent (Loiter & Norberg-Bohm, 1999), and technology-specific
(Watson, 2008). "A clear, long-term vision is needed that can underpin investor confidence to
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further invest in innovative technologies (IEA, 2008a pp. 127)." Stability is required to
minimize the risk in investing money into a project. If there is doubt as to whether the policy
will be in effect in the future firms may drag their heels hoping the policy will change. On
the other hand, if the policy is perceived to be stable it may be easier to get capital from
lending parties. Transparency is how closely the policy reflects the interests of the governing
authority. If a particular policy directly affects the target in an unambiguous way, firms can
predict future standards and take aggressive steps now rather than waiting. Policies that are
not transparent may cause firms to take actions that do not achieve the environmental goals.
Technology-specificity allows the entire portfolio of RETs under development to be
influenced by the market. Without technology-specificity the technology closest to
commercialization is the only one stimulated.
The importance of the market is to exert a pull earlier in the commercialization chain
that acts as a stimulus to researchers, investors, and industry to innovate to capture some of
the market. A potentially lucrative market encourages researchers to innovate to develop a
low cost technology that will return higher profits. A current example is the surge in
development and success of thin film PV technologies. These thin film technologies are
significantly less expensive to produce and yet they are still eligible for the feed-in tariff that
was designed to support the more expensive silicon cells. Incremental innovations are
commonly discovered as the technology is tested as a product. The market also provides
learning opportunities and a chance to achieve economies of scale in production and
installation as shown in. Cost reductions through economies of scale clearly require product
production. A market is a rational reason for industry and investors to spend the money
required to start large-scale production. A market that supports the technology at its present
cost can unlock the potential to drive down future costs. The assumptions that must be met to
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price below current costs may not be met with RETs because of the amount of competition
and non-appropriability of the technology (Spence, 1979).
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Model Documentation
Abandonment Rate [company,featuretype]=0
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which feature ideas are abandoned
Abandonment Rate 1 [company,featuretype]=Feature Devl Rate 1 [company,featuretype] *Feature Abandonment
Fraction 1 [company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which feature ideas are abandoned in Ist stage of product development
Abandonment Rate 2[company,featuretype] =
Feature Devl Rate 2 [company,featuretype]*Feature Abandonment Fraction 2 [company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which feature ideas are abandoned in 2nd stage of product development
Abandonment Rate 3[company,featuretype] =
Feature Devl Rate 3[company,featuretype]*Feature Abandonment Fraction 3[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which feature ideas are abandoned in 3rd stage of product development
Accounts Receivable= INTEG (Billing-Cash Received From Customers-Defaults on AR,O)
Units: Dollars
Revenue waiting to be received in cash
Additonal Increment of Adopters=((Purchasers-Dummy Purchasers)/TIME STEP)*Increase Adopters Switch
Units: Prospects/Month
The additional number of adopters induced from direct market stimulation policy
Adjustment for Eng Vacancies= (Desired Eng Vacancies - Eng Vacancies)/Eng Vacancy Adjustment Time
Units: Persons/Month
Adjusts eng vacancy creation to have the desired number of vacancies.
Adjustment for Engineers=(Indicated Desired Engineers-Engineers)/Engineers Adjustment Time
Units: Persons/Month
Adjusts the desired hiring rate of engineers to bring the number employed to the desired level.
Adjustment for FUD[company,featuretype]=(Desired FUD[company,featuretype]-Product Features Under
Development[company,featuretype])/FUD Adjustment Time[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
How many features per month we need to add (or subtract) from FUD
Adjustment for Sales Force=(Indicated Desired Sales Force-Sales Force)/Sales Force Adjustment Time
Units: Persons/Month
Adjusts the desired hiring rate of sales people to bring the number employed to the desired level.
Adjustment for Sales Vacancies= (Desired Sales Vacancies - Sales Vacancies)/Sales Vacancy Adjustment Time
Units: Persons/Month
Adjusts sales vacancy creation to have the desired number of vacancies.
Adjustment for Technology Under Development[company]=(Desired Technology Under
Development[company]-Technology Features Under Development[company])/Technology Under
Development Adjustment Time[company]
Units: Features/Month
How many features per month we need to add (or subtract) from TFUD
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Adopter Increase Ramp Time=3
Units: Months
Time it takes for policy to take full effect
Adopter Increase Start Time=0O
Units: Months
Time at which policy starts having an effect
Adopter Loss Fraction=Normal Adopter Loss Fraction*Effect of Customer Support on Adopter Loss Fraction
(Normalized Cust Support)*Effect of Features on Adopter Loss Fraction(Normalized Features)*Effect
of Technology on Adopter Loss Fraction(Normalized Technology)
Units: I/Months
What fraction of adopters we lose every month
Adopter loss rate=Adopters*Adopter Loss Fraction
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which adopters stop using the product
Adopters= INTEG (+Adoption Rate-Adopter loss rate,Initial Adopters)
Units: Prospects
Prospects who are now using the product
Adoption Capab Increase Ramp Time=3
Units: Months
Time it takes for policy to take full effect
Adoption Capab Increase Start Time=0O
Units: Months
Time at which policy starts having an effect
Adoption Productivity Of Sales Effort=MIN(Max Adoption Productivity From Sales,Sales Experience
Productivity Multiplier*Max Adoption Productivity From Sales*Effect Of Customer Support On
Adoption Efficiency*Effect Of Features On Adoption Efficiency*Effect Of Technology On Adoption
Efficiency)
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour)
The decision rate of sales effort as effected by price, features, cust support (for trials), and word-of-
mouth
Adoption Rate=IF THEN ELSE(Norm Adoption Rate>O, Norm Adoption Rate*Prospect Conversion Fn
(ZIDZ(Potential Adoption From Sales Effort,Norm Adoption Rate)), 0)
Units: Prospects/Month
The rate at which purchasers start to use the product
Adoption Sales Effort=Fraction effort for adoption*Sales Effort
Units: Persons* Hours/Month
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on decisions per month
Allow Layoffs= 1
Units: Dmnl
Whether or not to allow layoffs to occur (0=no, l=yes)
Annual Cash Flow from Private Investment-SAMPLE IF TRUE(Reset Switch= 1, Annual Cash Flow from
Private Investment Stock, Cash Flow from Private Investment*Reset Interval)
Units: $
Annual cash from private sector plotted to scale
Annual Cash Flow from Private Investment Stock= INTEG (Cash Flow from Private Investment-Reset Annual
Cash Flow from Private Investment,O)
Units: $
Annual private investment accumulates revenue inflows from the beginning to the end of a year.
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Annual Cash Flow from Public RD Funding= INTEG (Cash Flow from RD Funding-Reset Annual Cash Flow
from RD Funding,O)
Units: $
Annual public R&D funding accumulates revenue inflows from the beginning to the end of a year.
Annual Cash Flow from RD for Display=SAMPLE IF TRUE(
Reset Switch=l, Annual Cash Flow from Public RD Funding, Cash Flow from RD Funding*Reset
Interval)
Units: $
Annual public R&D funding accumulates revenue inflows from the beginning to the end of a year.
Annual Discount Rate=0.02
Units: Dimensionless
Discounting the value of money over time
Annual Total Cash Flow from Public Funding=SAMPLE IF TRUE(Reset Switch= 1, Annual Total Cash Flow
from Public Funding Stock, Total Cash Flow from Public Funding*Reset Interval)
Units: $
Annual cash from public plotted to scale
Annual Total Cash Flow from Public Funding Stock- INTEG (Total Cash Flow from Public Funding-Reset
Annual Total Cash Flow from Public Funding,0)
Units: $
Annual public funding accumulates revenue inflows from the beginning to the end of a year.
Appropriable Feature Development Fraction=l-Nonappropriable Feature Devlopment Fraction
Units: Dimensionless
Fraction of development effort applied to approbriable features
Available Private Investor Financing=IF THEN ELSE(Indicated Private Investment Win Fraction>1, Minimum
Private Investor Financing*Indicated Private Investment Win Fraction, 0)
Units: Dollars
The highest amount of funding the investors will provide considering the size of the market and the
competitiveness of the technology (cost and functionality)
Average Layoff Time=2
Units: Months
The average time required to lay off an engineer
Avg Engineer Experience=ZIDZ(Engineer Experience,Engineers)
Units: Hours
How many hours of experience the avg engineer has
Avg Experience Of New Eng Hires=2000
Units: Hours [0,10000,35]
Average relevant experience of new engineering hires
Avg Experience Of New Sales Hires= 1000
Units: Hours
Average relevant experience of new sales hires
Avg Feature Devl Time[company,featuretype]=2,12;4,24;
Units: Months [0,50]
How long, on average, does it take to develop a feature, regardless of how many engineers are working
on it
Avg Feature Lifetime[company,featuretype]=10000
Units: Months [0,10000]
Avg amount of time a feature is useful for
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Avg Hot Prospect Lifetime=4
Units: Months [1,?]
Mininum amount of time it takes to persuade a prospect to trial the product
Avg Potential Prospect Lifetime=6
Units: Months [1,?]
Average amount of time it takes for a potential prospect to become aware of product and become a
prospect
Avg Prospect Lifetime=l
Units: Months [1,?]
Average amount of time it takes to persuade a prospect to seriously consider purchasing
Avg Purchaser Lifetime=l
Units: Months [1,?]
Mininum amount of time it takes to persuade a purchaser to start using product
Avg Receivable Delay=1.5
Units: Months [0.1,12,0.1]
How long it takes on average to get paid
Avg Salary=17000
Units: Dollars/(Person*Month)
Average loaded salary across all employees (includes office and admin costs)
Avg Sales Experience=ZIDZ(Sales Experience, Sales Force)
Units: Hours
Avg hours of experience of sales force
Avg Technology Devl Time[company]=6, 12
Units: Months [0,20]
How long, on average, does it take to develop a technology regardless of how many engineers are
working on it
Avg Technology Lifetime[company]=10000
Units: Months
Avg amount of time a technology is useful for
Avg Time to Fill Eng Vacancies=2.5
Units: Months
The average time required to fill an engineering vacancy
Avg Time to Fill Sales Vacancies=2.5
Units: Months
The average time required to fill a sales vacancy
Bankrupt Switch= IF THEN ELSE(Working Capital<=0, 1, 0)
Units: Dmnl
If cash goes to 0 (or less!), then company is bankrupt
Begin Counter=Total Population*Increase In Addressable Market*Fraction Of Firms Capable Of Adopting
Units: Prospects/Month
Tracks increase in size of potential market by fraction of total firms that we are able to address that are
capable of adopting product per time period if there is no increase in adopters policy: All shadows in
this stock and flow chain are set up to determine the number of adopters in the absence of a direct
market incentive to determine the cost of the policy
Billing=Quantity Per Purchase*Adoption Rate*Initial Payment+Maintenance Billing
Units: Dollars/Month
Amount of money customers obligated to pay
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Bum Rate=IF THEN ELSE(Cash Flow From Operations<0, -Cash Flow From Operations, le-007)
Units: Dollars/Month
If cash flow is negative, bum rate is simply the inverse, otherwise we're not burning money, but set the
bum rate to very low number so as not to divide by 0.
Carbon Policy Effect on Comp Cost=0.3
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,0.01]
What fraction initial competitor cost will change based on carbon policy (0.1 = 10% increase, 1 =
double, -1 means it goes to 0)
Carbon Policy Ramp Time= 10
Units: Months
Time it takes for carbon policy to take full effect
Carbon Policy Start Time=0
Units: Months
Time at which carbon policy starts having an effect
Carbon Policy Switch=0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Whether's there's a carbon policy or not that will effect competitor's prices
Cash Flow From Operations=Cash Received From Customers-Outflows Of Capital
Units: Dollars/Month
The amount of cash left over after salaries and COGS are paid
Cash Flow from Private Investment=Funds Raised From Private Investors
Units: Dollars/Month
Private Investment as inflow to annual revenue accumulator.
Cash Flow from RD Funding=Public RD Investment
Units: Dollars/Month
Revenue as inflow to annual revenue accumulator.
Cash for Firm Operations= INTEG (Inflows Of Capital-Outflows Of Capital,0)
Units: Dollars
Amount of money venture has available to spend. Increased by investments and revenue, and decreased
by spending on salaries and COGS.
Cash Received From Customers=Accounts Receivable/Avg Receivable Delay
Units: Dollars/Month
Amount of cash coming in from customers
Cash Restricted for Technology Development= INTEG (Inflow of Technology Development Funding-Outflow
of Technology Development Funding,0)
Units: Dollars
Cash that because of government restrictions may only be used to fund technology development
Change in Bum Rate Required=IF THEN ELSE(Months of Runway>Min Runway In Order To Hire, Months of
Runway/Min Runway In Order To Hire, IF THEN ELSE( Months of Runway<Min Runway, Months
of Runway/(Min Runway+ 1),1))
Units: Dmnl
If we have more than enough months of capital to bum, we can adjust the bum up, but if we have less
than the min runway months of capital, we must adjust the bum down, otherwise don't adjust the bum
Change in Salary Required=Bum Rate*(Change in Bum Rate Required-l)
Units: Dollars/Month
How much to adjust salary payments to make the required adjustment in bum rate
109
Change in Workforce Required=Change in Salary Required/Avg Salary
Units: People
How many people do we need to lay off to change salary payments by the required amount
COGS=Product COGS+Maintenance COGS
Units: Dollars/Month
Total cost of goods sold
Competitor Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy=l +(Carbon Policy Switch *RAMP(Carbon Policy Effect
on Comp Cost/Carbon Policy Ramp Time, Carbon Policy Start Time, (Carbon Policy Start Time +
Carbon Policy Ramp Time)))
Units: Dimensionless
If there's a carbon policy, then effect on competitors cost will ramp up to it's full effect starting at start
time and taking the amount of time specified by ramp time.
Competitor Margin=Max Competitor Margin - Competitor Margin Adjustment Fn(Delay3i(Normalized
Price,Competitor Margin Adjust Time, 1)) * (Max Competitor Margin - Min Competitor Margin)
Units: Dmnl
Competitor will charge their max margin unless our price is below theirs in which case the Competitor
Margin Adjustment Fn will determine how far to move towards the min margin they could charge
Competitor Margin Adjust Time=3
Units: Months [0.1,36,0.1]
How long it takes for competitor to adjust their margin in response to venture's change in price
Competitor Margin Adjustment Fn([(0.5,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(0.5,1),(0.620795,0.907895),(0.69419,0.754386),(0.75
,0.5),(0.799694,0.232456),(0.874618,0.109649),(1,0),(1000,0))
Units: Dimensionless
Input is ratio between price and competitor's price and output is how much to adjust competitor's
margin. If ratio >=1, then no need to adjust at all, and if ratio <=0.5 (competitor is charging twice as
much) then adjust the maximum amount, and s-shaped curve in between
Competitor Price=(Initial Competitor Cost Per Unit * Competitor Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy)/(1-
Competitor Margin)
Units: Dollars/Unit
How much competitor charges (reference price)
Constrained Eng Hiring Rate=Desired Eng Hiring Rate
Units: People/Month
If we want to hire more people than we could afford, then if we don't want to hire anyone else, we can
hire the maximum allowed number of engineers, otherwise we hire the proportional number we're
allowed
Constrained Sales Hiring Rate=Desired Sales Hiring Rate
Units: People/Month
If we want to hire more people than we could afford, then if we don't want to hire anyone else, we can
hire the maximum allowed number of sales people, otherwise we hire the proportional number we're
allowed
Contact Rate=0.25
Units: 1/Month
Rate of contact between adopters and potential prospects (relatively high)
Cost Per Unit=(Initial Cost Per Unit*((Cumulative Purchases/Reference Production for Initial Cost)^(LN(1 -
Decrease in Costs per Double Purchases)/LN(2)))*((ZIDZ(Cumulative Technology
Development,Reference Technology Development for Initial Cost))A(LN(1 - Decrease in Costs per
Double Technology Development)/LN(2))))
Units: Dollars/Unit
Cost to manufacture/produce/provide product to purchasers
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Cost Share Amount=(Indicated Cost Share Amount/TIME STEP)*PULSE TRAIN(0,0,Funding
Frequency,FINAL TIME)
Units: Dollars/Month
The amount of cost shared public funds instantaneously pulsed in
Cost Share Switch=0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
When switch is on firm recieves money for cost sharing development and demonstration.
Cum Prob of Failure Based on Hazard Rate= INTEG (Hazard Rate Incr,0)
Units: Dimensionless
The cumulative probability of the investors or entrepreneurs giving up on the venture based on the
accumulation over time of a hazard rate of failure
Cumulative Profit=- INTEG (Net Income,0)
Units: $
The total profit a firm accumulates
Cumulative Purchases= INTEG (Purchase Rate, 1)
Units: Prospects
Total number of purchases made (regardless of how purchases used)
Cumulative Technology Development=Technology Development[self]
Units: Features
Total technology development over time
Cumulative Ticks= INTEG (Ticks - Reset ticks,0)
Units: Month
Cust Support Needed=Adopters*Cust Support Needed per Adopter + Purchasers*Cust Support Needed Per
Purchaser
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Total cust support needed for customers who have purchased and adopted the product (includes time
needed to deliver the product)
Cust Support Needed per Adopter=8
Units: ((Person*Hours)/Month)/Prospect
Person-Hours needed per month needed to support each adopter
Cust Support Needed Per Purchaser=40
Units: Hours*Person/(Month*Prospect)
Person-Hours needed per month needed to support each purchaser (in process of adoption)
Decision Productivity Of Sales Effort=MIN(Max Decision Productivity From Sales,Sales Experience
Productivity Multiplier*Max Decision Productivity From Sales*Effect Of Features On Decision
Efficiency*Effect Of Price On Decision Efficiency*Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Decision
Efficiency*Effect Of Customer Support On Decision Efficiency*Effect Of Technology On Decision
Efficiency)
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour)
The decision rate of sales effort as effected by price, features, cust support (for trials), and word-of-
mouth
Decision sales effort=Fraction effort for decision*Sales Effort
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on decisions per month
Decrease in Costs per Double Purchases=0.1
Units: Dmnl
Fractional decrease in costs to produce the products per double the amount produced (i.e. sold)
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Decrease in Costs per Double Technology Development=0.18
Units: Dmnl
Fractional decrease in costs to produce the products per double the technology development over time
Default Rate=Normal Default Fraction*Effect of Cust Support on Default Rate Fn(Normalized Cust Support)*
Effect of Cust Financial Condition on Default Rate Fn(Normalized Cust Fincd Condition)
Units: 1/Month
Rate at which customers are defaulting based on our cust support and their financial condition
Defaults on AR=Accounts Receivable*Default Rate
Units: Dollars/Month
Dollars per month we're losing due to customer defaults on their bills
Desired Eng Hiring Rate=MAX(0,Adjustment for Engineers + Eng Attrition Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
Hire enough people to replace expected attrition and adjust number of engineers to the desired level
(and if need to reduce them, then do so through attrition)
Desired Eng Lay Off Rate=Allow Layoffs * MAX(O, -Constrained Eng Hiring Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
If hiring rate is negative, means we want to get rid of engineers
Desired Eng Proportion=ZIDZ(Desired Eng Hiring Rate,Desired Hiring Rate)
Units: Dimensionless
Proportion of all new hires we want for engineering
Desired Eng Vacancies=MAX(O,Expected Time to Fill Eng Vacancies*Constrained Eng Hiring Rate)
Units: People
Number of engineering vacancies needed to generate the desired hiring rate, given the expected time
required to fill an engineering vacancy.
Desired Eng Vacancy Cancellation Rate=MAX(O, -Desired Eng Vacancy Creation Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
The desired rate of engineering vacancy cancellation, given by the desired vacancy creation rate
whenever that rate is negative.
Desired Eng Vacancy Creation Rate=Constrained Eng Hiring Rate + Adjustment for Eng Vacancies
Units: Persons/Month
Create enough engineering vacancies to result in the desired hiring rate, adjusted to bring the stock of
vacancies in line with the desired level.
Desired Engineering Effort for Cust Support=Cust Support Needed
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Assume for now that we desire engineers just for the customer support that's needed now
Desired Engineering Effort for Feature Development=Desired Feature Development Rate[self,appropriable] *
Eng Hrs Required per Feature[self,appropriable]+Desired Feature Development
Rate[self,nonappropriable] * Eng Hrs Required per Feature[self,nonappropriable]
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
How many person hours are needed to develop the features we desire
Desired Engineering Effort for Technology Development=Desired Technology Development Rate[self] * Eng
Hrs Required per Technology[self]+Desired Technology Development Rate[selfJ * Eng Hrs Required
per Technology[self]
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
How many person hours are needed to develop the features we desire
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Desired Engineers=xIDZ((Desired Engineering Effort for Feature Development + Desired Engineering Effort
for Cust Support+Desired Engineering Effort for Technology Development), Productive Eng Work
Month, 100)
Units: People
How many Engineers we need to make up the feature shortfall, based on their productivity and how
many hours are needed for cust support (current engineering) (but can't be negative if too many
featues)
Desired Feature Completion Rate[company,featuretype]=Feature Shortfall[company,featuretype]/Desired Time
to Catch Up Features[company,featuretype] +Perceived Feature Obsolescense
Rate[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
How many features we'd like to develop per month to obtain stock of features we'd like (taking into
account features we're losing from obsolescense) -- allowed to go negative
Desired Feature Development Rate[company,featuretype]=MAX(0, Desired Feature Completion Rate
[company,featuretype]+Abandonment Rate[company,featuretype]+Adjustment for
FUD[company,featuretype])
Units: Feature/Month
At what rate do we want to be starting feature development, taking into account the features already
under development, and the ones being abandoned
Desired Feature Ratio[self,appropriable]=1.25
Desired Feature Ratio[self,nonappropriable]=1 .25
Desired Feature Ratio[competitor,featuretype] = 1.1,1.1
Units: Dmnl [0,8,0.05]
Desired ratio between our features and competitors features (to drive product attractiveeness)
Desired Features[self,featuretype]=IF THEN ELSE (Switch for Product Development
=0,0,Features[competitor,featuretype]*Desired Feature Ratio[self,featuretype])Desired
Features[competitor,featuretype]=Features[self,featuretype] *Desired Feature
Ratio[competitor,featuretype]
Units: Features
How many features we desire (based on how many features competitors have, and how we want to
compare to competitors)
Desired FUD[company,featuretype]=Desired Feature Completion Rate[company,featuretype]*Avg Feature
Devl Time [company,featuretype]
Units: Features
How many features we need under development to maintain the rate of feature development we desire
Desired Hiring Rate=Desired Eng Hiring Rate+Desired Sales Hiring Rate
Units: People/Month
The total amount of hires we desire to make per month
Desired Marketing Effort=IF THEN ELSE (Cash for Firm Operations<=0,0,Min Marketing Effort*Portion of
Min Effort for Marketing Fn(Prospect to Population Ratio))
Units: Person*Hours/Month
Devote at least min hours, or the multiple of the min effort determined by the function
Desired Sales Effort=IF THEN ELSE (Cash for Firm Operations<=0,0,Desired Sales Hours/Time to Apply
Effort)
Units: Person*Hours/Month
How many person-hours of effort do we want the sales force to apply per month
Desired Sales Force=(Desired Sales Effort+Desired Marketing Effort)/Sales Work Month
Units: People
How many people do we want for sales and marketing
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Desired Sales Hiring Rate=MAX(O, Adjustment for Sales Force + Sales Attrition Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
Hire enough people to replace expected attrition and adjust number of sales people to the desired level
(and if need to reduce them, then do so through attrition)
Desired Sales Hours=ZIDZ(Potential Prospects,(ZIDZ(Knowledge Productivity Of Sales Effort, Effect Of
Features On Knowledge Efficiency))) +ZIDZ(Prospects, (ZIDZ(Persuasion Productivity Of Sales
Effort,Effect Of Features On Persuasion Efficiency))) +ZIDZ(Hot Prospects, (ZIDZ(Decision
Productivity Of Sales Effort,Effect Of Features On Decision Efficiency))) +ZIDZ(Purchasers,
(ZIDZ(Adoption Productivity Of Sales Effort,Effect Of Features On Adoption Efficiency)))
Units: (Person*Hours)
How many person-hours of sales effort do we need based on our sales productivity and the number of
prospects at each stage of the sales cycle
Desired Sales Lay Off Rate=Allow Layoffs * MAX(O, -Constrained Sales Hiring Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
If hiring rate is negative, means we want to get rid of sales people as long as we're willing to make lay
offs
Desired Sales Proportion=ZIDZ(Desired Sales Hiring Rate,Desired Hiring Rate)
Units: Dimensionless
Proportion of all new hires we want for sales
Desired Sales Vacancies=MAX(O,Expected Time to Fill Sales Vacancies*Constrained Sales Hiring Rate)
Units: People
Number of sales vacancies needed to generate the desired hiring rate, given the expected time required
to fill a sales vacancy.
Desired Sales Vacancy Cancellation Rate=MAX(O, -Desired Sales Vacancy Creation Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
The desired rate of sales vacancy cancellation, given by the desired vacancy creation rate whenever
that rate is negative.
Desired Sales Vacancy Creation Rate=Constrained Sales Hiring Rate + Adjustment for Sales Vacancies
Units: Persons/Month
Create enough sales vacancies to result in the desired hiring rate, adjusted to bring the stock of
vacancies in line with the desired level.
Desired Technology Completion Rate[company]=Technology Shortfall[company]/Desired Time to Catch Up
Technology[company]+Perceived Technology Obsolescense Rate[company]
Units: Features/Month
How much technology we'd like to develop per month to obtain stock of technology development we'd
like (taking into account technolgy we're losing from obsolescense) -- allowed to go negative
Desired Technology Development Rate[company]=MAX(O, Desired Technology Completion
Rate[company]+Technology Abandonment Rate[company]+Adjustment for Technology Under
Development[company])
Units: Feature/Month
At what rate do we want to be starting technology development, taking into account the technology
already under development, and the ones being abandoned
Desired Technology Under Development[company]=Desired Technology Completion Rate[company]*Avg
Technology Devl Time[company]
Units: Features
How much technology we need under development to maintain the rate of technology development we
desire
Desired Time to Catch Up Features[company,featuretype]=2,4;6,12;
Units: Months [0,80,0.1]
How soon we'd like our features to reach the desired level
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Desired Time to Catch Up Technology[company]=6,12
Units: Months [0,80,0.1]
How soon we'd like our technologies to reach the desired level
Dummy Adopter loss rate=Dummy Adopters*Adopter Loss Fraction
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Adopter loss rate
Dummy Adopters= INTEG (+Dummy Adoption Rate-Dummy Adopter loss rate,Initial Adopters)
Units: Prospects
Shadow of Adopters
Dummy Adoption Rate=IF THEN ELSE(Norm Adoption Rate>0, Dummy Norm Adoption Rate*Prospect
Conversion Fn(ZIDZ(Potential Adoption From Sales Effort,Dummy Norm Adoption Rate)), 0)
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Adoption Rate
Dummy Hot prospect loss rate=MAX(0,Dummy Norm Decision Rate-Dummy Purchase Rate)
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Hot prospect loss rate
Dummy Hot Prospects= INTEG (Dummy Persuasion Rate-Dummy Hot prospect loss rate-Dummy Purchase
Rate, Initial Hot Prospects)
Units: Prospects
Shadow of Hot Prospects
Dummy Knowledge Rate=Dummy Norm Knowledge Rate*Prospect Conversion Fn(ZIDZ(Potential Knowledge
From Sales Effort, Dummy Norm Knowledge Rate))
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Knowledge Rate
Dummy Lost Prospects= INTEG (Dummy Adopter loss rate+Dummy Hot prospect loss rate+Dummy Potential
Prospect Loss Rate+Dummy Prospect Loss Rate+Dummy Purchaser Loss Rate-Dummy Prospect
Regain Rate,0)
Units: Prospects
Shadow of Lost Prospects
Dummy Norm Adoption Rate=Dummy Purchasers/Avg Purchaser Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Norm Adoption Rate
Dummy Norm Decision Rate=Dummy Hot Prospects/Avg Hot Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Norm Decision Rate
Dummy Norm Knowledge Rate=Dummy Potential Prospects/Avg Potential Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Norm Knowledge Rate
Dummy Norm Persuasion Rate=Dummy Prospects/Avg Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Norm Persuasion Rate
Dummy Persuasion Rate=IF THEN ELSE(Norm Persuasion Rate>0, Dummy Norm Persuasion Rate*Prospect
Conversion Fn (ZIDZ(Potential Persuasion From Sales Effort, Dummy Norm Persuasion Rate)), 0)
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Persuasion Rate
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Dummy Potential Prospect Loss Rate=MAX(O,Dummy Norm Knowledge Rate-Dummy Knowledge Rate)
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Potential Prospect Loss Rate
Dummy Potential Prospects=INTEG (Begin Counter+Dummy Prospect Regain Rate-Dummy Knowledge Rate-
Dummy Potential Prospect Loss Rate,lnitial Potential Prospects)
Units: Prospects
Shadow of Potential Prospects
Dummy Prospect Loss Rate=MAX(0,(Dummy Norm Persuasion Rate-Dummy Persuasion Rate))
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Prospect Loss Rate
Dummy Prospect Regain Rate=Dummy Lost Prospects/Lost Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Prospect Regain Rate
Dummy Prospects= INTEG (Dummy Knowledge Rate-Dummy Persuasion Rate-Dummy Prospect Loss Rate,
Initial Prospects)
Units: Prospects
Shadow of Dummy Prospects
Dummy Purchase Rate=IF THEN ELSE(Norm Decision Rate>0, Dummy Norm Decision Rate*Prospect
Conversion Fn(ZIDZ(Potential Decision From Sales Effort,Dummy Norm Decision Rate)), 0)
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Purchase Rate
Dummy Purchaser Loss Rate=MAX(0,Dummy Norm Adoption Rate-Dummy Adoption Rate)
Units: Prospects/Month
Shadow of Purchaser Loss Rate
Dummy Purchasers= INTEG (Dummy Purchase Rate-Dummy Adoption Rate-Dummy Purchaser Loss
Rate,Initial Purchasers)
Units: Prospects
Shadow of Purchasers
Effect of Cust Financial Condition on Default Rate Fn([(0,0)-
(3,10)],(0,100),(0.1,10),(0.25,4),(0.33,3),(0.5,2),(0.75,1.33),(1,1),(2,0.1),( 100,0.01))
Units: Dmnl
If customers are bankrupt, then 100* default rate, and if customers have tons of cash, then 1% of
default rate, and asymptotic in between
Effect of Cust Support on Default Rate Fn([(0,0)(5,20)],(0,1000),(0.05,20),(0.1,5),(0.2,3.25),(0.5,2),(0.7,1.3),(1,
1),(5,0.5),(100,0.25))
Units: Dimensionless
With no customer support at all, all customers default, with norm cust support, defaults are normal, and
with maximum customer support, curve is asymptotic to one quarter the default rate
Effect of Customer Support on Adopter Loss Fraction([(0,0)(3,10)],(0,10),(0.06,5.5),(0.125,3.5),
(0.25,2.25),(0.5,1.5),(1,1),(1.44037,0.473684),(2,0. 1),(100,0. 1))
Units: Dmnl
If no cust support we lose everyone, and if great cust support we lose much fewer adopters than
normal, and asymptotic curve in between
Effect Of Customer Support On Adoption Efficiency= l+Effect Of Customer Support On Adoption Efficiency
Fn(Normalized Cust Support)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of implementation is affected by the level of customer support
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Effect Of Customer Support On Adoption Efficiency Fn([(0,0)-(1, 1)],(0,0),(1, 1))
Units: Dmnl
Assuming cust support is needed to help purchaser to use product, linear relationship between cust
support and adoption efficiency
Effect Of Customer Support On Decision Efficiency=l+Effect Of Customer Support On Decision Efficiency
Fn(Normalized Cust Support)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the decision stage is affected by the level of customer support
Effect Of Customer Support On Decision Efficiency Fn([(0,0)-(l0,10)],(0,0.5),(1,1),(10,1))
Units: Dmnl
Assuming only a portion of hot prospects are trialing, 0 cust support will only cut decision productivity
in half, and then it will rise linearly to 1
Effect of Features on Adopter Loss Fraction([(0,0)(3,100)],(0,100),(0.06,32),(0.125,16),(0.25,8),
(0.5,2),(1,1),(l .44037,0.473684),(2,0.1),(100,0. 1))
Units: Dmnl
If no features, we lose everyone, and if great features we lose much less, and asymptotic curve in
between
Effect Of Features On Adoption Efficiency=Effect Of Features On Adoption Efficiency Fn(Normalized
Features)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the adoption stage is affected by normalized features
Effect Of Features On Adoption Efficiency Fn([(O,0)-(l,1)],(0,0),(0.5,0.5),( 1.5,0.9),(2,1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
No features still equals no sales, but given that they've already purchased, lack of some features will
have less of a negative effect
Effect Of Features On Decision Efficiency=Effect Of Features On Decision Efficiency Fn(Normalized Features)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the decision stage is affected by normalized features
Effect Of Features On Decision Efficiency Fn([(0,0)(1,1),(0,0),(0. 125,0.02),(0.25,0.1),(0.375,0.2),(0.5,0.5)
,(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),(1,1)],(0,0),(0.25,0.02),(0.5,0.1),(0.75,0.2),(1,0.5),(l .35,0.8),(1.5,0.
9),(1.75,0.98),(2, 1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
Effect Of Features On Fraction of Firms Capable of Adopting=Effect Of Features On Fraction of Firms Capable
of Adopting Fn(Normalized Features)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by the normalized features
Effect Of Features On Fraction of Firms Capable of Adopting Fn([(0,0)-( 10, l),(0,0),(0.125,0.02),(0.25,0. 1),
(0.375,0.2),(0.5,0.5),(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),(1,1)],(0,0),(0.256881,0.0570175),(0.504587,0.
166667),(0.749235,0.298246),(1,0.5),(2.44648,0.622807),(4.98471,0.789474),(7.49235,0.925439),(10,
1))
Units: Dmnl
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
Effect Of Features On Knowledge Efficiency=Effect Of Features On Knowledge Efficiency Fn(Normalized
Features)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by the normalized features
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Effect Of Features On Knowledge Efficiency Fn([(0.5,0)(1,0.5),(0,0),(0.125,0.02),(0.25,0.1 ),(0.375,0.2)
,(0.5,0.5),(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),(1,1)],(0,0),(0.25,0.02),(0.5,0.1),(0.625382,0.129386),(0.7
5,0.2),(0.874618,0.33114),(1,0.5),( 1.35,0.8),(1 .5,0.9),(1.75,0.98),(2,1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
Effect Of Features On Persuasion Efficiency=Effect Of Features On Persuasion Efficiency Fn(Normalized
Features)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the persuasion stage is affected by normalized features
Effect Of Features On Persuasion Efficiency Fn([(0,0)( 1,1 ),(0,0),(0. 125,0.02),(0.25,0. 1),
(0.375,0.2),(0.5,0.5),(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),(1,1)],(0,0),(0.25,0.02),(0.5,0.1),(0.75,0.2),(1,0.
5),(1.35,0.8),(1.5,0.9),(1.75,0.98),(2,1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
Effect of Features on Private Investment Win Fraction=Function for Effect of Features on VC Win
Fraction(Normalized Features/Functionality Threshold as a Multiple of Incumbent Functionality)
Units: Dmnl
The multiple that investors is willing to invest because of superiority of features
Effect of Functionality on Private Investment Win Fraction=Effect of Features on Private Investment Win
Fraction*Effect of Technology on Private Investment Win Fraction
Units: Dimensionless
The fraction of funding a VC is willing to invest because of technology and features functionality
Effect of Market Size on Private Investment Win Fraction=Function for Effect of Market Size on Private
Investment Win Fraction(Potential Market Size/Minimum Market Size for Private Investment)
Units: Dimensionless
The multiple of funding a VC is willing to invest because of market size
Effect of Marketing Effort on Market Size Fn[(0,0)(100,0.06)],(0,0),(1,0.001 ),(4,0.00578947),(10,0.01)
,(17,0.0147368),(26,0.02),(40.0612,0.0310526),(58.7156,0.0413158),(76.1468,0.0463158),(100,0.05))
Units: 1/Month
No marketing effort has 0 effect, normalized has a tenth of a percent, and the most effect we can have
is 5% (with hundreds of marketing people) and asymptotic in between
Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge Efficiency=1+Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge Efficiency
Fn(Normalized Marketing)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by marketing
Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge Efficiency Fn([(0,0)-( 10,10)],(0,0. 1),(1,1))
Units: Dmnl
If no marketing, cuts sales producitivity in by 90%, then linear up to I
Effect Of Marketing On Persuasion Efficiency=1+Effect Of Marketing On Persuasion Efficiency
Fn(Normalized Marketing)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the persuasion stage is affected by marketing
Effect Of Marketing On Persuasion Efficiency Fn([(0,0)-(10, 10)],(0,0.5),(1,1))
Units: Dmnl
If no marketing, cuts sales producitivity in half, then linear up to 1
Effect Of Price On Decision Efficiency=Effect Of Price On Decision Efficiency Fn(Normalized Price)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the decision stage is affected by normalized price
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Effect Of Price On Decision Efficiency Fn([(0,0)(60,1)],(0,1),(0.5,0.92),(1,0.75),(1.25,0.5), (2.32416,0.315789),
(3.42508,0.162281),(5.50459,0.0614035),(7.82875,0.0438596),(10.581,0.0219298),(50,0))
Units: Dmnl
S-curve, If price is 0, get 100% sales efficiency, if it's normal, get 75% efficiency, and as price
approaches 10x normal, efficiency goes to 0
Effect Of Price On Fraction of Firms Capable of Adopting=Effect Of Price on Fraction of Firms Capable of
Adopting Fn(Normalized Price)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by normalized price
Effect Of Price on Fraction of Firms Capable of Adopting Fn([(1,0)(10,1)],(0,1),(0.0733945,0.855263),
(0.159021,0.719298),(0.287462,0.622807),(0.5,0.5),(0.611621,0.482456),(0.801223,0.425439),(1,0.3),
(1.25,0.15),(2,0.1),(3,0.05),(5,0.01),(7,0.005),(10,0.001),(50,0))
Units: Dmnl
S-curve
Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency=Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency Fn(Normalized Price)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by normalized price
Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency Fn([(0,0(60,1)],(0,1),(0.5,0.92),(1,0.75),(1.25,0.5), (2.32416,
0.315789),(3.42508,0.162281),(5.50459,0.0614035),(7.82875,0.0438596),(10.581,0.0219298),(50,0))
Units: Dmnl
S-curve, If price is 0, get 100% sales efficiency, if it's normal, get 50% efficiency, and as price
approaches 10x normal, efficiency goes to 0\
Effect Of Price On Persuasion Efficiency=Effect Of Price On Persuasion Efficiency Fn(Normalized Price)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the persuasion stage is affected by normalized price
Effect Of Price On Persuasion Efficiency Fn([(0,0)(60,1)],(0,1),(0.5,0.92),(1,0.75),(1.25,0.5), (2.32416,
0.315789),(3.42508,0.162281),(5.50459,0.0614035),(7.82875,0.0438596),(10.581,0.0219298),(50,0))
Units: Dmnl
S-curve, If price is 0, get 100% sales efficiency, if it's normal, get 50% efficiency, and as price
approaches 10x normal, efficiency goes to 0
Effect of Technology on Adopter Loss Fraction([(0,0)(3,100)],(0,100),(0.06,32),(0.125,16),(0.25,8),
(0.5,2),(1,1),(1.44037,0.473684),(2,0.1),(100,0.1))
Units: Dmnl
If no technology, we lose everyone, and if great technology we lose much less, and asymptotic curve in
between
Effect Of Technology On Adoption Efficiency=Effect Of Technology On Adoption Efficiency Fn(Normalized
Technology)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
How the efficiency of sales at the adoption stage is affected by normalized technology
Effect Of Technology On Adoption Efficiency Fn([(0,0)-(l ,1)],(0,0),(0.5,0.5),(1.5,0.9),(2,1),(100, 1))
Units: Dmnl
No features still equals no sales, but given that they've already purchased, lack of some features will
have less of a negative effect
Effect Of Technology On Decision Efficiency=Effect Of Technology On Decision Efficiency Fn(Normalized
Technology)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the decision stage is affected by normalized technology
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Effect Of Technology On Decision Efficiency Fn([(0,0)(1,1 ),(0,0),(0.125,0.02),(0.25,0.1 ),(0.375,0.2),
(0.5,0.5),(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),(1,1)],(0,0),(0.25,0.02),(0.5,0.1),(0.75,0.2),(1,
0.5),(1.35,0.8),(1.5,0.9),(1.75,0.98),(2,1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
Effect Of Technology On Fraction of Firms Capable of Adopting=Effect Of Technology on Fraction of Firms
Capable of Adopting Fn(Normalized Technology)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by the normalized technology
Effect Of Technology on Fraction of Firms Capable of Adopting Fn([(0,0)-
(10,1 ),(0,0),(0. 125,0.02),(0.25,0.1 ),(0.375,0.2),(0.5,0.5),(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),(1,1 )],(0,0),(
0.256881,0.0570175),(0.504587,0.166667),(0.749235,0.298246),(1,0.5),(2.44648,0.622807),(4.9847 1,
0.789474),(7.49235,0.925439),(10,1))
Units: Dmnl
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
Effect Of Technology On Knowledge Efficiency=Effect Of Technology On Knowledge Efficiency
Fn(Normalized Technology)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by the normalized technology
Effect Of Technology On Knowledge Efficiency Fn([(0.5,0)(1,0.5),(0,0),(0.125,0.02),(0.25,0.1),(0.375,0.2),
(0.5,0.5),(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),( 1,1)],(0,0),(0.25,0.02),(0.5,0.1),(0.625382,0.129386),(0.75
,0.2),(0.874618,0.33114),(1,0.5),( 1.35,0.8),(1.5,0.9),(1.75,0.98),(2,1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
Effect Of Technology On Persuasion Efficiency=Effect Of Technology On Persuasion Efficiency
Fn(Normalized Technology)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the persuasion stage is affected by normalized technology
Effect Of Technology On Persuasion Efficiency Fn([(0,0)( ,1 ),(0,0),(0. 125,0.02),(0.25,0. 1),
(0.375,0.2),(0.5,0.5),(0.675,0.8),(0.75,0.9),(0.875,0.98),( ,1)],(0,0),(0.25,0.02),(0.5,0.1 ),(0.75,0.2),(1,0.
5),(1.35,0.8),(1.5,0.9),(1.75,0.98),(2,1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
S curve with no features = no sales, normal features = 50% sales, double features = 100% sales
Effect of Technology on Private Investment Win Fraction=Function for Effect of Technology on VC Win
Fraction(Normalized Technology/Functionality Threshold as a Multiple of Incumbent Functionality)
Units: Dmnl
The mulitple that VC is willing to invest because of technology
Effect of Unit Cost on Private Investment Win Fraction=Function for Effect of Unit Cost on VC Win
Fraction(Competitor Cost Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy*Initial Competitor Cost Per Unit/Cost
Per Unit*Unit Cost Threshold as a Fraction of Incumbent Unit Cost)
Units: Dimensionless
The fraction of funding a VC is willing to invest because of the technology cost
Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Decision Efficiency=Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Decision Efficiency
Fn(Normalized Word of Mouth)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the decision stage is affected by word of mouth
Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Decision Efficiency Fn([(0,0)-( 100,10)],(0,0.5),(1,1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
0 word of mouth will cut decision efficiency in half, and then it will rise linearly to 1
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Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Knowledge Efficiency=Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Knowledge Efficiency
Fn(Normalized Word of Mouth)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the knowledge stage is affected by word of mouth
Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Knowledge Efficiency Fn([(0,0)-(2,1)],(0,0.15),(1,1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
If no word of mouth, sales productivity only 15%, then linear up to 1
Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Persuasion Efficiency=Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Persuasion Efficiency
Fn(Normalized Word of Mouth)
Units: Dmnl
How the efficiency of sales at the persuasion stage is affected by word of mouth
Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Persuasion Efficiency Fn([(O,0)-(1,l)],(0,0.33),(1,1),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
If no word of mouth, sales productivity only 1/3, then linear up to I
Effective Discount Rate=12*(((Annual Discount Rate+ 1)^(1/12))-1)
Units: Dimensionless
Transformation of an annual discount rate into a monthly rate
Effective Engineering Effort=Engineering Effort*Engineering Experience Productivity Multiplier
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
How many productive hours engineers work
Effective Prospects=ZIDZ(Total Prospects,Initial Potential Prospects)
Units: Dimensionless
Current number of prospects compared to the initial number of prospects
Eng Attrition Rate=Engineers*Fractional Eng Attrition Rate
Units: Persons/Month
Rate at which engineers leave (quit)
Eng Experience From Hiring=Eng Hiring Rate*Avg Experience Of New Eng Hires
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Experience gain from hiring
Eng Hiring Rate=(Eng Vacancies/Avg Time to Fill Eng Vacancies) * (1 - Bankrupt Switch)
Units: Persons/Month
Hire engineers based on how many vacancies have been created and the avg time to fill them
Eng Hrs Required per Feature[self,featuretype]=350,35000
Eng Hrs Required per Feature[competitor,featuretype]=350,35000
Units: Person*Hours/Feature
How many hours it would take one engineer to develop a feature
Eng Hrs Required per Technology[self]=Function for Effect of Approaching Theoretical Maximum Technology
Development Eng Hrs Required per Technology(Technology Development[self]/Theoretical
Maximum Technology Development[selfl)
Eng Hrs Required per Technology[competitor]=Function for Effect of Approaching Theoretical Maximum
Technology Development Eng Hrs Required per Technology(Technology
Development[competitor]/Theoretical Maximum Technology Development[competitor])
Units: Person*Hours/Feature [0,100000]
How many hours it would take one engineer to develop a technology
Eng Productivity Change Per Double Experience=0.33
Units: Dmnl
The fractional change in productivity of engineers for every doubling of their effective experience
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Eng Proportion=ZlDZ(Engineers,Total Labor)
Units: Dimensionless
Proportion of workforce made up of engineers
Eng Vacancies= INTEG (Eng Vacancy Creation Rate - Eng Vacancy Closure Rate - Eng Vacancy Cancellation
Rate,Desired Eng Vacancies)
Units: People
The number of open positions the firm seeks to fill.
Eng Vacancy Adjustment Time=l
Units: Months
The average time over which to adjust the actual number of engineering vacancies to the desired level.
Eng Vacancy Cancellation Rate=MIN(Desired Eng Vacancy Cancellation Rate, Max Eng Vacancy Cancellation
Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
The rate at which to cancel existing engineering vacancies prior to filling them.
Eng Vacancy Cancellation Time=l
Units: Months
The average time required to cancel an engineering vacancy.
Eng Vacancy Closure Rate=Eng Hiring Rate
Units: Persons/Month
Vacancies are closed when the employee is hired
Eng Vacancy Creation Rate=MAX(O,Desired Eng Vacancy Creation Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
The rate at which to create new engineering positions and begins to recruit for them.
Eng Work Month=175
Units: Hours/Month
How many hours engineers work per month
Engineer Experience= INTEG (Increase In Eng Experience+Eng Experience From Hiring-Loss Of Eng
Experience,Initial Engineers * Initial Avg Engineering Experience)
Units: Persons*Hours
Cumulative sales experience of organization
Engineer Lay Offs=MAX(Bankrupt Switch * ((Engineers/TIME STEP) - Eng Attrition Rate), MIN(Desired Eng
Lay Off Rate, Maximum Layoff Rate))
Units: Persons/Month
Engineers being layed off per month
Engineering Effort=Engineers*Eng Work Month
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
How many total hours engineers work per month
Engineering Effort for Cust Support=IF THEN ELSE (Cash for Firm Operations<=O,O,MIN(Cust Support
Needed, Effective Engineering Effort*(l-Min Development Fraction)))
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
After allocating the min percentage of engineering effort to development, then use engineering effort to
satisfy cust support (current engineering) needs
Engineering Effot Net of Customer Support=Effective Engineering Effort-Engineering Effort for Cust Support
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
The amount of engineering effort after customer service is performed that can be allocated to
technology or product development
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Engineering Experience Productivity Multiplier=(Avg Engineer Experience/Engineering Experience
Reference)^(LN(1 + Eng Productivity Change Per Double Experience)/LN(2))
Units: Dmnl
Learning curve for productivity from experience (from Sterman pg 507, from Zangwill and Kantor
(1998))
Engineering Experience Reference=2000
Units: Hours
Normal' engineering experience
Engineers= INTEG (+Eng Hiring Rate-Eng Attrition Rate-Engineer Lay Offs,Initial Engineers)
Units: Persons
Number of engineers
Engineers Adjustment Time=6
Units: Months [0,1000,10]
The time period over which the firm seeks to bring the labor force in line with the desired level.
Exp Gain Per Adoption=910
Units: Person*Hours/Prospect [0,6000,35]
How much of a boost in experience does each adopter provide
Exp Gain Per Purchase=910
Units: Person*Hours/Prospect [0,6000,35]
How much of a boost in experience does each purchase provide to the sales force
Expected Time to Fill Eng Vacancies=Avg Time to Fill Eng Vacancies
Units: Months
For simplicity, assume managers know the real avg time to fill vacancies (i.e. no information delay)
Expected Time to Fill Sales Vacancies=Avg Time to Fill Sales Vacancies
Units: Months
For simplicity, assume managers know the real avg time to fill vacancies (i.e. no information delay)
Feasible Feature Devl Rate[company,featuretype]=Product Development Effort[company,featuretype]/Eng Hrs
Required per Feature[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Given the engineering resources we have, and the amount of time it takes to develop a feature, how
many features can we develop per month
Feasible Technology Devl Rate[company]=Technology Development Effort[company]/Eng Hrs Required per
Technology[company]
Units: Features/Month
Given the engineering resources we have, and the amount of time it takes to develop a technology, how
many technologies can we develop per month
Feature Abandonment Fraction[company,featuretype]=0.099
Units: Dimensionless
Fraction of features under development that are abandoned
Feature Abandonment Fraction 1 [company,featuretype]=Feature AbandonmentFraction[company,featuretype]/3
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of features under development that are abandoned at 1 st stage of product development
Feature Abandonment Fraction 2[company,featuretype]=Feature AbandonmentFraction[company,featuretype]/3
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of features under development that are abandoned at 2nd stage of product development
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Feature Abandonment Fraction 3 [company,featuretype]=Feature AbandonmentFraction[company, featuretype]/3
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of features under development that are abandoned at 3rd stage of product development
Feature Completion Rate[company,featuretype]=Feature Completion Rate 3[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by how many features were
started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg feature devl time
Feature Completion Rate 1 [company,featuretype]=Feature Devl Rate 1 [company,featuretype]*(1 -Feature
Abandonment Fraction 1 [company,featuretype])
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by how many features were
started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg feature devl time
Feature Completion Rate 2 [company,featuretype]=Feature Devl Rate 2[company,featuretype]* (1 -Feature
Abandonment Fraction 2 [company,featuretype])
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by how many features were
started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg feature devl time
Feature Completion Rate 3 [company, featuretype]=Feature Devl Rate 3 [company,featuretype]*(1 -Feature
Abandonment Fraction 3 [company,featuretype])
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which features are developed into the product determined by how many features were
started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg feature devl time
Feature Devl Rate 1 [company,featuretype]=MIN(Features Under Development 1 [company,featuretype]/Avg \
Feature Devl Time[company,featuretype],Feasible Feature Devl Rate[company,featuretype]) * 3
Units: Features/Month
Develop 1/3 of features in minimum of 1/3 the avg feature development time or 1/3 the amount of time
it takes given the resources we have to develop features
Feature Devl Rate 2[company,featuretype]=MIN(Features Under Development 2[company,featuretype]/Avg
Feature Devl Time[company,featuretype], Feasible Feature Devl Rate[company,featuretype]) * 3
Units: Features/Month
Develop 1/3 of features in minimum of 1/3 the avg feature development time or 1/3 the amount of time
it takes given the resources we have to develop features
Feature Devl Rate 3[company,featuretype]=MIN(Features Under Development 3[company,featuretype]/Avg
Feature Devl Time[company,featuretype), Feasible Feature Devl Rate[company,featuretype]) * 3
Units: Features/Month
Develop 1/3 of features in minimum of 1/3 the avg feature development time or 1/3 the amount of time
it takes given the resources we have to develop features
Feature Obsolescense Rate[company, featuretype]=Features[company,featuretype]/Avg Feature
Lifetime[company,featuretype]
Units: Features/Month
Features that go out of date per month
Feature Shortfall[company,featuretype]=Desired Features[company,featuretype]-Features[company,featuretype]
Units: Features
How many features we're missing compared to what we desire.
Feature Start Rate[company,featuretype]=MIN(Feasible Feature Devl Rate[company,featuretype], Desired
Feature Development Rate[company,featuretype])
Units: Features/Month
Start features at the rate at which we can develop them
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Feature Value[company]=Features[company,nonappropriable]*Nonappropriable Feature Multiple + Features
[company,appropriable]
Units: Features
Value of combined approbriable and nonapprobriable features
Features[company,featuretype]= INTEG (Feature Completion Rate [company,featuretype]-Feature Obsolescense
Rate[company,featuretype],Initial Features[company,featuretype])
Units: Features
Features of the product
Features Under Development 1 [company,featuretype]= INTEG (+Feature Start Rate[company,featuretype]-
Abandonment Rate 1 [company,featuretype]-Feature Completion Rate 1 [company,featuretype],0)
Units: Features
Ist stage of feature development
Features Under Development 2[company,featuretype]= INTEG (+Feature Completion Rate 1 [company,
featuretype]-Abandonment Rate 2 [company,featuretype]-Feature Completion Rate
2[company,featuretype],0)
Units: Features
2nd stage of feature development
Features Under Development 3[company,featuretype]= INTEG (+Feature Completion Rate
2 [company,featuretype] -Abandonment Rate 3 [company,featuretype]-Feature Completion Rate
3 [company,featuretype],0)
Units: Features
3rd stage of feature development
FINAL TIME = 720
Units: Month
The final time for the simulation.
Firm Cash for Cost Share Agreement=IF THEN ELSE(Technology Development Switch for Cost Share
=0,O,Cost Share Amount*(1-Public Cost Share Fraction))
Units: Dollars/Month
Fraction of total cost share funding that is paid by the firm
Fraction effort for adoption=IF THEN ELSE(Weighted total prospects>0, ((1-Fraction effort for
knowledge)*(Purchasers Emphasis Multiplier*Purchasers)/Weighted total prospects), 0)
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of sales effort to make sure purchasers start using product
Fraction effort for decision=IF THEN ELSE(Weighted total prospects>0, ((1-Fraction effort for
knowledge)*(Hot Prospect Emphasis Multiplier*Hot Prospects)/Weighted total prospects), 0)
Units: Dmnl [0, 1]
Percent of effort of sales people applied to persuading prospects to seriously consider purchasing
Fraction effort for knowledge=0.25
Units: Dmnl
Percent of sales effort devoted to converting potential prospects to prospects
Fraction effort for persuasion=IF THEN ELSE(Weighted total prospects>0 ,((l-Fraction effort for
knowledge)*(Prospect Emphasis Multiplier*Prospects)/Weighted total prospects), 0)
Units: Dmnl [0,1]
Percent of effort of sales people applied to persuading prospects to trial
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Fraction Of Firms Capable Of Adopting=(Effect Of Features On Fraction of Firms Capable of Adopting*(Effect
Of Price On Fraction of Firms Capable of Adopting)*(Effect Of Technology On Fraction of Firms
Capable of Adopting))
Units: Dmnl
Initial capability of firms to adopt is affected by features and technology relative to the initial features
and initial technology development
Fractional Eng Attrition Rate = 0.02
Units: 1/Month
Percent of engineers that leave per month
Frequency of Private Funding=36
Units: Months
The frequency with which VCs evaluate and invest in the firm
FUD Adjustment Time[company,featuretype]=2
Units: Months [0,10,0.1]
How long to take to adjust FUD to desired level
Function for Effect of Approaching Theoretical Maximum Technology Development Eng Hrs Required per
Technology([(0,0)( 1, le+008)],(0,2000),(0.1,3000),(0.2,4000),(0.3,5000),(0.4,6000),(0.5,7000),(0.6,100
00),(0.7, 100000),(0.8,le+006),(0.9,le+007),(1,1e+008))
Units: Person*Hours/Feature
As the theoretical maximum of a technology is approached the number of hours necessary to develop a
technology increases
Function for Effect of Features on Investor Win Fraction([(0,0)-(4,4)],(0,0),(0,1 ),(1,1),(2,2),(3,3),(4,4))
Units: Dimensionless
The multiple of funding a investors is willing to invest because of the superiority of functionality of the
product
Function for Effect of Market Size on Private Investment Win Fraction([(0,0)-
(1000,600)],(0,0),(1,1),(10,30),(100,300),(1000,500))
Units: Dimensionless
No funding will be provided if the market size is below the threshold. Once the minimum market size
is reached then the higher the multiple the higher the funding multiple.s
Function for Effect of Technology Development on Cost Share Fraction([(0,0)-
(1,1 )],(0.3,0),(0.3,0.67),(0.4,0.67),(0.4,0.5),(0.5,0.5),(0.5,0.33),(0.6,0.33),(0.6,0))
Units: Dmnl
Cost Share Fraction depends on the development of the firms technology, relative to a reference value
representing the phyiscal limit to technology development. The higher the value of the technology
development relative to the reference, the lower the cost share fraction because governments only pay
for risky, long-term technology development
Function for Effect of Technology Development on Public RD Funding([(0,0)-(l, 1)],(0, 1),(0.5,0),(1,0))
Units: Dmnl
Cost Share Fraction depends on the development of the firms technology, relative to a reference value
representing the phyiscal limit to technology development. The higher the value of the technology
development relative to the reference, the lower the cost share fraction because governments only pay
for risky, long-term technology development
Function for Effect of Technology on Investor Win Fraction([(0,0)-(4,4)],(0,0),(0,1 ),(1,1 ),(2,2),(3,3),(4,4))
Units: Dimensionless
The multiple of funding an investor is willing to invest because of the superiority of functionality of the
product
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Function for Effect of Unit Cost on Investor Win Fraction([(-0. 1,0)-
(4,2)],(0,0),(0,1),(1,1),(1,1),(1,1),(1.25,1.35),(1.6,1.65),(2,1.85),(2.5,1.95),(3,2))
Units: Dimensionless
The multiple of funding a investor is willing to invest because of the cost difference compared to the
competition
Functionality Threshold as a Multiple of Incumbent Functionality=2
Units: Dimensionless
The factor of superiority the product functionality must be over competitors
Funding Frequency=36
Units: Months
The frequency with which a single public funding pulse occurs
Funds Raised From Private Investors=(l-Investor Exit Switch)*(Indicated Funds from Private Investors/TIME
STEP*PULSE TRAIN( 0 , 0 , Frequency of Private Funding , FINAL TIME ))
Units: Dollars/Month
Funds raised from private investors at the investor decision date
Government Market Stimulation= INTEG (Market Stimulation Payouts,O)
Units: Dollars
The amount pf public spending to promote market stimulation
Gross Profit=Revenue-COGS
Units: Dollars/Month
The amount of money a firm makes from sales less the cost of the goods sold
Hot Prospect Emphasis Multiplier=4
Units: Dmnl
Emphasis sales force places on hot prospects
Hot prospect loss rate=MAX(O,Norm Decision Rate-Purchase Rate)
Units: Prospects/Month
If rate of persuasion is not great enough to keep prospects from remaining the maximum prospect
lifetime, then this is the rate they will be lost at
Hot Prospects= INTEG (Persuasion Rate-Hot prospect loss rate-Purchase Rate,Initial Hot Prospects)
Units: Prospects
Prospects who have been qualified to be more likely to purchase and/or are trialing the product
Increase Adopters Switch=0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Whether's there's a policy that will effect firms capab to adopt
Increase Adoption Capab Switch=0
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Whether's there's a policy that will effect firms capab to adopt
Increase In Addressable Market=-Effect of Marketing Effort on Market Size Fn(Normalized Marketing)
Units: 1/Month
Increase in market (potential prospects) based on the effectiveness of marketing efforts
Increase in Adopters Due To Policy=Increase Adopters Switch *RAMP( Increase of Adopters/Adopter Increase
Ramp Time, Adopter Increase Start Time, (Adopter Increase Start Time+Adopter Increase Ramp
Time))
Units: Dimensionless
Ramp up effect of policy to increase capab of adoption
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Increase In Eng Experience=Engineers*Eng Work Month+Adoption Rate*Exp Gain Per Adoption
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Engineers learn from time spent working and from experience with adopters
Increase In Potential Prospects=Total Population*Increase In Addressable Market*Fraction Of Firms Capable
Of Adopting*( l+Increase in Adopters Due To Policy)
Units: Prospects/Month
Tracks increase in size of potential market by fraction of total firms that we are able to address that are
capable of adopting product per time period
Increase In Sales Experience=Sales Force*Sales Work Month+Adoption Rate*Exp Gain Per Purchase
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Sales people learn from time spent working and from experience making sales (purchases)
Increase of Adopters=0.05
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,0.01]
What additional fraction of firms will be capab of adopting per month
Increase of Adoption Capab=0.05
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,0.01]
What additional fraction of firms will be capab of adopting per month
Increase Of Capab Of Firms To Adopt Due To Policy=Increase Adoption Capab Switch *RAMP( Increase of
Adoption Capab/Adoption Capab Increase Ramp Time, Adoption Capab Increase Start Time,
(Adoption Capab Increase Start Time+Adoption Capab Increase Ramp Time))
Units: Dimensionless
Ramp up effect of policy to increase capab of adoption
Indicated Cost Share Amount=Technology Development Switch for Cost Share*Cost Share Switch*(IF THEN
ELSE(Funds Raised From Private Investors>=0,MIN(Funds Raised From Private Investors*TIME
STEP/(1-Public Cost Share Fraction),Maximum Cost Share Investment),0))
Units: Dollars
Cost Share amount is determined by the technology development and the available working capital
Indicated Desired Engineers=MIN (Desired Engineers, Maximum Employees from Current Size)
Units: People
The number of engineers the firm wishes to have in total
Indicated Desired Sales Force=MIN (Desired Sales Force, Maximum Sales Force from Current Size)
Units: People
The total number of sales personnel desired
Indicated Funds from Private Investors=Available Private Investor Financing
Units: Dollars
The magnitude of the VC funding pulse is the minimum of what was desired and what was granted IF
THEN ELSE (VC Financing Asking Amount<=Available VC Financing,VC Financing Asking
Amount,Available VC Financing)
Indicated Private Investment Win Fraction=MAX(Effect of Functionality on Private Investment Win Fraction,
Effect of Unit Cost on Private Investment Win Fraction)*Effect of Market Size on Private Investment
Win Fraction
Units: Dimensionless
The fraction of funding a VC is willing to invest because of the combined effect of market size,
technology cost and technology functionality.
Indicated Public RD Funding=Maximum Public RD Funding*Public RD Funding Fraction
Units: Dollars
Actual amount of public R&D funding each pulse
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Inflow of Technology Development Funding=(1-Switch for Relaxing Public Funding Restrictions)*Inflows of
Public Capital
Units: Dollars/Month
Infow of cash to fund technology development
Inflows Of Capital=Switch for Relaxing Public Funding Restrictions*(Inflows of Public Capital)+Cash
Received From Customers+Funds Raised From Private Investors+Cost Share Amount
Units: Dollars/Month
Cash coming in per month
Inflows of Public Capital=Public RD Investment
Units: Dollars/Month
The sum of total funding from the government.
Initial Adopters= 0
Units: Prospects
Start with no adopters
Initial Avg Engineering Experience = 10000
Units: Hours [0,60000,50]
How much relevant experience initial engineers have on average
Initial Avg Sales Experience= 1500
Units: Hours
How much experience initial sales people have on average
Initial Capab of Firms to Adopt=-0.05
Units: Dmnl [0,1,0.01]
Fraction of firms initially that are capable of adopting product
Initial Competitor Cost Per Unit= 100000
Units: Dollars/Unit
How much it costs competitor to produce the competing unit. Assume this is a mature technology and
that learning does not reduce their costs
Initial Cost Per Unit=-2e+006
Units: Dollars/Unit
Cost of the technology when the technlogy is first invented
Initial Engineers=2
Units: Persons [0,40,0.1]
Number of engineers company initially has
Initial Features[company,featuretype]=0,0; 100, 2;
Units: Features [0,300,0.1]
Amount of features product has when firm starts compared to competiors
Initial Hot Prospects=0
Units: Prospects [0,1000,1]
Initial number of prospects actively evaluating the firm's technology
Initial Payment=Price*Initial Payment Fraction
Units: Dollars/Unit
Amount that customer pays up front
Initial Payment Fraction= 1
Units: Dmnl [0,1,0.01]
Fraction of price that is paid by customer up front
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Initial Potential Prospects=0
Units: Prospects
Initial potential prospects are firms initialy capable of adopting the RET that could presumably be
evaluating the entire field of RET options to replace their current fossil-fuel technologies.
Initial Prospects=0
Units: Prospects [0,1000,1]
Initial prospects are all the firms initaly capable of adopting that are aware of their options and have not
ruled out purchasing the RET venture's technology
Initial Public Investment=3e+006
Units: Dollars [0,le+007,10000]
The initial public investment in R&D
Initial Purchasers=0
Units: Prospects [0,1000,1]
Start with no purchasers
Initial Sales Force=0
Units: Persons [0,20,0.1]
Number of sales people company initially has
Initial Technology Development[company]=1,40
Units: Features [0,300,0.1]
Amount of technology development when firm starts compared to competiors
INITIAL TIME =0
Units: Month
The initial time for the simulation.
Initial Total Population= le+006
Units: Prospects
Max possible number of adopters
Investor Exit Switch=IF THEN ELSE ((ZIDZ(Cumulative Profit,Total Private Investments))>Private Investor
Required Rate of Return, 1,0)
Units: Dimensionless
If VC return is met, VC funding stops
Knowledge Productivity Of Sales Effort=MIN(Max Knowledge Productivity From Sales,Sales Experience
Productivity Multiplier*Max Knowledge Productivity From Sale*Effect Of Features On Knowledge
Efficiency*Effect Of Price On Knowledge Efficiency*Effect Of Marketing On Knowledge
Efficiency*Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Knowledge Efficiency*Effect Of Technology On
Knowledge Efficiency)
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour)
The persuasion rate of sales effort as effected by price and features
Knowledge Rate=Norm Knowledge Rate*Prospect Conversion Fn(ZIDZ(Potential Knowledge From Sales
Effort,Norm Knowledge Rate))
Units: Prospects/Month
The rate of persuading prospects to become hot prospects is determined by the persuasion from sales
effort until it asymptotically approaches the normal conversion rate (prospects are not persuaded faster
than that)
Knowledge Sales Effort=Fraction effort for knowledge*Sales Effort
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on persuasion per month
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Log of Working Capital=log(IF THEN ELSE (Working Capital<=0, 1,Working Capital), 10)
Units: Dimensionless
Semi log plot for depicting the "valley of death"
Loss Of Eng Experience=(Engineer Lay Offs+Eng Attrition Rate)*Avg Engineer Experience
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Experience lost when engineers leave
Loss Of Sales Experience=(Sales Layoffs+Sales Attrition Rate)*Avg Sales Experience)
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Experience lost when sales people leave
Lost Prospect Lifetime=12
Units: Months
Amount of time before a lost prospect will reconsider becoming a prospect
Lost Prospects= INTEG (Adopter loss rate+Hot prospect loss rate+Potential Prospect Loss Rate+Prospect Loss
Rate+Purchaser Loss Rate-Prospect Regain Rate,0)
Units: Prospects
Former prospects who currently are not considering adopting the product
Maintenance Billing=Adopters*Quantity Per Purchase*Price*Maintenance Fraction*Maintenance Period
Units: Dollars/Month
Amount being charged to adopters per month for maintenance
Maintenance COGS=Maintenance Billing*(1-Maintenance Margin)
Units: Dollars/Month
The costs for maintenance
Maintenance Fraction=0.2
Units: Dmnl
The fraction of the price that is charged per period
Maintenance Margin=0.8
Units: Dmnl
The fraction of the maintenace charge which is profit
Maintenance Period= 1/12
Units: I/Month
The period over which the maintenance charge is made (i.e. 1/12 of a yearly fee is charged monthly)
Market Stimulation Payouts=Total Obligation Spent on Firm+Total Subsidy spent on Firm
Units: Dollars/Month
Amount of public funding used to stimualte the market
Marketing Effort--MIN(Desired Marketing Effort, 0.5*SalesMktg Effort)
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Spend no more than 50% of total sales effort on marketing, up to the desired marketing effort
Max Adoption Productivity From Sales=l
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour) [0,?]
Maximum number of purchasers that will able to start using product per hour of sales effort
Max Competitor Margin=0.3
Units: Dmnl
Maximum margin competitor will extract
Max Decision Productivity From Sales=1/16
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour) [0,?]
Maximum number of prospects that can be persuaded per person-hour of sales effort
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Max Eng Vacancy Cancellation Rate=Eng Vacancies/Eng Vacancy Cancellation Time
Units: Persons/Month
The maximum engineering vacancy cancellation rate is determined by the number of vacancies
outstanding and the minimum cancellation time.
Max Hires Per Month=MIN(Change in Workforce Required/Months for Runway Adjustment, Total Labor
*Maximum Workforce Growth Rate)
Units: People/Month
Maximum number of people to be added (or if negative, subtracted) from work force. Constrained to
be less than the maximum fractional assimilation/growth rate for the labor force.
Max Knowledge Productivity From Sales=1/4
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour) [0,?]
Maximum number of prospects that can be created per person-hour of sales effort
Max Persuasion Productivity From Sales=1/8
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour) [0,?]
Maximum number of prospects that can be persuaded per person-hour of sales effort
Max Sales Productivity Multiplier=l 0
Units: Dmnl
Max amount of productivity multiple that experience can bring
Max Sales Vacancy Cancellation Rate=Sales Vacancies/Sales Vacancy Cancellation Time
Units: Persons/Month
The maximum sales vacancy cancellation rate is determined by the number of vacancies outstanding
and the minimum cancellation time.
Maximum Cost Share Investment=2.5e+008
Units: Dollars
The highest amount of funding that can offered for a cost-shared public-private partnership
Maximum Employees from Current Size=MAX(Minimum Headcount for Expansion,Engineers*Maximum
Expansion Ratio)
Units: People
The maximum number of engineers that can be supported
Maximum Expansion Ratio= 1.01
Units: Dimensionless [0,6]
The largest incremental increase in the number of engineers
Maximum Layoff Rate=Engineers/Average Layoff Time
Units: People/Month
Maximum layoff rate is determined by the number of engineers and the layoff time.
Maximum Private Investor Financing=5e+007
Units: $
The highest amount of funding an investor is willing to offer
Maximum Public RD Funding=1.655e+007
Units: Dollars
The maximum amount of a single public funding investment for R&D
Maximum Sales Force Expansion Ratio= 1.05
Units: Dimensionless
The largest multiple by which the sales force can increase
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Maximum Sales Force from Current Size=MAX(Minimum Headcount for Sales Force Expansion,Sales Force*
Maximum Sales Force Expansion Ratio)
Units: People
The size of the sales force that can be supported
Maximum Workforce Growth Rate=IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Product Development=0,0.01,0.25)
Units: 1/Months
The maximum fractional rate of expansion for the labor force the firm can achieve/tolerate/assimilate.
Min Competitor Margin=0.3
Units: Dimensionless [0,0.3,0.01]
Minimum margin competitor needs to charge
Min Development Fraction=0.5
Units: Dmnl
Min percent of engineering effort to devote to development
Min Gross Margin=0
Units: Dmnl
Minimum margin company will charge (can be negative if wish to sell at below cost to gain initial
sales)
Min Marketing Effort=350
Units: Person*Hours/Month
Min effort we want to devote to marketing
Min Price=Cost Per Unit/(1-Min Gross Margin)
Units: Dollars/Unit
Min price will sell at
Min Runway=3
Units: Months
The min months of runway we need overall, so if less than this will need layoffs
Min Runway In Order To Hire=12
Units: Months
Minimum number of months of burn we can have in order to hire new employees
Minimum Headcount for Expansion=5
Units: People [0,40]
The fewest number of people required before expansion limitations are realized
Minimum Headcount for Sales Force Expansion=2
Units: People [0,10]
The number of people required before limitations to expansion are imposed
Minimum Market Size for Private Investment-3e+008
Units: $
The minimum market size that would be worth private sector investment
Minimum Private Investor Financing= 100000
Units: $
The smallest amount of funding that an investor is willing to offer
Minimum Technology Development[company]=Theoretical Maximum Technology Development[company]
*Minimum Technology Development as a Fraction of the Theoretical Maximum[company]
Units: Features
The minimum amount of technology development necessary for the technology to begin to be
marketed
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Minimum Technology Development as a Fraction of the Theoretical Maximum[company]=0.25
Units: Dimensionless [-1,1]
The fraction of of the theoretical maximum technology development required before a technology can
be marketable
Months for Runway Adjustment=2
Units: Months [0,6,6e-006]
How long to take to adjust hiring/firing based on runway
Months of Runway=Working Capital/Burn Rate
Units: Months
If we're burning cash, then months of cash we have left. If positive cash flow, then this will be a very
large number
Net Income=Operating Income-Defaults on AR
Units: Dollars/Month
The amont of money a firm has after defaults on accounts recievable have been removed
Nominal Subsidy=(Price*-Subsidy Policy Effect on Price)*Subsidy Policy
Units: Dollars/Unit
Amount of money subsidized to the customer when making a purchase
Nonappropriable Feature Devlopment Fraction=0.5
Units: Dimensionless
Fraction of development effort applied to non-approbriable features (as opposed to approbriable
features)
Nonappropriable Feature Multiple= 100
Units: Dimensionless
Avg multiple of value of approbriable features that nonapprobriable features have
Norm Adoption Rate=Purchasers/Avg Purchaser Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which purchasers could start using the product
Norm Decision Rate=Hot Prospects/Avg Hot Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Norm Knowledge Rate=Potential Prospects/Avg Potential Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Norm Persuasion Rate=Prospects/Avg Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which prospects can be persuaded to trial the product
Normal Adopter Loss Fraction=0.01
Units: 1/Months
What fraction of adopters we lose every month normally
Normal Default Fraction=0.002
Units: 1/Month
The 'normal' fraction of customers that default on what they owe per month
Normal Hazard Rate=0.05
Units: 1/Month
Given normal values for hazard rate components, the normal hazard rate of failure
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Normalized Cust Fincl Condition = 1
Units: Dimensionless
How able customers are able to pay their bills compared to normal (1 is normal, 0 means they are
bankrupt, and >1means they have cash to spare)
Normalized Cust Support=xIDZ(Engineering Effort for Cust Support,Cust Support Needed, 1)
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of max cust support effectiveness (If we don't need any cust support, then we're supplying all
that is needed). Also amount of cust support determines how soon product is "delivered".
Normalized Features=Feature Value[self]/Feature Value[competitor]
Units: Dmnl
Features of our company compared to competition (0 is no features, I is equiv features to competition)
Normalized Marketing=ZIDZ(Marketing Effort,Desired Marketing Effort)
Units: Dmnl
Normalized marketing determined by proportion of sales/marketing resources we have compared to
desired
Normalized Price=Price* Price Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy/Competitor Price
Units: Dmnl [0,50]
Normalized price (actual price divided by competitor/reference price)
Normalized Technology=Technology Value[self]/Technology Value[competitor]
Units: Dmnl
Technologies of our company compared to competition (0 is no technology, 1 is equiv technology to
competition)
Normalized Word of Mouth=ZIDZ((Contact Rate*Potential Prospects*ZIDZ(Adopters,Total Population)),Word
of Mouth Reference)
Units: Dmnl
Adoption by word of mouth is driven by the contact rate between potential adopters and active
adopters. The word of mouth effect is small if the number of active adopters relative to the total
population size is small.
Operating Income=Gross Profit-Total Salary Expense
Units: Dollars/Month
The firm income after paying salaries of employees
Outflow of Technology Development Funding=Technology Development Salary Expense
Units: Dollars/Month
Cash being paid each month for technology development
Outflows Of Capital=((l-Switch for Relaxing Public Funding Restrictions)*(Salary Expense Net Technology
Development Salary Expense))+COGS+Firm Cash for Cost Share Agreement+(Switch for Relaxing
Public Funding Restrictions*Total Salary Expense)
Units: Dollars/Month
Cash being paid out per month
Perceived Feature Obsolescense Rate[company,featuretype]=Feature Obsolescense Rate[company,featuretype]
Units: Feature/Month
What managers believe feature obsolescence rate is based on the actual rate (assume perception meets
reality)
Perceived Technology Obsolescense Rate[company]=Technology Obsolescense Rate[company]
Units: Feature/Month
What managers believe technology obsolescence rate is based on the actual rate (assume perception
meets reality)
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Persuasion Productivity Of Sales Effort=MIN(Max Persuasion Productivity From Sales,Sales Experience
Productivity Multiplier*Max Persuasion Productivity From Sales*Effect Of Features On Persuasion
Efficiency*Effect Of Price On Persuasion Efficiency*Effect Of Marketing On Persuasion Efficiency
*Effect Of Word Of Mouth On Persuasion Efficiency Effect Of Technology On Persuasion Efficiency)
Units: Prospects/(Person*Hour)
The persuasion rate of sales effort as effected by price and features
Persuasion Rate=IF THEN ELSE(Norm Persuasion Rate>0, Norm Persuasion Rate*Prospect Conversion
Fn(ZIDZ(Potential Persuasion From Sales Effort,Norm Persuasion Rate)), 0)
Units: Prospects/Month
The rate of persuading prospects to become hot prospects is determined by the persuasion from sales
effort until it asymptotically approaches the normal conversion rate (prospects are not persuaded faster
than that)
Persuasion Sales Effort=Fraction effort for persuasion*Sales Effort
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Total number of hours spent by the sales force on persuasion per month
Portion of Min Effort for Marketing Fn([(0,0)-(0.005,10)],(0,10),(0.001,2),(0.002,1.5),(1,1.2),(1.47401,1.1),
(1.85933,1.05),(100,1))
Units: Dmnl
If 0 Prospects, then devote max time to marketing, and if equal or more prospects compared to
population, devote most of time to sales, and asymptotic in between\!\!\!
Potential Adoption From Sales Effort=Adoption Sales Effort*Adoption Productivity Of Sales Effort
Units: Prospects/Month
The amount of effort the sales people apply to persuasion times the productivity of that effort (which is
determined by attributes of the product)
Potential Decision From Sales Effort=Decision sales effort*Decision Productivity Of Sales Effort
Units: Prospects/Month
The amount of effort the sales people apply to persuasion times the productivity of that effort (which is
determined by attributes of the product)
Potential Knowledge From Sales Effort=Knowledge Sales Effort*Knowledge Productivity Of Sales Effort
Units: Prospects/Month
The amount of effort the sales people apply to persuasion times the productivity of that effort (which is
determined by attributes of the product)
Potential Market Size=Total Population*Fraction Of Firms Capable Of Adopting*Quantity Per Purchase*
Target Price+Increase Adopters Switch*Total Population*Fraction Of Firms Capable Of
Adopting*Quantity Per Purchase*Target Price*(1+Increase of Adopters)
Units: $
The size of the entire market
Potential Persuasion From Sales Effort=Persuasion Sales Effort*Persuasion Productivity Of Sales Effort
Units: Prospects/Month
The amount of effort the sales people apply to persuasion times the productivity of that effort (which is
determined by attributes of the product)
Potential Prospect Loss Rate=MAX(0,Norm Knowledge Rate-Knowledge Rate)
Units: Prospects/Month
If rate of persuasion is not great enough to keep prospects from remaining the maximum prospect
lifetime, then this is the rate they will be lost at
Potential Prospects= INTEG (Increase In Potential Prospects+Prospect Regain Rate-Knowledge Rate-Potential
Prospect Loss Rate,Initial Potential Prospects)
Units: Prospects
Potential customers that have been selected to apply sales effort to persuade to trial the product.
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Price=MAX(Target Price, Min Price)
Units: Dollars/Unit
If target price is greater than the min price we can charge, charge that. Otherwise, charge our min price.
Price Adjustment Fraction Due To Policy=l +(Subsidy Policy *RAMP( Subsidy Policy Effect on Price/Subsidy
Policy Ramp Time, Subsidy Policy Start Time, (Subsidy Policy Start Time + Subsidy Policy Ramp
Time)))
Units: Dimensionless
If there's a subsidy policy, then effect on our cost will ramp up to it's full effect starting at start time
and taking the amount of time specified by ramp time.
Private Funding=Funds Raised From Private Investors
Units: Dollars/Month
Funds raised from private investors at the investor decision date
Private Investments=Funds Raised From Private Investors
Units: Dollars/Month
New investments to add to Total Investments
Private Investor Required Rate of Return= 1.3
Units: Dimensionless
The rate of return that VCs require on their investment
Product COGS=Cost Per Unit*Purchase Rate*Quantity Per Purchase
Units: Dollars/Month
Cost of goods sold for products sold
Product Development Effort[self,appropriable]=IF THEN ELSE (Cash for Firm Operations<=0,0,Appropriable
Feature Development Fraction*Engineering Effot Net of Customer Support*(1-Technology and
Product Development Effort Allocation[selfJ))
Product Development Effort[self,nonappropriable]=Nonappropriable Feature Devlopment Fraction*
Engineering Effot Net of Customer Support*(1-Technology and Product Development Effort
Allocation[selfJ)
Product Development Effort[competitor,featuretype]=8750, 8750
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Assume competitor has 50 people each for approb and nonapprob feature devl
Product Features Under Development[company,featuretype]= INTEG (+Feature Start
Rate[company,featuretype]-Abandonment Rate[company,featuretype]-Feature Completion
Rate[company,featuretype],0)
Units: Features
Features that are being worked on by the engineering staff
Productive Eng Work Month=Eng Work Month*Engineering Experience Productivity Multiplier
Units: Hours/Month
Productive hours worked per month by engineers (experienced engineers are more productive)
ProspectConversionFn([(O,O)(2e+016,I),(0,0),(0.5(1.5),(0.75,0.7),(5,0.85),(1.25,0.95),(1.5,I),(100,O,O,(0,0),(0.5,
0.5),(0.75,0.7),(1,0.85),(1.25,0.95),(1.5,1),(le+016,1))
Units: Dmnl
The fraction of prospects that move to the next stage
Prospect Emphasis Multiplier=-2
Units: Dmnl
Emphasis sales force places on prospects
Prospect Loss Rate=MAX(0,(Norm Persuasion Rate-Persuasion Rate))
Units: Prospects/Month
If rate of persuasion is not great enough to keep prospects from remaining the maximum prospect
lifetime, then this is the rate they will be lost at
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Prospect Regain Rate=Lost Prospects/Lost Prospect Lifetime
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which lost prospects become potential prospects again
Prospect to Population Ratio=ZIDZ(Total Prospects,Total Population)
Units: Dmnl
Ratio between all current prospects and total population
Prospects= INTEG (Knowledge Rate-Persuasion Rate-Prospect Loss Rate,Initial Prospects)
Units: Prospects
Potential customers that have been selected to apply sales effort to persuade to trial the product.
Public Cost Share Fraction=Function for Effect of Technology Development on Cost Share Fraction
(Cumulative Technology Development/Theoretical Maximum Technology Development[self])
Units: Dmnl
The fraction of a cost shared project that will be funded by the public sector
Public Development Investments=(Public RD Investment+Cost Share Amount*Public Cost Share
Fraction)*EXP(-Effective Discount Rate*Time)
Units: Dollars/Month
Discounted public funding for development
Public Investments=(Public RD Investment+Cost Share Amount*Public Cost Share Fraction+Market
Stimulation Payouts)*EXP(-Effective Discount Rate*Time)
Units: Dollars/Month
New investments to add to Total Investments
Public RD Funding Fraction=Function for Effect of Technology Development on Public RD Funding
(Cumulative Technology Development/Theoretical Maximum Technology Development[self])
Units: Dmnl
The percentage of the total public R&D funding. As technology development increases, the
government sponsors less R&D money
Public RD Investment=Indicated Public RD Funding/TIME STEP*PULSE TRAIN( 0 , 0 , Funding Frequency,
FINAL TIME)
Units: Dollars/Month
An instantaneous pulse of public R&D funding each period
Purchase Rate=IF THEN ELSE(Norm Decision Rate>0, Norm Decision Rate*Prospect Conversion
Fn(ZIDZ(Potential Decision From Sales Effort,Norm Decision Rate)), 0)
Units: Prospects/Month
The rate of persuading hot prospects to purchase the product
Purchaser Loss Rate=MAX(O,Norm Adoption Rate-Adoption Rate)
Units: Prospects/Month
Rate at which purchasers choose not to use the product
Purchasers= INTEG (Purchase Rate-Adoption Rate-Purchaser Loss Rate,Initial Purchasers)
Units: Prospects
Prospects who have purchased but aren't using
Purchasers Emphasis Multiplier=l
Units: Dmnl
Emphasis sales force places on purchasers (since they already purchased, relatively less emphasis)
Quantity Per Purchase=l
Units: Units/Prospect [0,20,2e-005]
Average number of units each adopter purchases/uses at a time
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Reference Production for Initial Cost=l-
Units: Prospects
Initial Cost is assuming already produced this many of product
Reference Technology Development for Initial Cost=1
Units: Features
Initial Cost is assuming already produced this many of product
Reset Annual Cash Flow from Private Investment=IF THEN ELSE ( Reset Switch = 1, Annual Cash Flow from
Private Investment Stock/ TIME STEP , 0)
Units: Dollars/Month
Reset annual Private Investment to zero at the beginning of next year in order to restart the
accumulation of annual revenue for next year.
Reset Annual Cash Flow from RD Funding=IF THEN ELSE ( Reset Switch = 1, Annual Cash Flow from Public
RD Funding / TIME STEP , 0)
Units: Dollars/Month
Reset annual revenue to zero at the beginning of next year in order to restart the accumulation of
annual revenue for next year.
Reset Annual Total Cash Flow from Public Funding=IF THEN ELSE ( Reset Switch = 1, Annual Total Cash
Flow from Public Funding Stock/ TIME STEP , 0)
Units: Dollars/Month
Reset annual public funding to zero at the beginning of next year in order to restart the accumulation of
annual revenue for next year.
Reset Interval=0.5
Units: Month
Length of reset time step for plotting
Reset Switch=IF THEN ELSE ( Cumulative Ticks >= Reset Interval, 1, 0)
Units: Dimensionless
To keep reset log of of time step for plotting
Reset ticks=IF THEN ELSE ( Reset Switch = 1, Cumulative Ticks / TIME STEP , 0)
Units: Dimensionless
To keep track of time step for plotting
Revenue=Price*Purchase Rate*Quantity Per Purchase+Maintenance Billing
Units: Dollars/Month
The amount of money the firm makes from sales
Salary Expense Net Technology Development Salary Expense=Total Salary Expense-Technology Development
Salary Expense
Units: Dollars/Month
The amount of salary paid for effort other than technology development effort
Sales Attrition Rate=Sales Force*Sales Fractional Attrition Rate
Units: Persons/Month
Rate at which sales people leave (quit)
Sales Average Layoff Time=2
Units: Months
The average time required to lay off a sales person
Sales Effort=SalesMktg Effort-Marketing Effort
Units: (Person*Hours)/Month
Effort devoted to direct sales
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Sales Experience= INTEG (Increase In Sales Experience+Sales Experience From Hiring-Loss Of Sales
Experience, Initial Sales Force * Initial Avg Sales Experience)
Units: Persons*Hours
Cumulative sales experience of organization
Sales Experience From Hiring=Sales Hiring Rate*Avg Experience Of New Sales Hires
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
Experience gain from hiring
Sales Experience Productivity Multiplier=MIN((Avg Sales Experience/Sales experience reference)^(LN( +
Sales Productivity Change Per Double Experience)/LN(2)), Max Sales Productivity Multiplier)
Units: Dmnl
Learning curve for productivity from experience (from Sterman pg 507, from Zangwill and Kantor
(1998))
Sales experience reference=2000
Units: Hours
Amount of sales experience which will produce normal productivity
Sales Force= INTEG (+Sales Hiring Rate-Sales Attrition Rate-Sales Layoffs,Initial Sales Force)
Units: Persons
Number of sales and marketing employees
Sales Force Adjustment Time=6
Units: Months [0,90,1]
The time period over which the firm seeks to bring the sales force in line with the desired level.
Sales Fractional Attrition Rate=0.02
Units: 1/Month
Percent of sales people that leave per month
Sales Hiring Rate=(Sales Vacancies/Avg Time to Fill Sales Vacancies) * (1 - Bankrupt Switch)
Units: Persons/Month
Hire sales people based on how many vacancies have been created and the avg time to fill them
Sales Layoffs=MAX(Bankrupt Switch * ((Sales Force/TIME STEP) - Sales Attrition Rate),MIN(Desired Sales
Lay Off Rate, Sales Maximum Layoff Rate))
Units: Persons/Month
Sales people being layed off per month
Sales Maximum Layoff Rate=Sales Force/Sales Average Layoff Time
Units: People/Month
Maximum layoff rate is determined by the number of sales people and the layoff time.
Sales Productivity Change Per Double Experience=0.4
Units: Dmnl
Fractional change in productivity of sales people per doubling of their effective experience
Sales Proportion=ZIDZ(Sales Force,Total Labor)
Units: Dimensionless
Proportion of workforce made up of sales people
Sales Vacancies= INTEG (Sales Vacancy Creation Rate - Sales Vacancy Closure Rate - Sales Vacancy
Cancellation Rate ,Desired Sales Vacancies)
Units: People
The number of open sales positions the firm seeks to fill.
Sales Vacancy Adjustment Time= 1
Units: Months
The average time over which to adjust the actual number of sales vacancies to the desired level.
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Sales Vacancy Cancellation Rate=MIN(Desired Sales Vacancy Cancellation Rate, Max Sales Vacancy
Cancellation Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
The rate at which to cancel existing sales vacancies prior to filling them.
Sales Vacancy Cancellation Time=l
Units: Months
The average time required to cancel a sales vacancy.
Sales Vacancy Closure Rate=Sales Hiring Rate
Units: Persons/Month
Vacancies are closed when the employee is hired
Sales Vacancy Creation Rate=MAX(0,Desired Sales Vacancy Creation Rate)
Units: Persons/Month
The rate at which to create new sales positions and begins to recruit for them.
Sales Work Month= 175
Units: Hours/Month
How many hours worked per month by sales people
SalesMktg Effort=IF THEN ELSE (Cash for Firm Operations<=0,0,Sales Force*Sales Work Month*Sales
Experience Productivity Multiplier)
Units: Person*Hours/Month
Total effort for sales and marketing
SAVEPER=TIME STEP
Units: Month [0,?]
The frequency with which output is stored.
Subsidy Policy=IF THEN ELSE((Cost Per Unit/Competitor Price)<l,0,Subsidy Policy Switch)
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
Whether's there's a subidy policy or not that will effect our costs
Subsidy Policy Effect on Price=-0.2
Units: Dimensionless [-1,0,0.01]
What fraction our price will change based on subsidy policy (-0.1 = 10% decrease, I = double, -1
means it goes to 0)
Subsidy Policy Ramp Time= 10
Units: Months
Time it takes for subidty policy to take full effect
Subsidy Policy Start Time=0
Units: Months
Time at which subsidy policy starts having an effect
Subsidy Policy Switch=O
Units: Dimensionless
A policy decision whether to offer a subsidy
Switch for Product Development=IF THEN ELSE (Technology Development[selfl<Minimum Technology
Development[self],0,1)
Units: Dimensionless
Product development may begin when technology development is advanced enough (at the minimum
technology development threshold)
Switch for Relaxing Public Funding Restrictions=0
Units: Dimensionless [0, 1,1]
If on then cash flows down
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Switch for Technology Development=1
Units: Dimensionless [0,1,1]
To simplify the firm not to include technology development, technology development can be turned off
Target Norm Price=0.75
Units: Dmnl [0, 1,4e-006]
How much venture would like price to be compared to competitor's price
Target Price=Target Norm Price*Competitor Price
Units: Dollars/Unit
Price the venture desires to sell the product for, based on price of competition
Technology Abandonment Fraction[company]=O.099
Units: Dimensionless
Fraction of technology under development that are abandoned
Technology Abandonment Fraction 1 [company]=Technology Abandonment Fraction[company]/3
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of technology under development that are abandoned at I st stage of technology development
Technology Abandonment Fraction 2[company]=Technology Abandonment Fraction[company]/3
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of technologies under development that are abandoned at 2nd stage of technology
development
Technology Abandonment Fraction 3[company]=Technology Abandonment Fraction[company]/3
Units: Dmnl
Fraction of technology under development that are abandoned at 3rd stage of technology development
Technology Abandonment Rate[company]=0
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which technology development ideas are abandoned
Technology Abandonment Rate 1 [company]=Technology Devl Rate 1 [company]*Technology Abandonment
Fraction 1 [company]
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which technology ideas are abandoned in 1st stage of technology development
Technology Abandonment Rate 2[company]=Technology Devl Rate 2[company]*Technology Abandonment
Fraction 2[company]
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which technology ideas are abandoned in 2nd stage of technology development
Technology Abandonment Rate 3[company]=Technology Devl Rate 3[company]*Technology Abandonment
Fraction 3[company]
Units: Features/Month
Rate at which technology ideas are abandoned in 3rd stage of technology development
Technology and Product Development Effort Allocation[self]=Switch for Technology Development*IF
THEN ELSE(Technology Development[self]<Minimum Technology Development[self], 1 ,Technology
and Product Effort Allocation after Minimum Technology Development[self])+(1 -Switch for
Technology
Development)*0
Units: Dimensionless
The actual fraction of engineering effort that is directed to technology development
Technology and Product Effort Allocation after Minimum Technology Development[self]=0.5
Units: Dimensionless [0,1]
The fraction of engineering effort that is directed to technology development before the minimum
technology development is achieved
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Technology Completion Rate[company]=Technology Completion Rate 3[company]
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which technoloies are developed is determined by how many innovations were started and
providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg technology devl time
Technology Completion Rate 1 [company]=Technology Devl Rate 1 [company]*(1-Technology Abandonment
Fraction 1 [company])
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which technology is developed into the technology determined by how many technology
were started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg technology devl time
Technology Completion Rate 2[company]=Technology Devl Rate 2[company]*(1-Technology Abandonment
Fraction 2[company])
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which technology is developed into the technology determined by how many innovations
were started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg technology devl time
Technology Completion Rate 3[company]=Technology Devl Rate 3 [company]*(1-Technology Abandonment
Fraction 3[company])
Units: Features/Month
The rate at which technology is developed into the technology determined by how many innovations
were started and providing a 3rd order delay to complete them in the avg technology devl time
Technology Development[company] = INTEG (Technology Completion Rate[company]-Technology
Obsolescense Rate[company],Initial Technology Development[company])
Units: Features
The capabilities and development of the technology
Technology Development Effort[self]=Engineering Effot Net of Customer Support*Technology and Product
Development Effort Allocation[self]Technology Development Effort[competitor]=8750
Units: Persons*Hours/Month
The amount of engineering effort directed towards technology development
Technology Development Salary Expense=(l-Switch for Relaxing Public Funding Restrictions)*Avg
Salary/EngWork Month*Technology Development Effort[self]
Units: Dollars/Month
Salary paid to engineers carrying out technology development
Technology Development Switch for Cost Share=IF THEN ELSE(Public Cost Share Fraction>0,1,0)
Units: Dimensionless
Switch to initiate and terminate cost share investment
Technology Devl Rate 1 [company]=MIN(Technology Under Development I [company]/Avg Technology
Devl Time[company], Feasible Technology Devl Rate[company]) * 3
Units: Features/Month
Develop 1/3 of technology in minimum of 1/3 the avg technology development time or 1/3 the amount
of time it takes given the resources we have to develop technology
Technology Devl Rate 2[company]=MIN(Technology Under Development 2[company]/Avg Technology
Devl Time[company], Feasible Technology Devl Rate[company]) * 3
Units: Features/Month
Develop 1/3 of technology in minimum of 1/3 the avg technology development time or 1/3 the amount
of time it takes given the resources we have to develop technology
Technology Devl Rate 3[company]=MIN(Technology Under Development 3[company]/Avg Technology
DevI Time[company], Feasible Technology Devl Rate[company]) * 3
Units: Features/Month
Develop 1/3 of technology in minimum of 1/3 the avg technology development time or 1/3 the amount
of time it takes given the resources we have to develop technology
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Technology Features Under Development[company]= INTEG (+Technology Start Rate[company]-
Technology Abandonment Rate[company]-Technology Completion Rate[company],O)
Units: Features
Technologies that are being worked on by the engineering staff
Technology Obsolescense Rate[company]=Technology Development[company]/Avg Technology
Lifetime[company]
Units: Features/Month
Technologies that go out of date per month
Technology Shortfall[company]=Theoretical Maximum Technology Development[company]-Technology
Development [company]
Units: Features
How much technology development we're missing compared to what we desire.
Technology Start Rate[company]=MIN(Feasible Technology Devl Rate[company], Desired Technology
Development Rate
[company])
Units: Features/Month
Start technology at the rate at which we can develop them
Technology Under Development I [company]= INTEG (+Technology Start Rate[company]-Technology
Abandonment Rate 1 [company]-Technology Completion Rate 1 [company],0)
Units: Features
1st stage of technology development
Technology Under Development 2[company]= INTEG (+Technology Completion Rate 1 [company]-
Technology Abandonment Rate 2[company]-Technology Completion Rate 2[company],0)
Units: Features
2nd stage of technology development
Technology Under Development 3[company]= INTEG (+Technology Completion Rate 2[company]-
Technology Abandonment Rate 3[company]-Technology Completion Rate 3[company],0)
Units: Features
3rd stage of technology development
Technology Under Development Adjustment Time[company]=2
Units: Months [0,10,0.1]
How long to take to adjust TFUD to desired level
Technology Value[company]=Technology Development[company]
Units: Features
Value of combined approbriable and nonapprobriable technology
Theoretical Maximum Technology Development[company]=200,50
Units: Features [0,4000]
The physical limit to technology development
Tick = 1
Units: Dimensionless
To keep track of timesteps for plotting
Ticks=Tick
Units: Dimensionless
To keep track of timesteps for plotting
TIME STEP = 0.125
Units: Month [0,?]
The time step for the simulation.
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Time to Apply Effort=l
Units: Month
Time period over which to apply desired sales hours of effort
Time to Max Prob of Failure= 1
Units: Month
When Hazard rate of failure is very high, how long for cum prob of failure to reach 100%
Total Cash Flow from Public Funding=Cost Share Amount*Public Cost Share Fraction+Market Stimulation
Payouts+Public RD Investment
Units: Dollars/Month
Public funding as inflow to annual revenue accumulator.
Total Labor=Engineers+Sales Force
Units: People
The number of employees working for the firm
Total Layoffs= INTEG (Engineer Lay Offs+Sales Layoffs, 0)
Units: Persons
How many people have been layed off in total
Total Obligation Spent on Firm=Additonal Increment of Adopters*Quantity Per Purchase*Price
Units: Dollars/Month
Amount of public funding through direct market stimulation policy that benefits the firm
Total Population= INTEG (-Increase In Potential Prospects, Initial Total Population)
Units: Prospects
Total population of firms that can conceivably become a prospect
Total Private Investment=- INTEG (Private Investments, Initial Public Investment)
Units: Dollars
Total amount invested in venture
Total Private Investments= INTEG (Private Funding, 0)
Units: $
The amount of money VC invests in the firm
Total Prospects=Hot Prospects+Potential Prospects+Prospects+Purchasers
Units: Prospects
All current prospects
Total Public Development Funding= INTEG (Public Development Investments, 0)
Units: Dollars
Cumulative public funding for technology development
Total Public Funding- INTEG (Public Investments, Initial Public Investment)
Units: Dollars
Total amount invested in venture by the public sector
Total Salary Expense=Avg Salary*Total Labor
Units: Dollars/Month
Total Loaded Salary for entire company
Total Subsidy spent on Firm=Nominal Subsidy*Purchase Rate*Quantity Per Purchase
Units: Dollars/Month
Total amount of subsidy paid that benefits a single firm
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Unit Cost Threshold as a Fraction of Incumbent Unit Cost=1/Functionality Threshold as a Multiple of
IncumbentFunctionality
Units: Dimensionless
The factor of superiority the technology cost must be over competitors
Weighted total prospects=Prospects*Prospect Emphasis Multiplier+Hot Prospects*Hot Prospect Emphasis
Multiplier+Purchasers*Purchasers Emphasis Multiplier
Units: Prospects
Number of prospects weighted by relative importance of prospects vs. hot prospects vs. purchasers for
the purpose of applying sales effort
Word of Mouth Reference=0. 1
Units: Prospects/Month
Reference value for word of mouth (at which it maximizes sales effectivness)
Working Capital=Cash Restricted for Technology Development+Cash for Firm Operations
Units: Dollars
Total amount of the firm's cash
146
Implementation of Policy Cases
In order to duplicate the results of each case discussed in this thesis within the model the
following parameters should be changed from the default values.
Base Case
Maximum Public RD Funding: 16.55 million
Annual discount rate: 0.01, 0.02, 0.03
Policy Case 1
Maximum Public RD Funding: 12.75 million
Subsidy Policy Switch: 1
Subsidy Policy Effect on Price: -0.2
Annual discount rate: 0.01, 0.02, 0.03
Policy Case 2
Maximum Public RD Funding: 9.5 million
Subsidy Policy Switch: 1
Subsidy Policy Effect on Price: -0.2
Cost Share Switch: 1
Maximum Cost Share Investment: 250 million
Annual discount rate: 0.01, 0.02, 0.03
Carbon 10%
Carbon Policy Switch: 1
Carbon Policy Effect on Comp
Maximum Public RD Funding:
Cost: 0.1
13.6 million
Carbon 30%
Carbon Policy Switch: 1
Carbon Policy Effect on Comp Cost: 0.3
Maximum Public RD Funding: 10.9 million
Carbon 50%
Carbon Policy Switch: 1
Carbon Policy Effect on Comp Cost: 0.5
Maximum Public RD Funding: 9.35 million
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